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A heated national debate has developed over whether one type of high-cost
predatory lender, commonly known as "'payday lenders, " target financially
vulnerable military families and whether the law protects them from such
predation. Writing within the relatively new interdisciplinary "law and
geography" movement, this Article provides geographic evidence that payday
lenders do aggressively target American military personnel, irrespective of
most forms of legal regulation.
This Article first provides a comprehensive introduction to payday lending
business practices and to the financial vulnerability of military personnel.
Next, this Article presents empirical research gatheredfrom an examination of
20 states, 1516 counties, 13,253 ZIP codes, nearly 15,000payday lenders, and
109 military bases. High concentrations of payday lending businesses in
counties, ZIP codes, and neighborhoods in close proximity to military bases
were found Observations were controlled by comparing the density ofpayday
lender locations to bank locations.
Each of the 20 states studied had a different legal and regulatory strategy for
addressing payday lending. However, the only regulatory strategy which
prevented payday lenders from targeting military personnel was the aggressive
and consistent enforcement of civil and criminal usury law. Going beyond the
debate over predatory lending to military personnel, this research provides a
realist check on pure legal reasoning and unfoundedfaith in current consumer
protection rules.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Support the troops" has become a national rallying cry. Because we live in a
complex and dangerous world, we as a society rely on the military to protect us.
President George W. Bush recently stated that "Americans live in freedom
because of our veterans' courage, dedication to duty, and love of country."' This
sentiment speaks to the fundamental debt of honor and respect we owe the
women and men who make great sacrifices, sometimes the ultimate sacrifice, to
protect us.2 In satisfying this debt, the United States expends vast resources in
caring for current and former military personnel and their families. 3 The
1 President George W. Bush, Proclamation on Veterans Day (Nov. 9, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041109-5.html).
2 See BERNARD J. VERKAMP, THE MORAL TREATMENT OF RETURNING WARRIORS IN
EARLY MEDIEVAL AND MODERN TIMES 103-08 (1993) (discussing differing social
approaches to reassimilating returning veterans with complex emotional and moral
problems).
3 One commentator has emphasized the relative cost of family support programs:
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Department of Defense maintains a comprehensive system of social services
aiming to meet every need of every member of every armed service family.4
Nevertheless, profound questions remain about the extent and nature of our
support of military personnel. In recent years, scholars have asked compelling
questions about the quality of life and overall well-being of military families. 5
Indeed, $25 billion of Defense Department spending on family support is actually
$3 billion more than the Navy will spend this year developing and buying new ships,
submarines, and aircraft. It exceeds what the Army, Navy, and Air Force each spend on
their worldwide operations in a year. It equals nearly half of the Army's total budget.
John Luddy, Meet the US. Government's Biggest Family Welfare Program, AM.
ENTERPRISE, May/June 1996, at 63.
4 These programs include: a system of worship services, locations, and chaplains,
government housing, housing subsidies, cost of living salary adjustments, and relocation
assistance programs, day care, youth activities, child development programs, and single-
parent support programs; mental health, substance abuse, suicide prevention, marital, family,
legal, and financial counseling; recreation, fitness, and entertainment opportunities,
commissaries and subsistence allowances, and a comprehensive medical and dental system
for military personnel, their families, and veterans. RICHARD BUDDIN, BUILDING A PERSONNEL
SUPPORT AGENDA: GOALS, ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK, AND DATA REQUIREMENTS 1-2 (Rand
Publication Series MR-916-OSD, 1998); M. AUDREY BURNAM ET AL., ARMY FAMILIES AND
SOLDIER READINESS 7 (Rand Publication Series R-3884-A, 1992); Sondra Albano, Military
Recognition of Family Concerns: Revolutionary War to 1993, 20 ARMED FORCES & SOC'Y
283,297 (1994).
5 See, e.g., MARGARET C. HARRELL, INVISIBLE WOMEN: JUNIOR ENLISTED ARMY WIVES
110-11 (2000) (describing financial deprivation, isolation, and invisibility of spouses of
junior enlisted personnel); CATHERINE LUTZ, HOMEFRONT: A MILITARY CITY AND THE
AMERICAN TWENTIETH CENTURY 7-9 (2001) (describing the complex and troubling
relationship between military installations and military towns); PETER A. MORRISON ET AL.,
FAMILIES IN THE ARMY: LOOKING AHEAD 49-51 (Rand Publication Series R-369 1-A, 1989)
(discussing stresses placed on military families); Gary L. Bowen et al., Family Adaptation of
Single Parents in the United States Army: An Empirical Analysis of Work Stressors and
Adaptive Resources, 42 FAM. REL. 293, 302-03 (1993) (emphasizing need for greater social
support resources for single parent Army families); BURNAM, supra note 4, at 75 (finding
that "[t]he proportion of soldiers screening positive for depression.., is three to four times
higher than that among civilians with similar gender and age characteristics"); James A.
Martin & Dennis K. Orthner, The "Company Town" in Transition: Rebuilding Military
Communities, in THE ORGANIZATION FAMILY: WORK AND FAMILY LINKAGES IN THE U.S.
MILITARY 163, 172-74 (Gary L. Bowen & Dennis K. Orthner eds., 1989) (discussing morale
problems stemming from isolated, tightly controlled, "company town" military installations);
Dennis K. Orthner et al., Growing Up in an Organization Family, in THE ORGANIZATION
FAMILY: WORK AND FAMILY LINKAGES IN THE U.S. MILITARY, supra, at 137 (discussing
inadequacy of military programs treating stress placed on children and adolescents of
military families); Mario R. Schwabe & Florence W. Kaslow, Violence in the Military
Family, in THE MILITARY FAMILY: DYNAMICS AND TREATMENT 125, 129-30 (Florence W.
Kaslow & Richard I. Ridenour eds., 1984) (discussing social, economic, and demographic
risk factors for military family violence); Theodore G. Williams, Substance Misuse and
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Recent events, such as soldier discontent over unarmored vehicles in Iraq, have
heightened these concerns.6 Similarly, many have pointed to unfairness over the
military's use of stop-loss orders to impose extended tours of duty.7 Closer to
home, recent studies have increasingly found many members of the armed forces
suffer a long-term earnings penalty later in life. 8 Several commentators have
suggested that military personnel may be targeted for a variety of consumer
scams, such as over-priced insurance and sham investments.9
Similarly, a heated national debate has developed over whether abusive high-
cost lenders are targeting financially vulnerable military families.' 0 Consumer
advocates and the media have accused one group of lenders, commonly known
Alcoholism in the Military Family, in THE MILITARY FAMILY: DYNAMICS AND TREATMENT,
supra, at 73, 77 (noting evidence of high incidence of alcoholic fathers amongst military
family dependents).
6 See Julian E. Barnes, A Well-Aimed Question, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 20,
2004, at 16; Charisse Jones, Soldier Says He'd 'Feel Safer in a Volvo': Military Families
Criticize Use of Unarmored Vehicles, USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 2004, at 2A.
7 See Mark Fisher, Hobson: Treat Military Fairly: Regular Troops Can Leave, but Not
Guard, Reserve, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 4, 2004, at B1; Jones, supra note 6.
8 Alan B. Krueger, Warning: Military Service Can Be a Drain on Later Earning Power
in Civilian Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,2004, at C2. This stands in stark contrast to the World
War II era when military service provided disadvantaged young men "an unprecedented
opportunity to better their lives through on-the-job training and further education." Robert J.
Sampson & John H. Laub, Socioeconomic Achievement in the Life Course ofDisadvantaged
Men: Military Service as a Turning Point, Circa 1940-1965, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 347, 364
(1996). In contrast to the massive social intervention of the GI bill, today "policy has
regressed to the point at which, for some segments of society, imprisonment is the major
governmental intervention in the transition to young adulthood." Id. at 365; see also Robert
L. Phillips et al., The Economic Returns to Military Service: Race-Ethnic Differences, 73
Soc. Sci. Q. 340, 340 (1992) (showing no significant post-service earnings benefit from
military service for blacks and Hispanics).
9 Paul K. Davis, Fighting Consumer Frauds Which Target Military Personnel,
DIALOGUE, Winter 2001, at 7.
Scam artists ... have developed a talent for effectively targeting distinct groups of
consumers for their sales pitches. Unfortunately, military consumers are considered
particularly vulnerable by many of these companies .... As a result, military consumers
are not only subjected to the same deceptive acts and practices as consumer in general;
they are also specifically targeted by unscrupulous companies.
Id. Diana B. Henriques, Deepening Debate on Soldiers and Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2004, at C I (discussing overpriced insurance sold to military personnel); Tom Philpott,
Military Update: First Command Investors Eligible for Restitution, STARS & STRIPES, Jan.
22, 2005 (discussing Securities and Exchange Commission settlement of fraud and securities
law violations).
10 CBSNews.com, New Enemy for US. Troops: Debt, Dec. 17, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/17/national/printable589033.shtml.
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as payday lenders, of causing particular trouble for enlisted military personnel. 11
For instance, a front page New York Times article discussed a growing chorus of
complaints that payday lenders charge exorbitant and unfair prices to
unsuspecting and desperate military borrowers. 12 These critics have pointed to
anecdotal evidence suggesting that payday lenders have identified the armed
forces as a profitable market to exploit, leading to hardship on military families.13
Some military officers have agreed, going so far as to complain that payday
lenders are eroding military readiness by undermining troop morale.14 These
officers believe that payday lenders sabotage all of the expensive programs and
services designed to preserve the quality of life for members of the armed
forces. 15 For their part, payday lenders say they are helping their debtors out of
short-term cash problems at an affordable price. 16 Payday lenders emphasize that
I I Editorial, Loan Businesses Prey on Troops, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Dec. 12,
2004, at 2P ("Not far outside the gates of many military bases lurks a predator lying in wait
for unwitting troops to make a mistake. These are not terrorists but storefront businesses that
offer financially naive troops quick loans at unconscionably high interest rates."); MARK
MUECKE & ROB SCHNEIDER, CONSUMERS UNION, PAYDAY LENDERS BURDEN WORKING
FAMmIES AND THE U.S. ARMED FORCES 4 (July 2003) (quoting former Joint Chiefs of Staff
member Admiral J. L. Jonson) ("'There can be no question that military families are among
the "targeted group." A preponderance of payday lenders and cash advance offices are
located in the immediate vicinity of our military bases."').
12 Diana B. Henriques, Seeking Quick Loans, Soldiers Race Into High-Interest Traps,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,2004, at Al ("Hardships... are becoming more common in the military
as high-cost easy money lenders increasingly make service members a target market. As a
result, many military people have become trapped in a spiral of borrowing at sky-high rates
that can ruin their finances, distract them from their duties and even destroy their careers.").
The New York Times article also features preliminary results of the study presented in this
Article, including a graphic reproducing of the author's map of Ft. Lewis and McChord Air
Force Base in Washington. Id. See also Loan Businesses Prey on Troops, supra note 11
(editorial condemning payday lending to military personnel highlighting preliminary results
of research presented in this Article).
13 Senator: Borrowers Trapped by 'Payday' Loans, High Interest, JEFFERSON CITY
NEWS TRm. (Jefferson City, Mo.), Dec. 28, 1999,
http://newstribune.com/articles/l999/12/28/export151440.txt [hereinafter Borrowers
Trapped] ("Navy Capt. Robert W. 'Andy' Andersen calls it a 'financial death spiral' in
which strapped sailors get short-term, high-interest 'payday loans' and fall into a cycle of
borrowing and debt.").
14 See Tom Shean, Payday-Loan Bill Draws Criticism from Military: Effort to Regulate
High-Interest Loans Would Backfire, They Say, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Feb. 16,
2002, at D1.
15 Payday Loans: The High Cost of Borrowing Against Your Paycheck, ARMY LAW.,
Feb. 2001, at 23 [hereinafter The High Cost of Borrowing]; Debbie Rhyne, AidFund Offers
Help to Military Personnel, Families, MACON TELEGRAPH, Dec. 29, 2001, at B 1.
16 See Doug Bandow, Those Misguided Payday-Loan Critics, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Mar. 25, 2004. at B11.
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their customers borrow voluntarily and they accuse their critics of paternalism. 17
Still, fearing a public relations nightmare, payday lenders and their trade
associations have vociferously denied targeting military personnel.' 8
This Article attempts to ascertain whether payday lenders do in fact target
members of the armed services. Employing analytical tools of the emerging
interdisciplinary law and geography movement, this study compares the payday
lender storefront locations in military towns across differing state legal regimes.
Moreover, this Article describes and evaluates the different legal strategies that
the federal and state governments have used to curtail perceived social problems
associated with payday lending. In particular, we examine whether differing state
legal approaches may have affected the extent to which payday lenders target
military personnel. Our study systematically surveys 20 states, 1516 counties,
13,253 ZIP codes, nearly 15,000 payday lenders, and 109 military bases. We
conclude that (1) there is irrefutable geographic evidence demonstrating that
payday lenders are actively and aggressively targeting U.S. military personnel,
and (2) all state legal strategies except for aggressive criminal prosecution of
usury laws have been ineffective in deterring this commercial behavior. Our
interdisciplinary use of law and geography should serve as a realist check on pure
legal reasoning and unfounded faith in the efficacy of our existing legal
strategies.
Part II of our Article describes the payday lending industry, frames the
background of financial vulnerability facing past, current, and future military
personnel, and introduces the emerging debate over payday lending to military
personnel. Part III introduces leading law and geography theory and summarizes
our empirical methodology. Part IV juxtaposes our empirical description of
payday lender location strategies near U.S. military bases with descriptions of the
payday lending legal environment in force at each location. Part V analyzes the
results of this study, ultimately drawing descriptive and prescriptive conclusions
for policy makers, including state and federal law makers, as well as military
leaders.
17 Chris Johnson, Vice President Urgent Money Service, Letter to the Editor,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., Jan. 7, 2002, at A6 ("I'm sure it's easy for you to sit in your
office and tell your readers how 'bad' payday lenders are. We offer a service, plain and
simple .... Our customers like our service. If they didn't, they wouldn't use us, plain and
simple.").
18 Paul Fain, The Few, the Proud, the Indebted. Payday Loan Shops Are Drawing Fire
from the Military's Top Brass, MOTHER JONES, May-June 2004, at 19.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Payday Lending
1. What Are Payday Loans?
Payday loans are high interest rate, rapidly compounding loans meant to tide
over cash-short borrowers until their next paycheck.19 In a typical transaction, a
customer might borrow $200 by writing a check drawn on her personal checking
account and made out to the lender for $235.20 Typically, the borrower "post-
dates" the check by writing a date one or two weeks in the future. 21 This date is
the day that the parties agree the borrower will repay the loan and interest. Before
making the loan, payday lenders generally verify the debtor's identity by asking
for documents or identification such as a driver's license, recent pay stubs, bank
statements, car registration, or telephone bills.22 Many lenders telephone the
borrower's human resource manager or boss to verify the borrower's
employment.23 Virtually all lenders require the names, addresses, and telephone
numbers of close family and friends in the event that the borrower skips town.24
Payday lenders usually decide whether to issue a loan on the spot without
obtaining a credit report.25 Both parties are aware that the borrower's checking
account does not have sufficient funds to cover the check when the check is
signed.26 The assumption is that the borrower will have deposited sufficient
funds in her checking account to cover the check before the due date of the loan.
After the paperwork is complete, the debtor walks away with $200 in cash or a
check drawn on the lender's account. When the two weeks are up, the debtor can
19 Payday loans go by many other names, including deferred deposit transactions,
deferred presentment check cashing, post-dated check loans, and check loans. Jean Ann Fox,
What Does It Take to Be a Loanshark in 1998? A Report on the Payday Loan Industry, 772
PRAC. L. INST./COM. 987,989 (1998).
20 Some lenders are now replacing the use of checks with a borrower's agreement to
allow the lender to simply debit the borrower's bank account on the due date of the loan.
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 149 (2004).
21 See Scott Andrew Schaaf, Note, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday
Lending Industry, N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 341-42 (2001).
2 2 Fox, supra note 19, at 989.
23 Christopher L. Peterson, Only Until Payday: A Primer on Utah's Growing Deferred
Deposit Loan Industry, UTAH B.J., Mar. 2002, at 16.
24 Id.
25 Fox, supra note 19, at 990.
2 6 See id.; Deborah A. Schmedemann, Time and Money: One State's Regulation of
Check-Based Loans, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 973, 974-76 (2000).
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redeem the check with cash or a money order, permit the check to be deposited,
or attempt to renew the loan by paying another fee. 27 If the borrower cannot pay
off the loan, the obligation continues to accrue $35 in interest every two weeks.
Although the initial $35 fee represents only 17.5% of the loan amount, the annual
percentage rate of the transaction is around 455%.
A 455% interest rate is by no means uncommon. 28 Studies by state
governments, scholars, and consumer advocates generally indicate that average
payday loan rates range from 364% to 550%. A consumer advocate coalition
study surveying lenders in nineteen states and the District of Columbia found an
average interest rate of 474%.29 Other regional data tend to roughly confirm this
figure. For instance, the Indiana Department of Financial Institutions survey
found that the average Indiana payday loan interest rate was 498.75%.30 North
Carolina consumers purchase about 63% of their payday loans at annual interest
rates between 460.08% and 805.15%. 31 A recent report on Oklahoma payday
lenders may suggest a slightly lower average APR of around 364.47% in that
state.32 A report on payday lenders in Salt Lake City showed an average rate of
528.49%. 33 Still, some lenders charge rates far in excess of these averages. For
example, Indiana regulators found one lender offering payday loans at an interest
rate of 7600%. 34 Moreover, these interest rates do not include common
contingent charges, including late fees and bounced check fees, which can cost
nearly as much, or even more, interest as the loan itself.
Payday lenders argue that quoting an annual percentage rate for a two-week
27 Fox, supra note 19, at 990.
2 8 CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE HIGH
COST CREDIT MARKET 10-11 (2004).
2 9 JEAN ANN Fox & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, SHOW ME THE MONEY 8 (2000).
30 IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., SUMMARY OF PAYDAY LENDER EXAMINATION (July-Sept.
1999), http://www.in.gov/dfi/legal/paydaylend/Payday.pdf [hereinafter IND. DEP'T OF FIN.
INSTS.].
31 OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON PAYDAY
LENDING, Feb. 22, 2001, at 3 (N.C. Feb. 22, 2001).
32 A survey of payday loans registered in a database required under Oklahoma law
suggested an average payday loan principal of $307.59 with an average fee of $43.
OKLAHOMA TRENDS IN DEFERRED DEPOSIT LENDING: OKLAHOMA DEFERRED DEPOSIT
PROGRAM 4 (Dec. 2004), http://www.veritecs.com/OK_trends12-2004.pdf [hereinafter
OKLAHOMA TRENDS]. Assuming a fourteen-day repayment period, these figures suggest an
APR of 364%.
33 Christopher L. Peterson, Note, Failed Markets, Failing Government, or Both?
Learning from the Unintended Consequences of Utah Consumer Credit Law on Vulnerable
Debtors, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 543, 563.
34 IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 30, at 1.
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loan is misleading and unhelpful.35 Instead, payday lenders prefer to quote loan
prices as a percent of the principal borrowed.36 For instance, if the consumer
borrows $300 for two weeks in exchange for a fee of $52.50, lenders will often
describe this as a "17.5%" loan. Lenders suggest payday loans compare favorably
to bounced check fees, which average around $21.37 Critics of payday lending
retort that a bounced check fee is a one-time charge that does not continue to
compound again and again.38 For loans, annualized interest rates are the uniform
metric which all mainstream creditors use to compare prices. Home mortgages,
student loans, and automobile loans are all disclosed and regulated with an
annual percentage rate terminology. Even other short-term lenders, such as credit
card issuers, use annual percentage rates. Consumers wishing to compare the
price of available credit options tend to be confused and surprised by different
price quoting conventions for different types of credit. To those with limited
financial literacy, or even to casual observers, a cash advance or purchase on a
17.5% APR credit card may be indistinguishable from a payday loan with
17.5%-of-principal fee. Most payday loan borrowers will be surprised to know
that the interest rate of the latter loan is about 26 times more expensive than that
of the former. Not surprisingly, one industry-sponsored telephone survey found
that 72% of payday loan borrowers said they did not know the annual percentage
rate of their most recent loan.39 More than half of the small minority who claimed
to know their annual percentage rate incorrectly believed that their rate was far
lower than it actually was.40
Annual percentage rate terminology is also appropriate for payday loans
because these loans often compound for durations coming close to or exceeding a
year. For any given loan, many payday loan borrowers simply lack the funds to
pay on the due date and are accordingly forced to roll over the loan.41
35 See Stay Awayfrom Payday Lenders: There are Few, IfAny, Sensible Reasons to Use
a Payday Lender, WIs. STATE J., Nov. 10, 2002, at B3.
36 Professor Johnson's study of Ohio payday lending found that lenders systematically
obscure their annual percentage rates by leaving them out of advertisements and refusing to
provide Truth in Lending disclosures until after loan consummation. See Creola Johnson,
Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 38-41, 44
(2002).
3 7 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
RETAIL FEES AND SERVICES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 5 (June 2002).
38 See John Hackett, Ethically Tainted, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 2001, at 48, 50.
3 9 JOHN P. CASKEY, THE ECONOMICS OF PAYDAY LENDING 3 (2002) (citing GREGORY
ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN
ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 54-55 (2001)).
40 Id.
41 Barr, supra note 20, at 156. Some lenders and borrowers use "same day advances"
where "[t]he borrower pays the loan in full, but that same day takes out another payday loan
in an amount equivalent to the balance paid earlier." Id.
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Compelling evidence suggests that a substantial portion of the payday loan
market is made up of extensions of previous loans, sometimes for protracted
durations. North Carolina regulators found that about 87% of borrowers would
roll over any given loan at least one time with any given lender.42 Not counting
debtors who borrowed from multiple locations, nearly 40% of North Carolina
borrowers renewed their payday loans more than ten times.43 The Indiana
Department of Financial Institutions study found that 77% of all payday
transactions were extensions of previous loans.44 In Oklahoma, the average
payday loan customer took out 4.3 payday loans during a four-month period from
August 2004 to November 2004-just over one per month.45 Consumer
advocates have found that the average payday loan customer borrows 10.19
payday loans per year.46 In Iowa, the Division of Banking found an average of
12.5 loans per year per customer.47 An industry-sponsored study found that 30%
of borrowers had seven or more loans in a year, and that about 75% of borrowers
rolled over their loan at least one time.48 Regulators in Illinois found payday loan
borrowers "who were borrowing continuously for over a year on their original
loan."49 An empirical study by Professor Creola Johnson found that payday
lenders repeatedly roll over payday loans even in states with statutes prohibiting
this practice. 50 Moreover, there are frequent reports of loans outstanding for one,
two, or even three years. 51 Collectively these statistics have led consumer
advocates to argue that payday loans trap borrowers into a cycle of "chain
debt."52
42 OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, supra note 31, at 6.
43 Id.
44 IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 30, at 3.
45 OKLAHOMA TRENDS, supra note 32, at 9.
4 6 Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 29, at 8.
47 Kathleen E. Keest, Stone Soup: Exploring the Boundaries Between Subprime Lending
and Predatory Lending, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 2001 at 1107, 1114
(Practicing Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series B-1241,
2001) (citing IOWA DIVISION OF BANKING, SURVEY (Dec. 2000)).
48 ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 39, at 54-55. This study likely understates the
duration of payday loans because it relies on a sample of more affluent payday borrowers,
only surveys borrowers willing to discuss their loans, and did not reach borrowers who had
their telephone service disconnected.
4 9 ILL. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., SHORT TERM LENDING: FINAL REPORT 30 (1999),
http://www.state.il.us/dfi/ccd/pdfs/Shorterm.pdf.
50 Johnson, supra note 36, at 32-33.
51 See Peterson, supra note 33, at 569 n. 167 (payday loan store cashier stating loans
accrue interest for "two or three years" in state with twelve-week limit on rollover duration);
Fox & MIERzwINSri, supra note 29, at 8 (loan renewed 66 times for two and a half years).
52 See, e.g., Barr, supra note 20, at 149; Johnson, supra note 36, at 6-7.
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Payday lenders argue that the high prices and long durations of their loans
are justified by the high administrative costs of doing business and by the high
default rates. 53 Scholars have countered that high payday loan prices actually
"mutually reinforc[e]" loan losses because the high prices induce default, which
in turn raises prices. 54 Moreover, even if payday loan loss rates justify higher
pricing, the payday lending business has still proven wildly profitable. A Federal
Deposit Insurance Agency official wrote that, despite credit and reputational
risks, "higher pricing on payday loans promises higher revenues and wider
margins for lenders." 55 One economics professor has estimated that payday
lending operations "earn ten to twenty times higher 'return on equity' than
traditional banks."56 Similarly, after the Tennessee Legislature took steps to
legalize payday lending, the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions
conducted a follow-up survey, finding that licensed payday lenders "earned over
[30%] return on investment in the first nine months of legal operation." 57 But
perhaps most interesting is that payday lender profits come disproportionately
from high-frequency borrowers. Peter Skillern's study of the North Carolina
market found that 85% of payday lender revenue in that state comes from
borrowers receiving five or more payday loans in a year.
5 8
Critics of the payday lenders have also complained of a culture of disregard
for the rule of law in the industry. For example, in 713 payday lender inspections
conducted over a three-year period, North Carolina banking officials found 8911
violations of simple state consumer-protection rules.59 Payday lenders in many
states refuse to obtain licenses required by state law. 60 Over a thousand payday
lenders in Texas openly ignore state interest rate limitations. 6 1 Creola Johnson's
53 See Marcus Franklin, Payday Loans Role Debated at Forum, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 9, 1999, at lB.
54 Barr, supra note 20, at 155 n.148; see also Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss,
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect.Information, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393 (1981).
55 Barbara A. Monheit, Consumer Financial Services Litigation: The Regulators Speak,
1361 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 459, 503 (March-May 2003) (PLI Order No. BO-OlTA).
56 Mike Hudson, Going for the Broke: How the 'Fringe Banking'Boom Cashes in on
the Poor, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at C4.
57 Fox & MIERZwINSKi, supra note 29, at 8.
5 8 PETER SKILLERN, CMTY. REINVESTMENT ASS'N OF N.C., SMALL LOANS, BIG BUCK$:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PAYDAY LENDING INDUSTRY IN NORTH CAROLINA 4 (2002),
http://www.cra-nc.org/smallloansbigbucks.pdf.
59 OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, supra note 31, at 2.
60 There are widespread reports of unlicensed payday lenders in many states, including
California, Florida, and North Carolina. See infra notes 84, 106, and 130 and accompanying
text.
61 JEAN ANN FOX, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND:
PAYDAY LENDERS HIDE BEHIND FDIC BANK CHARTERS TO PEDDLE USURY 13 (Mar. 30,
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study of Ohio payday lenders found that payday lenders in that state
systematically provided false and misleading information on loan contract terms,
illegally advertised the cost of credit without using annual percentage rate
terminology, and allowed "consumers to roll over payday loans in violation of
state law. "62 And there are widespread reports that many payday lenders use false
but intimidating threats of criminal prosecution under "bad check" laws. 63
Needless to say, criminal prosecution has not been a remedy available to
traditional creditors since debtors prisons were outlawed after the Civil War.64
2. Payday Lending in History:
Ancient Lineage and Recent Resurgence
Payday loans are only one recent incarnation of a consumer financial product
dating back to our earliest recorded civilizations. While it is true that the use of a
negotiable instrument (or an agreement to allow an electronic debit) as a form of
collateral is a relatively recent innovation amongst consumer borrowers, pledging
to pay one's earnings in the immediate future in exchange for money today is
ancient. High-cost loans with contractual terms similar to payday loans have
existed for thousands of years. Even before governments learned to coin
currency, records of ancient Mesopotamian and Mediterranean civilizations
amply document high-cost consumer loans payable in grain, animals, or metal.65
Just as today's debtors collect wages and borrow money using checks, ancient
peasants, who earned a living raising grains and animals, repaid their high-cost
debts in kind.66 While today's borrowers wonder whether they will have
sufficient funds in their accounts to cover a check post-dated two weeks in
advance, ancient debtors "dreaded 'the end of the moon"' when their high-cost
loans came due.67 And, like today's high-cost debtors, ancient borrowers signed
short-term loans intending to repay quickly, but in fact found themselves
committed to loans that "often compounded over long periods. '68 "Because
2004), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/pdlrentabankreport.pdf.
62 Johnson, supra note 36, at 32-33.
63 In only one year, payday lenders filed 13,000 criminal charges against their customers
in one Dallas precinct. 146 CONG. REc. S178 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Lieberman). See also Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 29, at 10 (discussing threats of
criminal prosecution in Ohio).
64 Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit:
The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv. 807, 846 (2003).
6 5 See SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATEs 25-31 (3d rev.
ed. 1996).
66Id.
6 7 Id. at 35.
6 8 Id. at 40.
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[high-cost] creditors lent to those in desperate need of food or shelter, the relative
bargaining position of debtors often placed them at a significant disadvantage."
69
One commentator explained the earliest credit markets thus: "Human nature
being what it is. .. [t]he rich extracted hard bargains and grew richer; the poor
fell into perpetual debt and forfeited their meager possessions." 70 It is an open
question whether this comment is less applicable today.
There is also significant historical evidence dating back thousands of years of
predatory loans harming military personnel and their families. While a
comprehensive discussion of this history is beyond the scope of our Article, a
few short examples are illustrative. First, the Roman Republic was forced to
address abusive high-cost lending to military personnel prior to its rise to a
preeminent power in the ancient Mediterranean. 71 In the fifth century B.C.E.,
Romans were only one of several ethnic groups present in Italy, and they were
still far away from assuming their later historical importance. 72 In 494 B.C.E., a
violent civil revolt took place. 73 A large number of poor plebeians withdrew from
the city and gathered on a hill overlooking the Tiber River, where they preceded
to elect their own shadow legislature, officials, and tribunes, essentially seceding
from the Roman Republic. 74 The revolt, called the First Secession, threatened to
rip apart the emerging Roman nation.75 Interestingly, "[b]y all accounts the
principal cause of the First Secession was a debt crisis." 76
Many historians, both modem and ancient, have focused on one story which
may have lit the fire.77 Apparently, a war veteran's farm was destroyed during a
battle with a rival tribe.78 The loss of his farm, combined with government tax
demands, forced the veteran to borrow money at dangerously high rates.79 When
69 Peterson, supra note 64, at 809.
70 James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 61, 63.
71 See KARL CHRIST, THE ROMANS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEIR HISTORY AND
CIVILISATION 13 (Christopher Holme trans., University of California Press, 1984); STEPHEN
L. DYSON, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY IN ROMAN ITALY 78 (1992).
72 See MICHAEL CRAWFORD, THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 31-42 (2d ed. 1993) (relating a brief
history of the Roman conquest of Italy); CHESTER G. STARR, JR., THE EMERGENCE OF ROME
AS RULER OF THE WESTERN WORLD 7-13, 16 (1953).
7 3 T.J. CORNELL, THE BEGINNINGS OF ROME: ITALY AND ROME FROM THE BRONZE AGE TO
THE PUNIC WARS (C. 1000-264 B.C.) 256-57 (1995).
7 4 Id.
75 Id. at 13.
76 CORNELL, supra note 73, at 266.
77 See, e.g., F.R. CoWELL, THE REVOLUTIONS OF ANCIENT ROME 31, 39-40 (1962).
78 Id. at 40 (quoting 1 Trrus LIvIUs, THE HISTORY OF ROME Book 2, Part 2.3 (Ernest
Rhys ed., Rev. Canon Roberts trans., J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London 1905)).
79 Id.
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he was unable to pay, his creditor imprisoned and tortured him.80 Eventually, the
veteran appeared in the city forum where those who heard his story were so
enraged they took to the streets rioting.81 The first major codification of Roman
law, called the Twelve Tables, was in part a response to the debt crisis of the
First Secession. 82 The Twelve Tables included Rome's first usury law and some
basic provisions to enforce it.83 Eventually settling on a 12% percent interest rate
cap, Rome rose to power under a legal regime which clearly outlawed today's
payday loans. 84 This 12% interest rate cap remained the legal limit for centuries
and was eventually adopted by both the later Empire and the Byzantine Empire
in Constantinople. 85
Predatory lending to military personnel has not been limited to Western
cultures. For example, historical sources link the decline of the Ming dynasty in
China to debt-related peasant riots sparked by predatory lending to soldiers.
During the Ming dynasty, China was home to a large and thriving industry of
creditors that loaned money to the working poor at high interest rates. Records
suggest that in 1587, over 20,000 pawn shops operated across China.86 Similarly,
businesses owned by wealthy families with links to imperial authority often took
high-priced mortgages on the homes and land of poor farmers. 87 When
subsistence farmers fell behind on payments, creditors relied on local
"roughnecks" to collect.88 In the late Ming dynasty, these contracts dispossessed
a substantial portion of the population and helped cement a wide gap between the
80 ld.
81 Id.
82 STARR, supra note 72, at 23.
83 HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 65, at 45-47 (establishing an 8.33% cap, which was
later amended to 12%).
84 Historians suggest that even illegal extortionate lenders in ancient Rome charged
interest rates hundreds of points lower than today's average payday loans. COWELL, supra
note 77, at 31.
There was at first no limit to the interest that might be demanded on loans, so those in
desperate want were forced to accept any terms. Moneylenders in ancient times were
notorious for their harsh, grasping greed and, left uncontrolled as they were, they
demanded thirty, fifty, a hundred percent interest and more.
Id.
85 HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 65, at 47-49.
8 6 RAY HUANG, 1587: A YEAR OF NO SIGNIFICANCE: THE MING DYNASTY IN DECLINE 144
(1981).
87 Id. at 145 ("Essentially, such exploitation was the economic basis of the bureaucracy
as an institution. Official families, who collected rents from landholdings and interest from
the moneylending business, were an integral part of the rural economy.").
88 Id. at 138.
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rich and poor.89
Some historians believe these financial conditions weakened China, inviting
invasion by hostile neighbors. The Ming dynasty ended after a series of peasant
rebellions paved the way for Manchurian invaders from the North.90 An ancient
Chinese historian attributes predatory loans to Chinese military personnel as the
trigger of these riots-bearing a remarkable similarity to Roman history.
Apparently the incident involved a predatory lender who named himself
"Ch'ien," which is the Chinese word for money.91 Surprising soldiers with
deceptively high rates, Ch'ien demanded repayment far in excess of the principal
originally borrowed. 92 This lender, and presumably others, managed to enforce
his loans by sharing the profits with officials, including a garrison commander.93
Eventually, soldiers became so outraged that they mutinied and organized local
peasants suffering from crushing poverty to join them.94 Unlike Rome, which
successfully reformed its laws, the Ming dynasty was too slow to react and
eventually faltered.
Historians have recorded similar incidents in American history as well. In the
nineteenth century, as the United States began expanding westward, military
personnel were often posted in remote frontier garrisons. 95 Similarly, during the
Civil War, Union soldiers faced long and disrupted supply lines. 96 These
conditions meant that soldiers often had insufficient food and clothing and also
received their wages at irregular intervals. 97 A particular type of merchant
followed Union Army units, setting up operations on the outskirts of each camp
or garrison. 98 Sometimes called "sutlers," these merchants came to specialize in
89 Id. at 145 ("Agrarian exploitation of the poor.., was far from limited to... isolated
incidents. It affected all walks of life and was carried out on a large and small scale without
surcease generation after generation.").
9 0 JAMES BUNYAN PARSONS, THE PEASANT REBELLIONS OF THE LATE MING DYNASTY
xiii, xv (1970); F.W. MOTE, IMPERIAL CHINA, 900-1800, at 795-96 (1999).
91 Of course today's payday lenders take similar names, such as Check into Cash, Ca$h
Now, and ACE Cash Express.
92 PARSONS, supra note 90, at 5 n.* (discussing CHI LIu-CH'I, MING CHI PEI LUEH 4/11 a-
b).
93 Id.
94 Id.
9 5 See BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD: THE ORDINARY LIFE AND EXTRAORDINARY TIMES OF
THE CIVIL WAR SOLDIER 150, 152-55 (David Madden ed., 2000) [hereinafter BEYOND THE
BATrLEFIELD].
96 1d. at 152-55.
97 Id.
9 8 ROBERT WOOSTER, SOLDIERS, SUTLERS, AND SETTLERS: GARRISON LIFE ON THE TEXAS
FRONTIER 77 (1987).
[Vol. 66:653
PREDATORY LENDING AND THE MILITARY
providing goods and services to struggling soldiers.99 Many sutlers lent cash, but
they also supplied food, clothing, boots, gloves, medication, tobacco, and alcohol
on credit. 10 0 Some sutlers refused to advance funds or provide change in
currency, instead giving cardboard tickets redeemable exclusively at the sutler's
own store. 10 1 This forced hungry and cold soldiers to trade away the liquidity of
their wages. With their wages converted into sutler's tickets, soldiers could not
force price competition with other sutlers, nor could they shop with traditional
merchants when the opportunity arose. 102 While sutlers did take risks, many got
rich by charging outrageous prices and interest rates to soldiers who made steady
wages and had few options.l0 3 Some sutlers gave "presents" to officers who then
looked the other way. 104
Recognizing its own limitations in meeting soldiers' needs, the Army
tolerated sutlers, allowing up to one sutler for each regiment. 10 5 Rank and file
soldiers, however, often despised their creditors; they "did not appreciate the
'risks' taken by men who were getting rich at their disadvantage, who did not
conform to military rules, and who were exposed to enemy fire only by accident,
and they accused the sutlers of price-gouging and profiteering."'01 6 While the
practices associated with Civil War era sutlers varied from unitto unit, their
situation repeatedly led enraged soldiers to rise up and rampage through their
own camps. 107 Many units took matters into their own hands, chasing their sutler
lenders out of camp with all-too-real death threats. 108
The immediate commercial precursor to today's payday lenders developed in
large eastern U.S. cities during this same period of time: the mid-nineteenth
century. A type of lender commonly referred to as a "salary lender" emerged by
serving a clientele typically composed of employees of large government and
industrial institutions, including "civil servants, railroad workers, streetcar
9 9 DAVID MICHAEL DELO, PEDDLERS AND POST TRADERS: THE ARMY SUTLER ON THE
FRONTIER 50-52 (1992).
10 0 BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 95, at 151.
101 See generally KENNETH KELLER, SUTLER PAPER MONEY (1994) (cataloging sutler
scrip as collectible memorabilia); DAVID E. SCHENKMAN, CIVIL WAR SUTLER TOKENS AND
CARDBOARD SCRIP (1983) (same).
102 DELO, supra note 99, at 131-32.
103 BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 95, at 151-52.
104 DELO, supra note 99, at 132.
105 BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 95, at 151-52.
106 Id. at 151-52.
107 Id. at 152 ("Repeatedly, sutlers were subjected to reprisals. Rampaging troops would
pillage their supply tents, sometimes stealing, sometimes simply destroying ....").
108 Id. ("[O]ften a sutler would be chased out of a camp at the risk of his life should he
return.").
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motormen, and clerks in firms such as insurance companies."' 109 Such workers,
often recent immigrants or former agricultural laborers, formed the foundation of
the emerging lower middle class of urban American society. 10 These people
usually borrowed to meet unexpected needs, such as family illness or moving
expenses."'1 Nevertheless, they held steady jobs and had family obligations
which prevented them from simply skipping town. 112 Salary lenders targeted
these workers because their steady supply of disposable income made them likely
to repay, and their frequent minor income shocks made them likely to borrow."l 3
It was these salary lenders whom working class people in the eastern United
States first came to describe as "loan sharks." 1 4 Although the term was new, the
contractual terms and collection tactics of the lenders were reminiscent of the
high-cost wage-based lending common in previous centuries. In a typical
transaction, a debtor would borrow five dollars and repay six within the next
week or so. 115 Very similar to today's payday loans, the charge of 20% of the
loan principal amounted to around 520% per annum, assuming a two-week
maturation period."l 6 The charge of one or two dollars itself seemed fairly
innocuous for any one given week. But, when a debtor lost a job, was not paid
for his work, became ill, had a family member become ill, or was prevented from
paying for any other reason, the simple transaction rapidly swelled into a sizeable
drain on an already strained budget. Thus, late nineteenth and early twentieth
century salary loans often ended up compounding over lengthy periods of
time. 117 Newspapers of the day frequently gave anecdotal accounts of debtors
trapped by their salary loans, such as "the employee of a New York publishing
house who supported a large family on a salary of $22.50 per week and had been
paying $5 per week to a salary lender for several years, until he had paid more
109 Mark H. Hailer & John V. Alviti, Loansharking in American Cities: Historical
Analysis of a Marginal Enterprise, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 125, 128 (1977).
1OId, at 127, 129.
111Id. at 128.
1121d. at 128-29.
113 Ackerman, supra note 70, at 89-90; Robert W. Kelso, Social and Economic
Background of the Small Loan Problem, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 14, 15-20 (1941).
114 Haller & Alviti, supra note 109, at 125-26. Thus, today's payday lenders are
loansharks in the most historically correct sense of the term. Contrary to Hollywood imagery,
the term "loanshark" did not come to describe the mafia until at least the 1930s. PETERSON,
supra note 28, at 10.
115 HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 65, at 428.
116 Id. There were, of course, variations in loan terms. Many lenders used one-week
balloon payments. Id. Also, often lenders charged African Americans rates twice as high in
the same type of transaction, where a loan of five dollars was repaid with seven at the end of
the week. Id.
117 Haller & Alviti, supra note 109, at 133.
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than ten times the original loan."' 118 Similarly, a Chicago consumer borrowed
$15, but "ten years later [he] had repaid $2,153 and still owed the original
$15."119 More compelling were the records of one salary lender in New York
City, which showed that out of approximately 400 debtors, 163 had been making
payments on the loans for over two years. 1
20
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century salary lenders charged interest
rates far in excess of state usury laws. A far cry from contemporary American
attitudes about credit, early American culture strongly condemned borrowing
money for personal purposes. Early colonial leaders, including the founding
fathers of the U.S. Constitution, believed borrowing was a moral vice.
121
Accordingly, these leaders adopted interest rate caps, called general usury laws,
which limited annual interest rates to around six percent. 122 With a few
exceptions, these interest rate caps remained intact into the twentieth century.1
23
Nevertheless, salary lenders in eastern U.S. cities managed to conduct business
through a variety of thinly veiled disguises and sham transactions. 124 For
instance, many lenders justified ignoring the interest rate cap by phrasing the
contract as a purchase or assignment of future wages, rather than as a loan.
125
Other lenders would manipulate the legal "time-price doctrine" to avoid interest
rate caps. 126 Under English law, when a buyer purchased a physical good over
time through installments, it was not considered a loan for purposes of a statutory
interest rate cap. 127 This led some lenders to avoid interest rate caps by, for
example, requiring the debtor to "purchase" a worthless oil painting at the time
the loan contract was signed. 128 The debtor would owe the same amount of
118 Id.
119 1d.at 134.
120 Id.at 133.
121 HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 65, at 274.
122 KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 37 (2d ed. 2000); Ackerman,
supra note 70, at 85; Tracy A. Westen, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the
Lex Debitoris, 55 CAL. L. REv. 123, 131 n.45 (1967). Most of these statutes were roughly
modeled on the English Statute of Anne. See Laurence M. Katz, Comment, Usury Laws and
the Corporate Exception, 23 MD. L. REv. 51, 52 n. 11 (1962).
123 KEEST & RENUART, supra note 122, at 37.
124 Peterson, supra note 69, at 852-54 (providing a more thorough discussion of salary
lender evasion of state usury law).
12 5 LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
CONSUMER CREDIT 50 (1999); DAVID J. GALLERT ET AL., SMALL LOAN LEGISLATION: A
HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF THE BUSINESS OF LENDING SMALL SUMS 180 (1932).
126 KEEST & RENUART, supra note 122, at 38.
127 ld. at 37-38.
128 CALDER, supra note 125, at 50.
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money, and could immediately throw the painting away, but the transaction
would be at least superficially legal. 129
Beginning in the 1910s and 1920s, a widespread movement aimed at
cracking down on the salary lending industry, now often called the "loan shark
problem," developed. Nonprofit organizations, often backed by the fortunes of
deceased captains of industry, attacked salary lenders through legal advocacy and
by providing low-cost charitable alternatives to salary loans.130 The media began
exposing and editorializing against salary lenders, creating pressure for reform.
Appellate courts began handing down stinging rebukes of salary lenders and
developing common law language exhorting trial judges to ignore salary lender
subterfuges that concealed illegal interest rates. 131 State legislatures began
amending their general usury laws to raise interest rate caps in order to attract
legal private capital to the markets for consumer loans.132 These "special usury
laws," commonly called small loan laws, allowed lenders-who would agree to
licensing, bookkeeping, security interest, and collection practice rules-to lend
small amounts at between 36% and 42% per year. 133 The hope was that, with
these new interest rate caps, honest, respectable private lenders would flow into
the market for costly consumer loans, creating healthy competition and driving
the salary lenders out of business. 134 And finally, large industry accepted these
reforms because they themselves wanted to begin lending to consumers at
moderate prices which nevertheless exceeded the low colonial-era general usury
laws. Collectively, these forces significantly curtailed salary lending throughout
the United States for most of the twentieth century.
Economic forces and legal changes in the 1970s and 1980s began to lay a
foundation for a resurgence in salary lending, however. Unprecedented inflation
forced the Federal Reserve Board to adopt monetary policy resulting in high
long-term commercial interest rates. The high cost of funds made it difficult for
banks, credit unions, and other mainstream lenders to loan money within state
interest rate caps. It became fashionable for neoclassical economists and legal
and economics scholars to goad leaders into abandoning usury laws. State
legislatures were increasingly making a habit of granting special permission to
lenders to charge higher and higher interest rates. Retail installment stores,
pawnshops, and rent-to-own furnishing stores all successfully lobbied for special
treatment. Many state legislatures also raised, or even eliminated, their interest
129 See, e.g., id.
13 0 KEEST & RENUART, supra note 122, at 38.
131 See, e.g., In re Home Disc. Co., 147 F. 538, 546 (N.D. Ala. 1906) (characterizing
salary lenders as having "brought on conditions which were yearly reducing hundreds of
laborers and other small wage earners to a condition of serfdom in all but name").
13 2 KEEST & RENUART, supra note 122, at 39.
133 GALLERT, supra note 125, at 89; KEEST & RENUART, supra note 122, at 48.
134 See KEEST & RENUART, supra note 122, at 48.
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rate caps. 135 Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in Marquette National
Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,136 which is discussed in greater detail in
the next Part, encouraged these trends.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the best available estimate suggests that fewer
than 200 business locations nationwide offered payday loans-loans that were
clearly a throw-back to the old salary lending business mostly stamped out 50 or
so years before. 137 Businesses offering payday loans at this point were usually
focused primarily on cashing paychecks for consumers who lacked traditional
banking services. These businesses found that they could attract larger clientele
and make staggering profits by agreeing to "cash" consumers' post-dated
personal checks. If a consumer needed a loan, she could write a check for funds
she did not actually have in her checking account. 138 If the "check casher" agreed
to wait two weeks before attempting to tender the check, then the consumer
would have time to make some more money, deposit additional funds in her
checking account, and thus cover the check by the agreed-upon date. 139 The term
"payday loan" derived from this practice because often the date consumers wrote
on their checks corresponded to their next payday. When sued by consumers
alleging usury violations, these check cashers maintained that they were not
lending money, but were simply cashing a check. 140
Current payday lenders make similar arguments. Some payday lenders claim
to be "leasing" money to the consumer, rather than making a loan. 141 In these
sale-leaseback transactions, the consumer "sells" a household appliance to the
business, which then "leases" it back for a fee until the consumer can repurchase
it. "The appliance, however, is never actually delivered to the lender. Instead, the
lender gives the consumer cash and takes only a post-dated check from the
consumer as security."' 142 Other payday lenders disguise their loans as "catalog
sales."'143 Similar to the worthless oil painting dodge of a century ago, these
lenders require that the consumer buy certificates, which they can redeem for
merchandise from a catalog. The consumer writes a check and in return obtains
cash and some certificates redeemable for merchandise from a catalog on
135 Id. at 55.
136 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
13 7 JOHN P. CASKEY, THE EcoNoMics OF PAYDAY LENDING 3 (2002).
138 Johnson, supra note 36, at 12-13.
13 9Id.
140 See Schmedemann, supra note 26, at 978.
141 Jeff Gelles, Payday Loans Will Just Make It Worse, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov.
21, 2001, at Col.
142 Johnson, supra note 36, at 18-19.
143 People v. JAG NY, LLC, 794 N.Y.S.2d 488,489 (N.Y. app. Div. 2005) (describing
the loans as "sales of gift certificates for catalog merchandise").
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display. 144 While the borrower may never redeem the catalog certificates, the real
point of the transaction is that the lender waits about two weeks before tendering
the borrower's check. Oblivious to the recurring patterns from disguised salary
loans of a century earlier, some courts have gone along with these charades.145
The Federal Reserve Board, however, has been relatively quick to recognize the
fees associated with these transactions for what they are: a finance charge subject
to disclosure as interest under the Truth in Lending Act.146
Still, with state courts and regulatory authorities slow to act, and with
enormous profits to be had, the payday lending business exploded in the late
1990s. In North Carolina, payday lending outlets roughly quadrupled in four
years, growing from 307 in 1997 to 1204 in 2000.147 Payday lending outlets
quintupled in Salt Lake City between 1994 and 2000.148 Wyoming payday
lenders almost tripled between 1996 and 1997.149 Iowa's payday lenders
increased from eight to 64 in two years. 150 In states where payday lending was
once illegal under state law, bills purporting to regulate the industry have in fact
legitimized it, leading to astonishing growth nearly overnight. For instance, after
Mississippi began regulating payday lenders in 1998, the number of outlets in
that state quickly tripled. 151 Some lenders, such as QC Holdings, Inc., have
proven so profitable that they have filed with the SEC and are now publicly
traded corporations. 152 As of 2001, over 12,000 payday loan outlets were
144 Id
145 See, e.g., Betts v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., 827 So. 2d 294, 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002). Some state legislatures have attempted to prevent these disguised payday loans by
statute. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-18A-12(d) (2004) ("No person shall use any device,
subterfuge, or pretense whatsoever, including, but not limited to, catalog sales, discount
vouchers, Internet instant-rebate programs, phone card clubs, or any agreement, including
agreements with affiliated persons, with the intent to obtain greater charges than would
otherwise be authorized by this chapter.").
146 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000), discussed in Official Staff
Commentary § 226.2(a)(14)-2, as published in 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129 (Mar. 31, 2000).
147 OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, supra note 31, at 5.
148 Peterson, supra note 33, at 560-61.
14 9 CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, THE GROWTH OF LEGAL LOAN SHARKING: A
REPORT ON THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 3 (Nov. 1998),
http://www.consumerfed.org/The Growth-of LegalLoanSharking_1998.pdf.
150 Id.
151 Jimmie E. Gates, Check-Cashing Businesses Rolling out the Dough, CLARION-
LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Feb. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050206/NEWSO 1/502060399/1
002/NEWSO1.
152 See Stephen Roth, Payday Loan Firm Seeks Cash on Wall Street, Bus. J. (Kansas
City, Mo.), June 18, 2004,
http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2004/06/21/story5.html.
[Vol. 66:653
PREDA TORY LENDING AMD THE MILITARY
operating nationwide, with the industry continuing to expand rapidly. 153
Attempting to put this fundamental shift in the financial services industry into
perspective, the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency famously remarked that
"California alone has more payday loan offices-nearly 2,000-than it does
McDonalds and Burger Kings."' 154
B. Financial Vulnerability of Military Personnel
For those who care about the well-being of American military service
members, the recent resurgence of an industry which first gave rise to the term
"loan shark" has troubling overtones. A large and well-documented body of
literature has explored the precarious financial position of members of the U.S.
military. We believe this literature suggests that military service members may
have several characteristics which make them especially vulnerable to high-cost
indebtedness. From this literature, we have distilled four factors which tend to
suggest that military personnel may be uniquely viable targets for predatory
lending in general, and payday loans in particular: (1) demographic
characteristics which predispose military service members toward high-cost
indebtedness; (2) the form, amount, and distribution of military compensation;
(3) dislocation faced by military service members and their families; and (4)
military cultural considerations.
1. Demographic Predisposition
Military service members tend to have demographic characteristics
associated with personal indebtedness problems. While there is considerable
variation among different service branches, the great majority of military service
members are young enlisted personnel. Junior enlisted personnel make up about
75% of the military. 155 In fact, the Department of Defense is "the nation's largest
employer of American youth."'156 Unlike their civilian peers, a relatively large
proportion of these young people are recently married and have young
153 CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA & THE U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH
GROUP, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: How BANKS HELP PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE
CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 1-2 (Nov. 2001).
154 Barr, supra note 20, at 150 (quoting remarks by John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of
the Currency, before the ABA National Community and Economic Development
Conference, Baltimore, MD, Mar. 18, 2002).
155 Pamela C. Twiss & James A. Martin, Conventional and Military Public Housingfor
Families, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 240, 241 (1999).
156 Phillips, supra note 8, at 340; see also DAVID GOTrLIEB, BABES IN ARMS: YOUTH IN
THE ARMY (1980) (surveying motivation and experiences of new Army recruits).
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children. 157 Some commentators have suggested that high health care costs and
the growing scarcity of health insurance have forced young parents to turn
disproportionately to the military because of its relatively generous government-
provided health care system. 158 A small but growing minority of these families
are single-parent households.159
Historically, young enlisted military personnel have hailed from primarily
economically disadvantaged backgrounds.160 Moreover, vulnerable groups have
sought out the armed services as a means of moving along both formal and
informal paths of citizenship and social privilege. 161 For centuries, minorities and
recent immigrants have seen service in the armed forces as a way to achieve
social legitimacy and legal rights.162 Especially during maj or conflicts, such as
the Civil War and both World Wars, authorities have waived normal citizenship
requirements for alien military personnel.' 63 Many refugees and temporary
workers still turn to the military as a way of speeding up immigration
procedures. 164 Currently, a small but symbolically important group of about
32,000 non-citizens is serving in the U.S. military. 165 More significant
demographically is the disproportionate representation of African Americans in
the military, who make up about 13% of the American civilian population, but
about 20% of enlisted personnel. 166
157 Twiss & Martin, supra note 155, at 241. The percent of married military service
members has increased steadily since the military converted to an all volunteer force. Brenda
L. Moore, The Propensity of Junior Enlisted Personnel to Remain in Today s Military, 28
ARMED FORCES & SOC'Y 257, 272 (2002). Interestingly, the decrease in the median age at
first marriage for military personnel runs opposite to the civilian trend of marrying later in
life. Charles C. Moskos, The American Enlisted Man in the All- Volunteer Army, in LIFE IN
THE RANK AND FILE: ENLISTED MEN AND WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 35, 40 (David R. Segal & H.
Wallace Sinaiko eds., 1986). Currently about 65% of military members are married. BUDDIN,
supra note 4, at 4.
158 Harrell, supra note 5, at 23.
159 Twiss & Martin, supra note 155, at 241; Karen Jowers, Single Parents a Growing
Segment of Military, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999, at 18.
160 Glen H. Elder, Jr., Military Times and Turning Points in Men's Lives, 22
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 233, 244 (1986).
161 The armed forces are more ethnically diverse than the civilian population. Twiss &
Martin, supra note 155, at 241.
162 MORPs JANOwrrz, MILITARY CONFLICT 77-78 (1975); DAVID R. SEGAL, RECRUITING
FOR UNCLE SAM: CITIZENSHIP AND MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY 10 (1989).
163 SEGAL, supra note 162, at 10.
164 Nina Bernstein, Fightingfor U.S., andfor Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,2005, at
B1.
16 5 Id.
166 Phillips et al., supra note 8, at 341.
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Enlisted military personnel also have had historically limited educational
backgrounds. 167 For instance, at the end of the 1970s, almost half of military
enlistees lacked a high school diploma, and only 2.2% had any college
experience. 168 Because in recent years military recruiters have focused on
applicants with high school degrees, currently about ninety-nine percent of
enlistees are high school graduates. 169 Nevertheless, almost half of enlisted
personnel list the primary motivation for joining the military as the ability to
receive future assistance in obtaining an education that they have not yet
acquired. 170
Consumer finance research suggests these demographic characteristics of the
nation's enlisted military personnel are serious risk factors for personal debt
problems. Young people often lack financial experience and tend to borrow with
less regard for the long-term consequences. 171 Young families have extreme
financial pressure from child-rearing expenses, making debt a tempting option.172
The emerging class of single-parent military personnel may be especially
vulnerable. 173 Empirical evidence consistently finds an association between
single-parent families and a variety of social, health, and financial
impairments. 174 Single-income families are less able to overcome income shocks
and sudden expenses, making them more likely to borrow and less likely to repay
successfully. A recent study of bankrupt families found that "[h]ouseholds
without a male present were nearly twice as likely to file for bankruptcy giving a
medical reason or identifying a substantial medical debt as households with a
male present."' 175 Similarly, because enlisted service members tend to come from
financially vulnerable backgrounds, they may have fewer familial resources to
167 Moskos, supra note 157, at 35-37. Professor Glen Elder's study of archival data of
men born in the 1920s in Berkeley, California showed that young men with poor high school
grades and teenage self-inadequacy predicted early timing of military service. Elder, supra
note 160, at 244.
168 Moskos, supra note 157, at 35-36.
169 Moore, supra note 157, at 259.
170 GOTTLIEB, supra note 156, at 19. Roughly half of enlistees report that they enlisted
because they faced unsatisfactory employment options. Id.
171 PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note 28, at 168.
172 Frank Green & Mike Freeman, The Debt Generation: Free Spending 20-Somethings
Lured by Easy Credit, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Jan. 3, 2002, at Al.
173 Leslie N. Richards & Cynthia J. Schmiege, Problems and Strengths ofSingle-Parent
Families: Implications for Practice and Policy, 42 FAM. REL. 277, 282 (1993) (finding
financial problems are "pervasive" for single mothers).
174 Id. at 280.
175 Elizabeth Warren, Teresa Sullivan, and Melissa Jacoby, Medical Problems and
Bankruptcy Filings, 2 (Harv. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 009, 2000).
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
draw on in financial emergencies, in turn forcing them to creditors. Many recent
immigrants and their families have tenuous personal finances, face language
barriers, and hail from countries relatively unaccustomed to credit.' 76 Several
commentators have argued persuasively that these characteristics leave recent
immigrants vulnerable to targeting by predatory lenders. 177 A large literature
suggests that African Americans and other ethnic minorities have faced exclusion
from inexpensive creditors and targeting by predatory lenders. 178 Finally, many
commentators have argued that individuals with limited education and financial
experience have greater difficulty shopping for lower priced loans, leaving them
at risk for marketing by high-cost and predatory lenders. 179 All of these factors
suggest troubling implications for military service members.
176 See generally Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming
Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027 (1996).
177 See, e.g., Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Note, Can New Americans Achieve the American
Dream? Promoting Homeownership in Immigrant Communities, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
169, 172, 188-91 (2004).
178 See, e.g., ROBERT SCHAFER & HELEN F. LADD, DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE
LENDING (1981); Harold A. Black, Is There Discrimination in Mortgage Lending? What
Does the Research Tell Us?, 27 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 23, 25-27 (1999); Cathy Cloud
& George Galster, What Do We Know About Racial Discrimination in Mortgage Markets?,
22 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 101, 116-17 (1993); Theodore E. Day & S. J. Liebowitz,
Mortgage Lending to Minorities: Where 's the Bias?, 36 EcON. INQUIRY 3 (1998); Stephen A.
Fuchs, Discriminatory Lending Practices: Recent Developments, Causes and Solutions, 10
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 461, 466-73 (1991); Fred Galves, The Discriminatory Impact of
Traditional Lending Criteria: An Economic and Moral Critique, 29 SETON HALL L. REV.
1467, 1472-73, 1481-83 (1999); Glenn W. Harrison, Mortgage Lending in Boston: A
Reconsideration of the Evidence, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 29 (1998); Helen F. Ladd, Evidence on
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 46-47 (1998); Stanley D.
Longhofer, Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: What Have We Learned?, ECON.
COMMENT., Aug. 15, 1996, at 1; Robert E. Martin & R. Carter Hill, Loan Performance and
Race, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 136 (2000); Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston:
Interpreting HMDA Data, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 25-26, 31,41 (1996); Reynold F. Nesiba,
Racial Discrimination in Residential Lending Markets: Why Empirical Researchers Always
See It and Economic Theorists Never Do, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 51, 52-55 (1996); Ron Nixon,
Application Denied: Do Lending Institutions Overlook Hispanics?, 11 HISP. 30, 32-33
(1998); Ronald K. Schuster, Lending Discrimination: Is the Secondary Market Helping to
Make the 'American Dream' a Reality?, 36 GoNz. L. REV. 153, 162-73 (2000/200 1); Peter
P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics
Analysis, 73 TEx. L. REV. 787, 806-14 (1995). See also Discrimination in Home Mortgage
Lending: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101 st Cong. 118 (1989) (statement of Sen.
Alan J. Dixon).
179 See, e.g., Tania Davenport, Note, An American Nightmare: Predatory Lending in the
Subprime Home Mortgage Industry, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 531, 533 (2003).
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2. The Military Compensation System
The form, amount, and distribution of military compensation may also place
military personnel at risk for high-cost debt problems. The most important aspect
of military compensation is the lack of it. Junior enlisted military personnel are
low-wage entry-level workers. A typical Army private first class makes $16,884
per year. 180 Like all low-wage workers, military personnel tend to live month-to-
month, often struggling to pay their bills. Military surveys reveal that nearly one-
third of enlisted service members self-report moderate to severe difficulty in
paying their bills. 181 Sudden unexpected expenses such as car trouble or legal
problems, as well as poor personal financial choices, can all pitch low-wage
workers into financial hardship caused by debt. For junior enlisted military
personnel, these cash shortages do not always resolve themselves over time
because these enlistees tend to see relatively little growth in their monetary
compensation over the course of their careers. 182
Furthermore, military compensation comes with high opportunity costs from
long and irregular hours. As Professors Bowen and Orthner observed:
Service in the armed forces involves more than an occupation choice; it is
the selection of a life style that permeates almost every aspect of a person's life.
Few civilian occupations require the high level of commitment and dedication
from their employees that the military services require. Even fewer ask their
employees, much less members of the employees' families, to make such a
range of personal and family sacrifices to accommodate the work mission,
including long work hours, high-stress assignments, required relocations,
frequent family separations and reunions, remote tours of service, long-term
separations from extended family and friends, residence in foreign countries,
and frequent subservience of family needs to mission responsibilities. 183
At the most practical level, when military personnel fall into financial
difficulty, they do not have the option of taking a second job to cover their
expenses, which is an important route to overcome financial hardship for
civilians. 184 Nor does the military pay overtime to its employees despite requiring
180 U.S. ARMY, BENEFITS: MONEY, http://www.goarmy.com/benefits/money.jsp (last
visited Oct. 17, 2005).
181 Martha McNeil Hamilton, Ignorance Costs Plenty: Officials Promote Financial
Literacy, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2002, at EO1.
182 Moore, supra note 157, at 261.
183 Gary L. Bowen & Dennis K. Orthner, Introduction, in THE ORGANIZATIONAL
FAMILY: WORK AND FAMILY LINKAGES IN THE U.S. MILITARY, supra note 5, at ix, xiii.
184 See Go'rrLIEB, supra note 156, at 163; HARRELL, supra note 5, at 108.
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long hours. 185
The predictability of monthly income forjunior enlisted personnel also may
place them at risk for debt problems. On the one hand, prospective creditors can
be relatively certain that military personnel are going to be paid. Unlike
comparable private sector workers, such as service employees, construction
workers, and small business entrepreneurs, junior enlisted military personnel are
unlikely to be laid off, fired, or have their businesses fail. On the other hand,
junior enlisted military personnel often have great difficulty predicting exactly
what their monthly income will be in any given month. The Government
Accountability Office has found that military families chronically suffer from
delays and mistakes in the distribution of their wages. But even when wages are
paid correctly, enlisted family income varies significantly with the deployment
schedule of the unit.186 For example, many military families receive a subsistence
allowance intended to feed the service member, and many rely on this allowance
to feed the entire family and to pay bills. 187 Yet when the service member is
unexpectedly deployed or called into the field, this separate allowance is no
longer provided, potentially creating an unexpected income shock. 188 The
simultaneous likelihood that military members will eventually be paid, combined
with unpredictable changes in compensation, make military families likely to
borrow to bridge unexpected gaps.
The form of military compensation also limits the ability of military families
to adapt to financial crises, potentially forcing them to turn to creditors. Much of
military compensation comes in the form of non-fungible in-kind goods and
services, rather than a traditional paycheck. Military health care, future tuition
assistance, military housing, military food, access to commissaries, and access to
military recreational facilities and entertainment are all important components of
the compensation package for military personnel. 189 Military recruiters
understandably use these side benefits as a way of explaining and justifying
relatively low military pay. Nevertheless, the non-fingible nature of non-cash
compensation prevents military personnel from converting a significant portion
of their resources to overcome income shocks and unexpected expenses. If a
civilian family car breaks down, because the primary wage earner is likely to
receive all or nearly all of his or her compensation in the form of cash payment,
the family can divert resources normally allocated to important but ultimately
expendable purchases into repairing the car. For instance, the family might be
able to forego entertainment or cut back on food expenditures through more
185 GOTrLIEB, supra note 156, at 163; HARRELL, supra note 5, at 108.
186 HARRELL, supra note 5, at 108.
18 7 Id. at 108-09.
188 Id.
189 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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parsimonious shopping. A family that is saving for educational expenses can
temporarily halt monthly contributions, or even draw from pre-existing reserves.
Cash compensation can be more readily applied to repairing the car (or to
servicing a loan balance which paid for repairing the car). This diversion of
resources may be more difficult for military families because their pool of
fungible resources is relatively smaller than their otherwise identical civilian
counterparts. A military family cannot transform its right to receive military
entertainment or food into cash. Nor can it transform a military promise to pay
future school tuition into cash which might be useful in repairing the car. This is,
of course, not to belittle the value of the considerable in-kind compensation
military families receive; it is merely to point out its illiquidity. Because military
families receive a comparatively greater portion of their compensation in non-
cash forms, we should expect that they will be marginally less able to adapt their
monthly budget to overcome financial hurdles than will a family that receives
liquid cash compensation of the same absolute value.
The military wage distribution system may also give aggressive lenders a
relatively greater opportunity to capture the income of enlisted military
personnel. As a service to military members, the armed services have allowed
members to "allot" their income; creditors, including landlords, utilities,
merchants, and others, can be paid directly by the government out of service
members' wages. 190 This provides a convenience to service members who may
be unable to mail payments while in the field. However, some creditors make
allotments a condition of lending money. Margaret Harrell's study of junior
enlisted Army personnel suggests that the system tends to encourage service
members to take on credit, for which they would not qualify if they were
civilians. 191 If true, this would leave members precariously over-extended and
vulnerable to high-cost debt marketing. We should also expect that the system
will erode the ability of military borrowers to deter creditor over-reaching with
the most effective strategy: refusing to repay. 192
3. The Dislocation of Military Service Members
Military service members may be at risk for debt problems because they have
difficulty maintaining traditional support networks within the institutional
constraints of the armed forces. The military is a prototypical example of what
'
90 See 32 C.F.R. § 113.6 (2005).
191 HARRELL, supra note 5, at 109.
192 The Truth in Lending Act recognizes the importance of the ability to refuse payment
by allowing credit card borrowers to assert against credit card lenders most claims and
defenses assertable against merchants who honor credit cards.
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Lewis Coser called a "greedy" institution. 193 For instance, the military tends to
place great demands on its members with respect to geographic mobility. Military
personnel are frequently transferred between posts and assignments. Historically,
most military assignments last for no more than three years. One study found that
86% of enlisted personnel moved at least once in the three years preceding the
survey. 194 Seasoned service members and officers are also expected to change
locations frequently. Seventy-six percent of enlisted personnel with seven to ten
years of service reported moving three or more times. 195 For officers, this figure
rose to 82%.196 "For those with more than fourteen years of service, 40% of
enlisted personnel and 55% of officers reported more than nine moves."
197
Moreover, because there are often waiting lists for military housing, many
transfers involve two moves: one into a temporary private rental home and a
second move into less expensive military housing when it becomes available. 198
Because of security and training needs, military posts are also often in
isolated locations far from mainstream civilian institutions. Even when stationed
at bases located in large metropolitan areas, service members face significant
emotional and cultural barriers which prevent them from developing a sense of
community with nearby civilians. 199 Moreover, many may be hesitant to integrate
into civilian communities because they move so frequently.200 Accordingly,
military members are often reluctant to engage in, and are slow to be recognized
by, local democratic institutions. 20 1 Low voter registration and participation rates
of military personnel may make local leaders less responsive to financial
hardship suffered by soldiers at the hands of politically aggressive local
merchants.202 Many military personnel also report outright tension between
19 3 LEWIs A. COSER, GREEDY INSTrrUTIONs: PATTERNs OF UNDIVIDED COMMITMENT
(1974); Mady Wechsler Segal, The Military and Family as Greedy Institutions, 13 ARMED
FORCES & SOC'Y 9, 9 (1986).
194 Zahava D. Doering & William P. Hutzler, Description of Officers and Enlisted
Personnel in the US. Armed Forces: A Reference for Military Manpower Analysis 161
(1982).
195 Segal, supra note 193, at 17.
196 Id.
197 Id. (citing Doering & Hutzler, supra note 194).
198 Id. at 22.
199 Martin & Orthner, supra note 5, at 175.
200 For example, Buddin has found that military members living in military housing
typically have higher use rates for military family support and recreation programs and may
integrate into surrounding communities slowly. BUDDIN, supra note 4, at 73.
201 LUTZ, supra note 5 (discussing weak local democratic culture from low voter
registration and participation around Ft. Bragg).
202 Id.
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service members and civilians who live near military posts.203 Overseas
assignments not only create geographic isolation, but also place service members
and their families in foreign and sometimes resentful cultures.
These geographic mobility issues dislocate military personnel from their
extended families, which can erode their ability to bridge unexpected expenses
and income shocks.204 When a car breaks down, siblings, parents, or long-time
friends may not be available to assist with temporary transportation. When a
child is ill, or when work requires long hours, grandparents may not be close by
to provide free child care. Geographic separation is especially difficult for young
enlisted personnel and their spouses, many of whom are away from their families
and long-time friends for the first time.205 There may be less incentive to invest
in new friendships and long-term support networks, since these relationships are
likely to be severed when the service member is next transferred.20 6
Geographic constraints placed on military families also create a significant
earnings penalty for the spouses of service members. Although 60% of military
spouses work outside the home, they suffer disruption to their careers when the
family is forced to relocate. And, because bases are typically in isolated locales
which often have depressed economies, there are often few employment
prospects for spouses.20 7 The military does provide spousal employment services,
which aim to help spouses adjust financially to relocation; 20 8 however, service
members rated this service dead last in user satisfaction among all military
community and family support programs. 20 9 Studying this phenomenon in over
18,000 military personnel observations, Payne, Warner, and Little found that
three-year rotations caused a 40% decrease in the income that a spouse would
have earned had he or she been able to remain at one location for. six years.210
203 One soldier explained:
I never seen anything like it anywhere. It's like they can't wait to see you. Like
they know when troops get paid so they have everything ready. The prices just go sky
high whenever you get paid. They make it real clear that they hate you. Even when they
are taking your money they make you feel like you are not a human person. Anything
goes wrong in that town and they blame the Army. Babies come up missing, people
getting killed. The soldier gets all the blame for it, so they look at all of us that way.
GoT"rLIEB, supra note 156, at 60.
204 HARRELL, supra note 5, at 108-09.
205 Segal, supra note 193, at 17-18.
206 Id. at 18.
207 HARRELL, supra note 5, at 108-09.
208 BUDDIN, supra note 4, at 51-52.
209 Id. On a five-point scale, respondents gave military spouse employment services an
average score of 2.88. Id. at 51. In comparison, the highest-rated service was chaplain
services, rated at 4.12. Id.
210 Deborah M. Payne, John T. Warner & Roger D. Little, Tied Migration andReturns
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Recognizing these facts, many military families end up foregoing human capital
investments for military spouses because education, training, and occupational
experience are less likely to yield returns in the long run. 211 This suggests
another risk factor for debt problems because a second income is an important
hedge for income shocks and sudden expenses. 212 When one partner suffers a
setback, the other can take up the slack to avoid reliance on creditors. Spouses of
military personnel are comparatively less able to do this because of the demands
placed on military families.
Frequent moves also prevent military members from reaping many of the
benefits of home ownership. This is important because family homes are often
the most important device for accumulating and stabilizing wealth in the
American middle class. Unlike other common middle- and lower-class physical
assets, such as automobiles, homes generally appreciate in value over time,
giving their owners an investment return. Home mortgages are also forced
savings mechanisms which discipline families. As homeowners pay down their
mortgages, they accumulate equity in a valuable asset, which they can leverage to
obtain low-cost financing. Low-cost home mortgages are a valuable tool in
overcoming income shocks and unexpected expenses without relying on high-
cost lenders. Similarly, when long-time homeowners suffer a permanent decline
in income from illness, divorce, retirement, or job loss, they have the option of
selling their home to create a pool of liquid funds with which to restart their
financial development. Professor Dalton Conley has argued persuasively that
home ownership is also the most important asset in promoting long-term inter-
generational transfer of wealth from parents to their children.213
Because military families move frequently, it makes less sense for them to
invest in purchasing a family home.214 Most financial planners advise that realtor
commissions, mortgage loan closing costs, and large interest payments at the
beginning of a mortgage loan term eliminate the financial benefits of home
ownership for families that plan to own a home for fewer than three years.
Moreover, those military families who do end up staying in one location long
enough to make home ownership feasible will not usually know this ahead of
time. The result is that many military families are forced to rent their homes,
either in fact (from a landlord) or in effect (from the real estate sales and finance
industry costs). Military housing or housing allowances offset missed home
ownership to a degree, but these substitutes do not create investment returns,
to Human Capital. The Case of Military Wives, 73 Soc. Scl. Q. 324, 328, 337 (1992).
211Id. at 325.
212 HARRELL, supra note 5, at 108-09.
2 13 DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN AMERICA 41-43 (1999).
2 14 RICHARD BUDDIN ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF HOUSING OPTIONS FOR MILITARY
FAMILIES 26 (1999).
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forced savings, low-cost borrowing opportunities, or intergenerational wealth
transfer effects.215 Moreover, service members have given these benefits and
services low marks, complaining of long waiting lists, poor distribution of
information, and poor quality housing stocks.216
4. Military Culture and Financial Obligations
Military attitudes toward financial problems may facilitate predatory lending
to enlisted personnel. The military, both as a matter of policy and institutional
culture, steadfastly refuses to allow service members to avoid financial
obligations. 217 While this policy is certainly laudable in most contexts, such as
child support or tax obligations, it may be more problematic in the context of
predatory lenders. The institutional demand that service members have their
financial affairs in order is backed up with the very real threat of reprimand, loss
of security clearances, bar to re-enlistment, denial of promotion, court martial,
and dishonorable discharge.218 "Soldiers are required to manage their personal
affairs satisfactorily and pay their debts promptly," explain Army regulations. 219
"Failure to do so damages their credit reputation and affects the Army's public
image." 220 Thus, military service members who do not pay their bills are often
subject to intense pressure from their commanding officer.221 Where many
215 Id. at 28.
2 16 BUDDIN, supra note 4, at 51-52.
2 17 Alan L. Cook, The Armed Forces as a Model Employer in Child Support
Enforcement: A Proposal to Improve Service of Process on Military Members, 155 MIL. L.
REv. 153, 168-69(1998).
2 18 Id. at 169 n.103; CBSNews.com, supra note 10. For example, the Navy Military
Personnel Manual states:
Members of the Naval service are expected to pay their just debts and financial
obligations in a proper and timely manner.
The way in which one handles their private financial affairs provides a reliable
indication of their general character and trustworthiness.
Failure to pay just debts.., is evidence of irresponsibility and may jeopardize
their security clearance status, advancement status, duty assignment, qualification for
reenlistment or extension of enlistment, retention, and in aggravated circumstances may
become grounds for disciplinary and/or administrative separation action.
NAVY MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL 7000-020 (2005),
http://buperscd.technology.navy.millbup-updtCD/BUPERS/MILPERS/Milpers.pdf.
219 Indebtedness of Military Personnel, Army Regulation 600-15, at 1-5a (1986).
220 Id.221 Edward Robinson, Big Banks Fuel Growth of Payday Lenders, TENNESSEEAN.COM,
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working-class Americans might simply refuse to pay an over-reaching lender,
service members may not have this option. We should also expect that
bankruptcy is a less realistic option for most military personnel. Where civilians
might be able to defeat over-reaching unsecured creditors by filing a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition, many in the military might simply refuse to entertain this
possibility.
This military cultural commitment to financial responsibility also helps
ensure that military personnel are relatively easy to track. For some high-cost
lenders, the possibility that the debtor may simply skip town or disappear is one
of the greatest risks of doing business. High-cost creditors often employ skip
tracing departments and private investigators to track down delinquent debtors.
Creditors also face difficulty in delivering service of process on elusive civilian
borrowers delaying judicial collection proceedings. Some civilian debtors can
obtain an informal "discharge" of their debts by simply disappearing. In
comparison, the military maintains a system for locating their service members.
Importantly, the military has a defined and mechanical system where it actively
assists companies and individuals seeking to serve process on military
personnel. 222
The military culture and policies dealing with financial obligations make it
relatively more difficult for military personnel to escape their financial past. This
fact should make military borrowers a better credit risk which, given efficient
price competition, could encourage lenders to pass on lower prices. But it also
probably encourages targeting of military service members by lenders who
specialize in extending onerous loans to uninformed and overextended
borrowers. Predatory lending is, above all, a collection business. Unsecured
predatory lenders do not attempt to compete by offering lower prices than their
competition, but rather by extracting debts others cannot. The military insistence
on repayment under all circumstances may simply assist predatory lenders in
making and enforcing questionable loans. Unlike the civilian marketplace,
creditors specializing in loans to military personnel can expect a free and
effective built-in pressure and tracking network to assist them in forcing
payment.
C. Payday Lending to Military Personnel
1. Congress 's Position: The Servicemembers' Civil ReliefAct
Historically, Congress has not been blind to the financial vulnerability of
military personnel. Ever since the early nineteenth century, Congress has taken
Nov. 29, 2004, http://www.tennessean.com/business/archives/04/11/62129411 .shtml
(sergeant discussing discharge of soldiers from debt defaults).
222 Cook, supra note 217, at 170-72.
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steps to protect service members from civil lawsuits brought by creditors. During
both the War of 1812 and the Civil War, Congress passed "stay laws" which
suspended civil proceedings against soldiers and sailors until they returned from
war. 223 When passing similar legislation during World War 1,224 a House Report
explained:
[T]here are ... tens of thousands of men in military service who will be
utterly ruined and their families made destitute if creditors are allowed
unrestrictedly to push their claims; and yet these same soldiers, if given time
and opportunity can, in most cases, meet their obligations dollar for dollar. The
country is asking.., its young men to risk their lives and, if need be, to give up
their lives for their country. Before long even more will be asked to make the
same sacrifice. Is it more than naked justice to give to the savings of these same
men such just measure of protection as is possible? 225
World War II ignited similar concerns, causing Congress again to protect
service members, this time with the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940.226 This law authorized "temporary suspension of legal proceedings and
transactions which [could have] prejudice[d] the civil rights of persons" fighting
in World War 11.227 Unlike previous legislation, the World War II law did not
223 Terry M. Jarrett, The Servicemembers ' Civil ReliefAct: Important New Protections
for Those in Uniform, 60 J. Mo. B. 174 (2004) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 108-81, at 32 (2003)).
The Civil War era statute read:
[W]henever, during the existence of the [Civil War], any action, civil or criminal,
shall accrue against any person who, by reason of [war] .... cannot be served with
process... the time during which such person shall so be beyond the reach of legal
process shall not be deemed... as any part of the time limited by law for the
commencement of such action.
Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 118, 13 Stat. 123; see U.S. ARMY JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S
SCHOOL, SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT GUIDE 1-1 (July 2000),
http://www.louisvillelaw.com/federal/ArmyPubs/ja260_sscradb.pdf [hereinafter JAG
GUIDE].
224 The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918, ch. 20, 40 Stat. 440, did not
completely ban all civil actions, instead requiring "trial courts to take whatever action equity
required when a service member's rights were involved in a controversy." JAG GUIDE, supra
note 223, at 1-1. Specifically, it protected soldiers from proceedings in bankruptcy,
foreclosure, repossession of property, default judgments, stays of proceedings, and evictions.
Jarrett, supra note 223, at 174 (citing H.R. REP. No. 108-81, at 33 (2003)).
225 Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 565 n.2 (1943) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 65-181, at
2-3 (1918)).
226 Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, ch. 888, § 100, 54 Stat. 1178 (1940).
227 Id. at 1179. The Act's specific protections included the following:
staying civil court proceedings if military service materially affected the service
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automatically expire at the end of the war. As a result, although Congress
amended the Act many times,228 it stayed in effect until December 2003, when
Congress completely overhauled it under the new name of the Servicemembers'
Civil Relief Act of 2003 (SCRA). 229
Like previous statutes, the purpose of the SCRA is:
to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense
[and to enable] servicemembers of the United States ... to devote their entire
energy to the defense needs of the Nation [by providing] for the temporary
suspension ofjudicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may
adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their military
service.230
Among other provisions, the SCRA protects against default judgments;231
prohibits creditors from repossessing, selling, foreclosing on, or seizing the
property of a service member; 232 and protects military families from being
evicted.233 Perhaps most significantly, the SCRA also enables service members
to reduce interest rates on any previous obligations to a six percent annual rate.234
Nevertheless, the SCRA has virtually no impact on payday lending. Payday
lenders generally do not take security interests in personal property, making
repossession protections irrelevant. And, although the Act requires a reduction in
member's ability to defend his or her interest; reducing interest rates to six percent on
pre-service loans and obligations; requiring a court order before a service member's
family could be evicted from a rented residence for non-payment if the monthly rent
was $1200 or less; terminating a pre-service residential lease; and allowing service
members to retain their state of residence for tax purposes despite military relocations to
other states.
Jarrett, supra note 223, at 175.
228 E.g., Act of Oct. 6, 1942, ch. 581, 56 Stat. 769; Act of Jan. 20, 1942, ch. 10, 56 Stat.
10; Act of May 13, 1942, ch. 303, 56 Stat. 276; Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798;
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-12, 105 Stat.
34; Veterans Benefits Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-330, 116 Stat. 2820.
229 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-596 (2005).
230 1d. § 502.
2 31 1d. § 521.
232 1d. §§ 532-533.
233 Id. § 531.
2341d. § 527. This protection applies onlyto obligations incurred by the service member
prior to entering active duty.
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interest rates to six percent on any debt incurred before going on active duty,235
the legislation imposes no limit on rates of loans consummated after a service
member is activated. Consequently, the SCRA's only threat to the payday loan
industry would arise if a service member entered into a payday loan transaction
and then, and only then, was called up to active duty. In that case, the SCRA
would reduce the annual interest rate on the loan from around 450% to 6%
"during the period of military service." 236 Currently, federal law provides no
interest rate cap whatsoever on loans made to active duty service members.
Some legislators from both parties have acknowledged their discomfort with
this fact.23 7 As of this writing, Congress is considering at least one bill, called the
Servicemembers Anti-Predatory Lending Protection Act, which would cap
annual percentage rates of payday loans to military members at 360/-a reduction
of about 400 percentage points from current average rates. 238 Sponsored by
Congressman Sam Graves (R-Mo.), the bill would also prohibit payday lenders
from automatically renewing, refinancing; or consolidating a payday loan with
the proceeds of another loan without executing a new loan document.239 The bill
has struggled under intense behind-the-scenes opposition from payday lenders. 240
With Representative Graves's bill seemingly stalled, and national attention
focused on the well-being of service members suffering from conflict in the
Middle East, the issue appears likely to remain at the forefront for some time.
235 50 U.S.C. app. § 527 (2005).
236 Id. § 527(a)(1). In order for a service member to take advantage of the provision, he
or she need only provide to the lender written notice and a copy of the military orders calling
the service member to duty. Id. § 527(b). If the lender were to object, a court could refuse to
reduce the interest rate if it determined that the service member's military service did not
"materially affect[]" his or her ability to pay the interest as stated in the original loan
contract. Id. § 527(c).
237 See Ken Newton, Bill Targets Payday Loans to Military, ST. JOSEPH NEWS-PRESS
(St. Joseph, Mo.), Feb. 10, 2005, at lB.
238 H.R. 5300, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004).
239 Id.
240 When Representative Graves first introduced the legislation in 2004, it was referred
to the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, and then to the Subcommittee on Benefits.
Thirteen days later, the bill stalled and sank. Henriques, supra note 12. On January 4, 2005,
Representative Graves resubmitted the bill with the same text. As of February 2005, the
House Committee on Veterans' Affairs was still reviewing the bill, and it was considering
expanding the bill to include non-military borrowers. Newton, supra note 237.
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2. The Debate: Do Payday Lenders Target Military Service Members?
Given the resurgence of payday lending in the past decade, the factors
placing military personnel at risk for debt problems, and the absence of direct
federal regulatory control under the SCRA, it was perhaps inevitable that
questions over payday lending to service members would develop. Recently,
military leaders and rank-and-file enlisted personnel have complained about the
harsh consequences of payday loans for service members. A front page New York
Times article told the story of a young Navy Petty Officer and his wife who
borrowed $500 from a Puget Sound payday lender. The sailor's wages could not
keep up with the interest forcing him to borrow again and again until he had
borrowed over $4000-about 25% of his annual income-in instant loans from
lenders with official names like "Military Financial Network."'24 1 Based on
industry records, the article informally estimated that 26% of all military
households have borrowed from payday lenders.2 42 Network television news
bureaus have given airtime to military complaints. 243 Faculty from the Judge
Advocate General's School have bemoaned the consequences of payday loans for
enlisted personnel, arguing that "[r]arely does the service member emerge from
[a payday loan] ... in better financial condition and often only gets deeper in
debt."'244 Rear Admiral David Architzel has complained that payday loans "seem
[like] an appealing solution" for the tight budget problems of enlisted military
personnel, but actually "compound[] their financial problems by subjecting them
to the additional hardships of what are effectively unreasonable interest rates. '245
A director of a state Navy Marine Corps Relief Society, which attempts to assist
service members in financial trouble, explained that the payday lending problems
for service members are "getting worse, really-much, much worse. '246 A chorus
of military personnel and journalists have complained that payday lenders are
now flocking to the highways and strip malls near the gates of military bases to
feed off the wages of enlisted personnel.247
241 Henriques, supra note 12; U.S. ARMY, supra note 180.
242 Henriques, supra note 12. Previous research by Gregory Elliehausen suggests that
approximately 180,000 military households used payday loans in 2002. The New York Times
compared this figure to Pentagon personnel figures to come up with the 26% estimate. Id.
243 CBSNews.com, supra note 10.
244 The High Cost of Borrowing, supra note 15
245 Shean, supra note 14.
246 Henriques, supra note 12.
247 See, e.g., Ian McNutly, Fast Cash Outfits Win Enemies, NEW ORLEANS
CITYBUSINESS, Jan. 21, 2002, at 1 ("[I]t was changes in state laws that opened the doors to
payday lending in Louisiana and around the country. In the early 1990s, payday lenders first
started showing up around Fort Polk army base in Leesville."); Borrowers Trapped, supra
note 13 ("The [payday] loans are made by storefront businesses in'flashy, neon sign-adomed
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Consumer advocacy groups have also seized on these complaints and
conducted informal investigations over the merits of these claims. Steven Tripoli
and Amy Mix, consumer advocates with the National Consumer Law Center,
prepared a report discussing a variety of consumer scams and high-priced loans,
including payday loans targeted at military service members. 248 The study
informally collected business newspaper advertisements, loan contracts,
applications, and disclosure statements. 249 The report also includes letters from
military leaders complaining of the effects of payday loans and other harsh
business practices on service members. 250 Finally, the National Consumer Law
Center researchers visited the locale surrounding Kings Bay Naval Submarine
Base in southeastern Georgia and Mayport Naval Air Station nearby in
northeastern Florida. 251 The report concludes that predatory lending, high-priced
goods and services, and other scams are plaguing military communities. 252
Consumers Union, the publisher of Consumer Reports magazine, also has
inquired whether payday lenders target military personnel, conducting an
informal telephone survey of 31 payday lenders in six Texas cities.253 The
purpose of the informal survey was to show how the payday loan processes work,
rather than to collect statistical information on payday lender rates, practices, or
clientele.254 The small survey sample and informal methods did not distinguish
between payday loans to military and civilian customers. Nevertheless, the report
concluded that payday lenders are targeting military personnel.
Payday lenders vociferously deny these claims, attacking consumer advocacy
reports as unscientific. To support their position, the Community Financial
Services Association (CFSA), a payday lending industry trade association, has
recently retained two public relations firms specializing in reputation crisis
buildings (that) line the roadways surrounding the military bases, obviously targeting the
serviceman .... '); Shean, supra note 14 ("Prall of the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society
said payday lenders tend to concentrate near military installations because members of the
military have steady jobs and checking accounts for direct deposit of their paychecks.");
CBSNews.com, supra note 10 ("On Gen. Screven Way, the one-mile strip of fast-food joints
and pawn shops leading to the front gate of Fort Stewart, getting a cash loan of$ 100 to $500
is about as easy as buying a cheeseburger.").
2 4 8 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, IN HARM'S WAY-AT HOME: CONSUMER SCAMS
AND DIRECT TARGETING OF AMERICA'S MILITARY AND VETERANS (2003),
http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/military/content/report-military.pdf.
249 Id. at 45-54.
250 Id. at 59-66.
251 Id. at 7-9.
252 Id. at 29.
253 MUECKE & SCHNEIDER, supra note 11.
2 5 4 d at 1-2.
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOUR[.AL
management to influence popular perceptions of payday loans. 255 These firms
have issued a press release reporting a telephone survey purporting to establish
that few military personnel have borrowed from payday lenders.256 In conducting
the survey, the public relations firms purchased a list of military personnel from
Equifax, a credit reporting agency that maintains credit histories of consumers. 257
The firms then telephoned approximately 1000 military personnel, of whom 37
admitted to taking out a payday loan in the last five years. 258 From this, the
public relations firms concluded that 3.69% of military personnel use payday
loans.259
However, this telephone survey methodology is seriously flawed for at least
six reasons. First, the survey did not speak with spouses of service members,
many of whom actually handle family finances, including borrowing money.260
Second, the survey ignores a classic self-response bias in that many debtors do
not admit to borrowing money when approached by strangers. 26 1 In part a result
of personal embarrassment over financial problems, this self-reporting bias is a
serious methodological problem that has challenged consumer credit research for
over a century.262 Third, relying on a credit reporting agency for a contact list
introduces serious sample problems. Many of the most financially vulnerable
service members are as young as eighteen years old, and either may not yet have
credit histories with Equifax, or may not be identified as military personnel in
those histories. Relying on credit histories for the survey sample probably
artificially selects relatively established service members, such as officers and
senior enlisted personnel. Fourth, many of the most vulnerable military service
members are impossible to reach through a telephone survey. Some junior
255 Press Release, Steven Schlein & Jay Leveton, Less Than 4 Percent of Military Have
Taken a Payday Advance Loan Says New Survey (Feb. 3, 2004) (on file with authors).
256 Id.
257 Memorandum from Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates to Board of Directors,
Community Financial Services Association of America (Jan. 26,2005) (on file with authors).
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Because about 65% of military service members are married, we should expect
surveying only service members and not their spouses to significantly reduce reported payday
loan rates from actual use. BUDDIN, supra note 4, at 4.
261 See, e.g., Jeff McDonald & Norberto Santana Jr., Payday Loans Have Financial
Dark Side: High Charges Lead to Lasting Cycle ofDebt, Officials Warn, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIn., Mar. 9, 2004, at Al (discussing refusal of approached San Diego sailor to discuss
terms of payday loan).
262 See CALDER, supra note 125, at 40 (discussing Census Bureau fears that public
hostility from survey questions about debt would destroy the entire 1890 census); JANET
FORD, THE INDEBTED SOCIETY: CREDIT AND DEFAULT IN THE 1980s, 126-130 (1988)
(empirical findings suggesting many debtors actively conceal debt problems out of
embarrassment).
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enlisted personnel live in on-base barracks that lack individual telephones.
Similarly, many service members are currently out of reach in combat zones
overseas, even though their families may be financially struggling at home. Fifth,
the survey focused on payday loans identified as such, and does not make
reference to payday loans masquerading as something else, such as a "sale-lease-
back" transaction or "catalog sale" loan. 263 Some survey respondents may have
reported not taking out a payday loan, even though they have used a "catalog
sale" lender. Finally, the survey authors have not published, nor even publicly
released, their survey instrument or methodology for peer review. Given that the
public relations firms that commissioned and conducted the study have
reputations for bare knuckle political advocacy, the veracity of the survey should
perhaps be treated with some caution.264 Nevertheless, there is certainly some
truth to the argument advanced by one lobbyist for payday lenders in Georgia. He
asserts: "They're not preying on anybody-they're just open for business. '265
HI. METHODS
To date, there has been no nationwide, scientific research on whether payday
lenders do in fact target military personnel. In Part III.A, we first discuss the
viability of using combined geographic and legal analysis to probe issues
surrounding payday lending and the military. In Part III.B, we describe our
methodology in conducting an extensive empirical study of payday lending to
military personnel.
A. Law and Geography: Theoretical Considerations
Interdisciplinary legal and geographic scholarship explores the relationship
between law and space. It shows how law and legal institutions can manifest
themselves in traceable ways across locations and boundaries. While legal rules
are a product of human thought and communication, they are designed to control
and influence events in the physical world. Jurists, legislators, and administrators
263 See Gelles, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
264 Douglas Fischer, Chemical Industry May Fight Tests, OAKLAND TRIB., Nov. 21,
2003 (on file with author); see also Glen Martin, Chemical Industry Told to Get Tough:
Lobbyist s Memo Advises Hardball Tactics for Fighting Tighter California Regulations, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 21, 2003, at A21 ("'They're known for creating deceptive, phony front
groups,' Walker said. 'They go through people's trash; they make a policy of hiring former
FBI and CIA operatives. Their motto basically is that they're not a PR firm-you hire them
when you want to win a war.' ... Steven Schlein, a senior vice president with Nichols-
Dezenhall, defended the firm's tactics. 'We may be aggressive in the service of our clients,
but we never break the law,' he said.").
265 CBSNews.com, supra note 10.
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all perceive the physical world and craft their policies in relation to it. Thus, "law
and geography" scholarship uses geographic tools to understand the
consequences of legal policies and institutions. In turn, it explores the "inertia of
space"--that is, how space shapes the process and substance of law.266
In recent years, many law and geography scholars have come to "interrogate
the legal from a critical geographic perspective," often exposing the hidden
bigotries of our laws.267 These scholars sometimes draw inspiration from
Foucault, who noted that "[a] whole history remains to be written of
spaces-which would at the same time be the history ofpowers (both these terms
in the plural)-from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the
habitat, .. . passing via economic and political installations." 268 For example,
Richard Ford has argued that race-neutral local jurisdictional boundaries are
vestiges of America's segregated past that continue to racially define residential
space and in turn perpetuate a cycle of inequality independent of our private
choices. 269 Similarly, David Delaney has examined the way courts have used
perceived geographic "facts" to provide authority for limiting constitutional
protection of black school children in school desegregation cases. 270 Carol
Sanger has pointed out that in the post-automobile world, suburban geographic
patterns and zoning ordinances have helped rigidify gender roles by creating the
"chauffeur-mother." 271 Leslie Moran uses a spatial analysis of Manchester's gay
266 Nicholas K. Blomley & Joel C. Bakan, Spacing Out: Towards a Critical Geography
ofLaw, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 661, 664 (1992). There is, of course, far too much useful law
and geography scholarship to list here. For a short introduction to the still-emerging field, see
id.; David Delaney, et al., Preface: Where is Law?, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER:
LAW, POWER, AND SPACE xiii (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001); Jane Holder & Carolyn
Harrison, Connecting Law and Geography, in LAW & GEOGRAPHY 2 (Jane Holder & Carolyn
Harrison eds., 2002).
267 Delaney, et al., supra note 266, at xv.
268 Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1857 (1995) (quoting Michel Foucault, The Eye of
Power, in POWER]KNOWLEDGE 146, 149 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans.,
1980)).
269 Id. at 1845; see also Kay J. Anderson, The Idea of Chinatown: The Power of Place
and Institutional Practice in the Making of a Racial Category, 77 ANNALS Ass'N. AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 580 (1987) (exploring how legal classification of an area as "Chinatown"
affected discriminatory racial ideology); Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and
Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365
(1997) (contrasting the legal treatment of electoral districts with that of local government
boundaries).
270 David Delaney, The Boundaries ofResponsibility: Interpretations of Geography in
School Desegregation Cases, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 266, at 54,
67.
271 Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of
Gendered Space, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 709 (1995).
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village in the United Kingdom as a vehicle to explore heterosexism in law. 272
Moreover, the landmark case Shelley v. Kraemer, which struck down legal
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, is perhaps best thought of as a
critical "law and geography" motivated opinion. 273
Other law and geography scholars use geographic tools to tease out otherwise
imperceptible legal inefficiencies or to track troubling spatial results of law. For
instance, Robert Ellickson has argued that if we used municipal codes of conduct
regulating panhandling and other chronic nuisances that varied spatially from
street to street, we might better balance rights of homeless people and other city
dwellers.274 Geographic analysis of the Organ Transplant Act showed pockets of
inadequate organ distribution and missed opportunities for organ harvesting in
rural areas and among ethnic minorities. 275 Erik Luna has advocated the use of
crime mapping in developing more transparent, efficient, and fair policing.276
Robert Goldstein has argued that recent advances in mapping technology have
the potential to better measure and conceptualize the success and failures of
environmental law. 277
Interdisciplinary law and geography analysis has also produced influential
consumer financial services scholarship. Most prominently, several authors have
used geographic analysis of home mortgage lending patterns to demonstrate
racial bias in approval of credit applications. 278 Moreover, geographic analysis
272 Leslie J. Moran, The Queen s Peace: Reflections on the Spatial Politics of Sexuality
in Law, in LAW & GEOGRAPHY, supra note 266, at 85, 99-107.
273 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
274 Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALEL.J. 1165, 1171-72 (1995); cf
Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-
Homeless Laws in the United States, 29 ANTIPODE 303, 310-12 (1997) (arguing that laws
seek to erase the homeless through outlawing activities connected to their existence in the
only spaces available).
275 Tom Koch & Ken Denike, Geography: The Problem of Scale, and Process or
Allocation: The U.S. National Organ Transplant Act of 1986, Amended 1990, in LAW &
GEOGRAPHY, supra note 266, at 109, 122-23, 127-29.
276 Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1107, 1177-1193 (2000)
(conducting spacial analysis of drug arrests along the north coast of San Diego County,
California).
277 Robert J. Goldstein, Putting Environmental Law on the Map: A Spatial Approach to
Environmental Law Using GIS, in LAW & GEOGRAPHY, supra note 266, at 523, 536-37.
278 See Joe T. Darden, Lending Practices and Policies Affecting the American
Metropolitan System, in THE AMERICAN METROPOLITAN SYSTEMS: PRESENT AND FuTURE 93
(Stanley D. Brunn & James 0. Wheeler eds., 1980); Steven R. Holloway, Exploring the
Neighborhood Contingency of Race Discrimination in Mortgage Lending in Columbus,
Ohio, 88 ANNALS ASS'N. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 252 (1998); Michael Reibel, Geographic
Variation in Mortgage Discrimination: Evidence from Los Angeles, 21 URBAN GEOGRAPHY
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convinced Congress that in some specific neighborhoods and communities,
banks accepted deposits but did not give out equivalent amounts in loans-a
process sometimes called "disinvestment. '279 Accordingly, Congress adopted the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requiring that depository institutions make
efforts to lend in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods within the
contiguous geographic area surrounding their office or group of offices.
280
Finally, there is compelling evidence suggesting that check cashers, pawnshops,
and payday lenders all disproportionately locate their branches in poor and
minority neighborhoods. 281
Our current Article draws on and expands this law and geography literature.
Our empirical investigation explores what lessons the spatial relationship
between payday lending operations and military personnel might hold for today's
policy makers. In particular, this Article seeks to provide a definitive resolution
to the national debate over whether payday lenders target military service
members. Payday lenders, like most businesses, carefully locate near their
targeted customers. For instance, in its Securities and Exchange Commission
filing, one national lender disclosed that its stores are located within three miles
of their intended market.282 Accordingly, mapping payday lender locations can
reliably determine the extent to which payday lenders target military personnel.
45 (2000).
279 Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S. 406 Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 17 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-175, at 33 (1977); Robert
G. Boehmer, Mortgage Discrimination: Paperwork and Prohibitions Prove Insufficient-Is
It Time for Simplification and Incentives?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 622 (1993).
280 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (2000). Under the CRA, banking regulators are required to
conduct periodic law and geographic analyses of depository institutions potentially denying
permission to merge or open new branches to institutions receiving poor evaluations. See
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic
Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 300-01 (1993) (describing this process).
281 Steven M. Graves, Landscapes of Predation, Landscapes of Neglect: A Location
Analysis of Payday Lenders and Banks, 55 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 303, 312 (2003) (studying
payday lender location patterns in urban Illinois and Louisiana); KENNETH TEMKIN & NOAH
SAWYER, FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION, ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICE
PROVIDERS 11-26,
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/pdf!021904_altfinservproviders.pdf (last
visited Oct. 17, 2005) (studying check casher, pawnshop, and payday lender location patterns
in Chicago, Atlanta, Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, Memphis, and Washington,
D.C.).
282 Payday lenders themselves candidly admit that they take great pains to find locations
close to their target demographic. See, e.g., Check Into Cash, Inc., Registration Statement
Form S-1, at 33 (July 31, 1998),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067289/0000931763-98-001978.txt [hereinafter
Check Into Cash S-1 Registration Statement] (explaining importance of proximity of store
location to target market).
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Moreover, if payday lenders do target service members, we consider the extent to
which various state legal environments have held this targeting in check.
Specifically, we ask what legal approaches, if any, have demonstrated promise in
preventing targeting of military personnel for triple-digit interest rate payday
loans.
B. Empirical Methodology
1. Study Overview: Sample, Scales of Resolution, and Control Group
Our study analyzes the locations of payday lenders in 20 states. We chose our
sample of states based on several criteria. First and foremost, we looked for states
that are home to what might best be described as "military towns." By this we
mean places where military personnel are the clear consumer demographic, due
to either the large population of the military base, the small size of the
surrounding communities, or both. Studying payday lender outlet locations in
these areas reduces the chance that observed commercial retail patterns would be
unduly affected by other demographic variables, such as race or poverty. Second,
we sought to analyze military bases in states with a wide variety of legislative and
regulatory strategies for addressing payday lending issues. This was necessary to
discover whether variation in state regulation created any demonstrable effect on
the spatial relationship of payday lenders and military installations. Accordingly,
in some cases we also considered states with military installations where military
personnel are a less predominant component of local business demographics.
Third, we attempted to include states with bases of special military importance as
well as bases from all the branches of the armed forces. Thus, San Diego,
California and the Greater Norfolk, Virginia regions were included because of
the significant military population residing in those locales, despite the potential
for causal noise from their large coextensive civilian populations. States with
little or no military presence were not included in our study.
For each of these 20 states, we attempted to construct maps and statistical
analyses based on four levels of geographic resolution. First, for each state we
made several generalizations about the intensity of payday lending in that state as
compared to others. Second, we conducted countywide statistical analyses.
County-level analysis enables comparison of the distribution and density of
payday lenders within a state, and it provides an important scale by which to
examine industry density locations relative to military installations. Because
military bases are often as large as counties themselves and may have several
scattered off-base retail and service districts, the county-level resolution
sometimes catches concentrations that disappear at more local scales. Third, we
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analyzed every ZIP code region in each of the 20 states. 283 Maps at this scale are
especially useful because ZIP code regions frequently replicate the market range
and threshold parameters used by site location analysts who very likely figure
heavily into the final location of banks and payday lenders.284 In other words,
most local ZIP code regions contain those consumers whom payday lenders
operating in that ZIP code hope to attract. And fourth, several military
installations were chosen as focal points for more detailed, street-level case
analyses of payday lending. At this "neighborhood" scale, specific street
addresses were mapped for an entire county or counties in which the base(s) is
located. Not only does this allow us to know the absolute location of payday
lenders throughout a county, but it also allows us to track the distance from base
gates and service member quarters.
To further refine the validity of our study, we also mapped all bank and bank
branch locations in all 20 states. The bank control group allowed us to compare
the number of payday lenders with the number of banks in a given state, county,
ZIP code region, or neighborhood. And mapping banks also allowed us to
compare the distance separating payday lenders and military bases with the
distance separating banks and military bases. These comparisons are important
because they provide spatial context, giving us something of a barometer of
commercial activity in an observed locale. Mapping banks also helps account for
variations in zoning regulations. For example, it is theoretically possible that
current or past zoning ordinances might force payday lenders into geographic
areas in close proximity to military bases, even though military personnel are not
making relatively greater use of payday lender services. This becomes a much
less plausible explanation of payday lender locations if payday lenders are
clustered near military bases, but banks, who face similar zoning rules, are not.
By mapping banks, we gain some insight into where retail and service activity is
permissible in the towns and cities we are analyzing and get a good idea of where
consumers are likely to be found.
283 Matching addresses to ZIP code polygons is highly reliable, and over 98% of all
addresses used in the study reported a ZIP code that could be located and placed on a map.
Banks and payday lenders reporting a point location, such as those assigned a university,
mall, or P.O. Box address, were assigned the ZIP code region containing the ZIP code point
in question. Less than two percent of the addresses were reported as points.
284 Range refers to the distance a consumer will travel to obtain a good or service.
Threshold refers to the minimum population necessary to maintain solvency for a given
business. Location analysts commonly conduct geographic market range and threshold
parameter studies on behalf of businesses seeking locations and forming business plans. See
DEAN M. HANINK, PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: ECONOMY,
POLICY, ENVIRONMENT 247 (1997) (discussing theoretical issues in market range evaluation).
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2. Data Sources and Mapping Techniques
To complete our study, we required four types of data: population
information, military base locations, bank locations, and payday lender locations.
All civilian population information was obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau. 285 The absence of an authoritative reliable source for military population
made analysis requiring this information somewhat more problematic. Because
military personnel are frequently being deployed, reassigned, trained, and moved,
many of the bases we contacted were unable to give us reliable manpower
figures. After consulting with representatives from the Department of Defense
(DOD), we selected the DOD's annual Base Structure Report of 2004 as our
primary databank. 286 Data regarding personnel was cross-referenced with a report
published by the DOD's Statistical Information Analysis Division2 87 as well as
with the data from the Census Bureau.
Data on military base locations in general is widely available. However, the
precise boundaries of military bases are sometimes ambiguous. In delineating
base boundaries, we primarily relied on maps issued by the United States
Geologic Survey (USGS) and published by the Environmental System Research
Institute (ESRI). However, we found several instances where USGS maps did not
match maps created by either the U.S. Department of Transportation or other
private digital map vendors. Discrepancies in base location were resolved via
telephone calls to information offices at individual bases. Many bases are large
and include multiple parcels of land, sometimes flung over several counties.
Where this was the case, the ZIP code region(s) containing the base headquarters
and the majority of on-base housing was used to delineate the boundaries of the
military installation under consideration.
While bank and bank branch addresses were easily obtained from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),288 obtaining reliable data on payday
lender locations proved more challenging. We obtained the addresses of payday
285 See United States Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3,
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html.
2 8 6 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, BASE STRucTuRE REPORT (2004),
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20040910_2004BaseStructureReport.pdf. According to
officials in this office, this data was submitted to the DOD by officials on base.
287 Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports,
Statistical Information Analysis Division, Distribution of Personnel by State and by Selected
Locations, http://web l.whs.osd.mil/mmid/pubs.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). According to
officials in this office, this data was collected through payroll records.
288 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Find an Institution,
http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). The FDIC recognizes
several different categories of banks. For our purposes, we included all branch locations
irrespective of the FDIC's categories.
2005]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
lenders from the state regulatory authority charged with oversight of payday
lenders in all but three states included in the study. In most instances, regulatory
oversight offices host a website where the addresses of payday lenders can be
downloaded; several other states sent lists of payday lenders via electronic mail
or as paper copies via U.S. Postal Service. Though we believe the individual
licensing agencies are the best source for addresses, we do not believe they are
comprehensive. Ample anecdotal evidence suggests that many payday lenders
operate without a license from the state. We were able to phone several payday
lenders listed in local telephone directories that were not licensed or included on
the list of payday lenders provided by various states. Conversations with state
authorities and other industry observers confirmed our observations. 289
Though incomplete, we are confident that the lists provided by the states do
include businesses engaged in the business of payday lending. To that end, each
regulatory authority was contacted in order to ensure that the criteria used to
define "payday lender" in our study was consistent from state to state. In three
states vital to our survey-New York, North Carolina, and Texas-we could not
obtain adequate data from state regulators, and accordingly we used alternative
data gathering strategies. Our data collection methods for these three states are
elaborated in Part IV alongside discussions of the law and empirical findings in
those states.
In terms of mapping technique, we used commercial mapping software to
map the addresses of individual payday lender and bank locations onto TIGER
centerline files. 290 Using these files, we are able to enter a database of addresses
into mapping software that places points on street maps indicating the location of
each address. For each case study location, a minimum 75% match rate was
achieved; but in most cases, especially for payday lenders, match rates of over
90% were realized, giving us reliable sample sizes and excellent statistical
confidence. 291 Matched addresses were randomly checked for accuracy by cross-
289 Telephone conversations with several state officials and other industry analysts
confirmed our suspicion that there are many unregulated payday lending operations in each
state. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Delacamp, Lawton Area Supervisor, Consumer
Credit Counseling of Oklahoma (Jan. 2005). Independent of the conclusions of this Article,
it is troubling that some payday lenders simply have refused to acknowledge the authority of
state regulators by openly disregarding state licensing requirements.
290 TIGER Line files are the basis for street and road maps used by many government
agencies. See, e.g., KANG-TSUNG CHANG, INTRODUCTION TO GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
SYSTEMS 308 (2002) (describing TIGER/Line files). Our maps were created using the
Geocode function in ESRI's ArcMap 9.0 software, a common professional geography
computer program which allows users to compile, author, analyze, map, and publish
geographic information. See Environmental System Research Institute, What is ArcGIS?,
http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/about/overview.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
291 See GARETH SHAW & DENNIs WHEELER, STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES IN GEOGRAPHICAL
ANALYsIs 48-53 (2d ed. 1994) (describing statistical significance in mapping match rates).
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referencing matched locations with several widely available on-line address-
matching services. 292
3. Statistical Analysis of Payday Lender Location Density
Maps were analyzed using simple, widely-understood statistical measures in
hopes that the findings would be transparent to the widest possible audience. At
the county and ZIP code levels, three basic measures of payday lending were
employed. The first was the total number of payday lenders per geographic
region. The second was payday lenders per capita, generally expressed in terms
of payday lenders per 100,000 persons. The third measure we used is a measure
of payday lending density relative to banking density. Professional geographers
have a variety of commonly accepted methods for measuring relative location
density of two business types. Most geographers typically use a standard business
density formula known as a "location quotient. ' 293 In calculating payday lender
density relative to banks, we used statistically acceptable variations on the
standard location quotient formula tailored to capture subtle differences in
payday lender and bank density for our county and ZIP code level analyses. 294
292 See, e.g., Environmental System Research Institute, ArcWeb Showcase: Map Viewer
Application, http://arcweb.esri.com/sc/viewer/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005); Google
Maps, http://maps.google.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2005); Mapquest, Mapping Service,
http://www.mapquest.com/ (last visited Oct. 17,2005); Yahoo Maps, http://maps.yahoo.com
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
293 Location quotient is the most frequently used statistic to determine a region's share
of some business activity. One standard location quotient formula is:
Xi
L Z XLQ- ri,
where LQ is the location quotient, X and Y are the businesses in question, and i is the
geographic location, such as a ZIP code or a county. SHAW & WHEELER, supra note 291, at
313. However, an in-depth discussion of analytic statistical geography is beyond the scope of
this Article. For an excellent introduction to this topic, see generally JAMES E. BURT &
GERALD M. BARBER, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS FOR GEOGRAPHERS (2d ed. 1996).
294 The standard location quotient formula is not appropriate for this study, given the
data limitations inherent in tracking payday lending locations. Because there are many ZIP
codes with no payday lenders, the standard formula is not suited to measuring this industry.
Modifying this formula allows us to use the data we have available to include those areas
without payday lenders, instead of tossing them aside, and to see subtle differences between
two areas with identical ratios of banks to payday lenders but with different numbers
(volume) of banks and payday lenders. In the alternative, we conducted experiments with
numerous formulaic variations and produced nearly identical results. We selected a very
simple county level ratio:
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Next, we ranked each of these three statistical measures against their
intrastate counterparts, with the lowest rank (first) in each category assigned to
the county or ZIP code with the highest score on each variable. So, for example,
the county with the highest total number of payday lenders would therefore
receive a rank of first in that category. Similarly, the ZIP code region with the
highest relative density of payday lenders in comparison to banks would receive
the first place ranking for that category. Finally, the ranks for all three categories
were averaged together to produce a composite index for each scale level.
Because the composite index is a function of our three measured categories, the
lowest ranked counties and ZIP code regions will generally feature a relatively
large number of payday lenders, a relatively high density of payday lenders per
capita, and a relatively high ratio of payday lenders to banks. These composite
index scores were also assigned ranks with the highest composite index score
again receiving the first place ranking. Importantly, our composite index scores
create an opportunity to express the proximity of the payday lending industry as a
whole in any given county or ZIP code to military bases with a single, easily
comparable number.
In order to give us some perspective on the per capita density of payday
lenders in any unit of analysis, such as a ZIP code, we calculated the statewide
average for payday lenders per 100,000 people. By multiplying the statewide
average by the population in smaller-area units, such as a ZIP code, we were able
to predict the number of payday lenders that should be in that unit of analysis, if
it were to conform to the statewide average. 295 Finally, we compared our
LQ = _)Xl100
where LQ is the location quotient, X are payday lenders, and Y are banks. For ZIP code
regions, our relative measurement of payday lender to bank density needed additional
refinement to account for the great number of ZIP codes without banks, payday lenders, or
either. Once again, after numerous experiments, we selected the following formula which
distinguishes ZIP code regions that have identical ratios payday lenders and banks, but have
different absolute numbers of bank and payday lenders. Our ZIP code region formula is:
LQ = +(X-Y)
where, once again, LQ is the location quotient, X are payday lenders, and Y are banks. We
believe these formulas provide the best opportunity to see subtle differences in the density of
payday lending (relative to banks) among counties and ZIP codes in each state. Moreover,
they are well within traditionally accepted geographic methodology. SHAW & WHEELER,
supra note 291, at 313-15.
295 The formula we used to determine the expected number of payday lenders is:
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prediction, or "expected" number, of payday lenders against the actual number of
payday lenders observed in each geographic unit. This allowed us to accurately
characterize the actual number of payday lenders as being in excess of, equal to,
or below the statewide per capita average for any given regional population.
For those bases mapped at the neighborhood level, we analyzed data in a
manner we hoped would show differences in the prevalence of payday lending
close to and far away from a given base. In these analyses we adopted two spatial
categories: neighborhoods were "near" a base when they were located within a
three-mile radius of the base, while "distant" neighborhoods were outside the
three-mile zone. We chose the three-mile radius following the industry's own
commonly agreed-upon store location goals.296 In several maps presented later,
we used mapping software to draw buffer zones one, two, and three miles around
each base. Then we counted the number of people, payday lenders, and banks
both within and outside the three-mile buffer zone. 297 "Near base" census tracts
could then be statistically measured against those outside the three-mile buffer.
Near base tracts could also be measured against countywide and statewide
averages. Statistical measures employed at the neighborhood level included the
absolute number of payday lenders and banks and the density of payday lenders
and banks per capita. These near base statistical analyses provide a useful
quantitative snapshot of the landscape immediately surrounding military service
members.
X= xp
where X is the expected number of payday lenders in a given county, ZIP code, or other
geographic region; L is all payday lenders statewide; P is the population statewide; andp is
the population of the county, ZIP code, or other geographic region in question.
296 For example, Check Into Cash explained its store location threshold in an SEC
filing:
Management believes that most consumers reside within a five-mile radius of the store
that they visit and that the convenience of a store's location is extremely important to
customers. As a result, management seeks to open each new store within three miles of
the market area that it is intended to serve.
Check Into Cash S-1 Registration Statement, supra note 282, at 33.
297 We estimated population totals within each buffer zone by summing the population
of all census tracts with a centroid point inside the selected buffer zone.
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V. RESULTS: THE LAW AND GEOGRAPHY OF MILITARY PAYDAY
LENDING JUXTAPOSED
A. Federal Banking Law and the Marquette Doctrine. A Backdrop to
American Payday Lending
The law and geography of payday lending to military personnel in individual
states cannot be understood without an appreciation of federal banking law in
general and the landmark case of Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha
Service Corp. in particular.298 The Marquette decision interpreted a Civil War
era congressional statute called the National Bank Act. 299 When Congress passed
the National Bank Act in the 1860s, states and the federal government were
competing aggressively for regulatory and tax control over the emerging
American banking industry. 300 Banks could (and still can) receive their charters
either from state governments or from the federal government.30' Both the states
and the federal government were actively encouraging banks to choose charters
from their own level of government.302 In order to entice banks to charter at the
state level, some states passed laws allowing state banks to charge higher interest
rates than federal chartered banks lending within that state's borders.303 Claiming
unfair discrimination against federally chartered banks, and fearing
encroachment on its tax and regulatory power, Congress drew on its authority
under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to prohibit states from
authorizing higher permissible interest rate caps for state banks than for federal
banks.30 4
Over a hundred years later, the growing credit card industry in the 1970s
298 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
299 Id. at 310 n.23.
300 James J. White, The Usury Trompe l'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REv. 445, 450 (2000).
301 Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine
and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REv. 518, 540 (2004).
302 White, supra note 300, at 450.
303 See, e.g., Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 411 (1873)
(discussing state law which provided an eight percent interest rate cap for state banks and a
ten percent cap for all other lenders).
304 The statute, now referred to as section 85 of the Act, allows national banks to
charge:
interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank
is located.., and no more, except that where by the laws of any State a different rate is
limited for banks [of issue] organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be
allowed for [national banks] organized or existing in any such State ....
National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 99, 108 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 85 (2000)).
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forced the Supreme Court to face a novel question. The issue was which state's
interest rate cap applies when a bank located in one state loans money across
borders at an interest rate in excess of the state interest rate cap where the
borrower lives. The Marquette Court held that the National Bank Act-which
originally leveled the playing field between federal and state banks-now
authorized federally chartered national banks to export the interest rate cap (or
lack thereof) of a bank's home state to consumers in other jurisdictions. 30 5
The Supreme Court's intervention in what had been state lawmaking was the
starting gun in a corporate race to the bottom that significantly eroded the power
of state governments to set meaningful interest rate caps. 306 Lenders quickly
relocated in states with no interest rate caps such as Delaware and South Dakota
and exported those laws to states that chose more aggressive price regulation.
30 7
States with interest rate caps became much more amenable to removing them in
order to hold on to their financial services industry jobs.30 8 Because the
Marquette decision only applied to national banks, state chartered banks were at
a significant competitive disadvantage. 30 9 Bowing to pressure by state banks,
Congress included language in the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) that allowed state banks to charge
interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state where the bank is located. 310
Section 521 of this act granted exporting powers to state banks similar to those of
national banks. 31'
The extent to which the Marquette decision (for national banks) and § 521 of
DIDMCA (for state banks) applies to payday lending currently remains in flux.
Payday lenders, at least some of whom have always sought new ways to
circumvent state interest rate caps, began attempting to use the Marquette
exporting doctrine to their advantage in the 1990s.312 In general, banks were
unwilling to risk their own reputations by offering triple-digit interest rate loans
out of their own branch lobbies in their own communities. However, a small
minority of banks were willing to form business relationships to make payday
loans through storefront payday companies usually located in other states. In
305 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 310-12 (1978).
306 William F. Baxter, Section 85 of the National Bank Act and Consumer Welfare,
1995 UTAH L. REv. 1009, 1010-11; Schiltz, supra note 301, at 619-20.
307 White, supra note 300, at 447-48.
308 Id. at 454.
309 Schlitz, supra note 301, at 565-66.
310 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, § 521, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 183 1(d)(a) (2004)).
311 Hill v. Chemical Bank, 799 F.Supp. 948, 951 (D. Minn. 1992) ("Congress enacted
§ 521 to create parity between national and state banks with respect to usury limitations.").
3 12 CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA & U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP,
supra note 153, at 12-15.
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these transactions, which have become standard in the industry, the payday loan
company manages marketing, staff, locations, customer service, and loan
applications, but the bank advances the loan funds to borrowers. On paper, every
loan is "made" by the bank, but the name on the door is that of the payday loan
company, and the only person the borrower ever sees is an employee of the
payday lender.313 By prior agreement, the payday loan company usually then
immediately purchases the right to receive payment from consumers back from
the bank.314 Then, the payday loan company goes on to handle the most
important aspect of the business: collections. The bank, in effect, "rents" its
charter powers under the Marquette doctrine or § 521, either in exchange for a
per loan fee or for ownership in a small percent of the proceeds of each loan. 315
The entire point of the business relationship is to circumvent interest rate caps
adopted by state legislatures. 316
Not surprisingly, many bankers and bank regulators were extremely
uncomfortable with these "charter-renting" relationships. In 2002, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) used its oversight powers over federally
chartered banks to crack down on charter-renting. Speaking on the Marquette
doctrine, the Comptroller of the Currency explained:
Let me raise one ... caution .... The benefit that national banks enjoy by
reason of this important constitutional doctrine cannot be treated as a piece of
disposable property that a bank may rent out to a third-party that is not a
national bank. Preemption is not like excess space in a bank-owned office
building. It is an inalienable right of the bank itself
Indeed, the payday lending industry has expressly promoted such a
"national bank strategy" as a way of evading state and local laws. Typically,
these arrangements are originated by the payday lender, which attempts to
clothe itself with the status of an "agent" of the national bank.
Not only do these arrangements constitute an abuse of the national charter,
but they are highly conducive to the creation of safety and soundness problems
at the bank, which may not have the capacity to manage effectively a multistate
313 Letter from Carlene McNulty, North Carolina Justice and Cmty. Dev. Ctr., to Joseph
A. Smith, Jr., North Carolina Banking Comm'n 2 (Nov. 9, 2004) (on file with authors).
314 Schiltz, supra note 301, at 583.
3 15 Id. at 582-83.
316 Id.
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loan origination operation that is in reality the business of the payday lender.3 17
Following this reasoning, one by one, the OCC gave negative oversight
evaluations to every federally chartered bank involved in payday lending. 3 18
Under threat of losing their bank charters, all national banks terminated their
charter-renting relationships with payday loan companies.
State-chartered banks have been a different story. Banks chartered by state
governments are primarily regulated by that state's bank examiner or department
of financial institutions. However, state-chartered banks also receive oversight
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which is an independent
federal agency created in 1933 in response to bank failures during the Great
Depression.3 1 9 State banks are under FDIC oversight because the banks purchase
federal insurance from the FDIC to protect the bank accounts of their customers
from theft and other losses. Unlike the OCC, the FDIC has turned a blind eye to
charter-renting, taking the position that state bank charter-renting to payday loan
companies is just as legal as the credit card loans made in the Marquette case. 320
Consumer advocates have responded by furiously accusing the FDIC of
undemocratically undermining every usury law in the nation.3 2 1 But the FDIC,
which has an institutional history and culture focused almost exclusively on
preventing bank failures, has essentially ignored the consumer protection
concerns of payday lending critics.322 Thus, payday loan companies and state
banks continue to claim a license to ignore state interest rate laws. Under this
highly controversial interpretation of the law, so long as officials at the FDIC and
one state government in the entire country refuse to prevent 450% loans, one
state bank located in that one state may empower payday loan companies to
export the state's law (or lack thereof) to every borrower in the country.
Sheltered under this protective regulatory umbrella, twelve state banks of the
more than 5200 institutions currently supervised by the FDIC continue to act as
facilitators for many of the nation's payday loan companies. 3 23
For their part, courts have not been able to agree on a definitive legal
resolution as to whether banks and payday loan companies may use the
3 17 John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Women in
Housing and Finance (Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-1Oa.txt.
318 Fox, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND, supra note 61, at 17-19.
3 19 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., WHO IS THE FDIC?,
http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
320 Fox, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND, supra note 61, at 19-22.
32 1 1d. at 29.
322 By statute, the mission of the FDIC is to protect the safety and soundness of insured
depository institutions. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1816, 1828(c)(1), 183 lm-1, 183 lp-1 (2005).
323 Press Release, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., FDIC Revises Payday Lending
Guidance (Mar. 2, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2005/pr1905.html.
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Marquette doctrine to simply disregard state interest rate laws. Nevertheless, two
trends have emerged. The first was cemented into place by Beneficial National
Bank v. Anderson, where the Supreme Court held that state usury law does not
bind national banks and "there is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of
usury against a national bank. '324 However, Beneficial did not resolve the issue
of the extent to which a bank may alienate its ability to ignore state usury law to
other non-bank companies, such as payday lenders. On this issue, lower courts
over the past few years have emphatically stated that while a bank may have the
right to export interest rate laws, non-bank payday loan companies in a
contractual relationship with a bank do not. At least nine courts have held that
there is no federal preemption of usury claims where the victim alleges that a
payday loan company is, in fact, making payday loans while using the name of a
bank as a pretext to avoid state usury law. 32 5 A federal district court in New York
has gone so far as to hold that no federal legal issue exists where a state attorney
general accuses a state bank of criminally aiding a payday loan company in
committing criminal usury through a charter-renting arrangement. 326 Thus, while
banks may presently be free to avoid state usury law, it must, as a matter of
economic fact, be the bank that makes and retains the risk on loans.327 As we
324 Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (complete preemption
doctrine required reversal of U.S. Court of Appeals order remanding state law usury claims
to state court when brought against a national bank.)
325 Long v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-1306-J-25TJC, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24617, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2001); Brown v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., Civ.
No. S-01-2674, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25847, at *5-6 (D. Md. Nov. 14,2001); Colorado v.
ACE Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282,1284-85 (D. Colo. 2002); Goleta Nat'l Bank
v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717 (E.D.N.C. 2002); Goleta Nat'l Bank v. O'Donnell,
239 F. Supp. 2d 745, 755-56 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Flowers v. EZPawn Oklahoma, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 2d 1191, 1204-06 (N.D. Okla. 2003); People v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach,
1:03-CV-1320 (N.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004),
www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL230044pub/links.shtml (subscription required);
Carson v. H&R Block, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 669, 675 (S.D. Miss. 2003); BankWest, Inc. v.
Oxendine, 598 S.E.2d 343, 347-48 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
326 The court stated:
[The bank's argument] would be relevant if the State in this case were asserting state
law usury claims against County Bank. However, as stated above, the State's claims
against County Bank include only allegations of criminal facilitation, fraudulent
business conduct, and deceptive business practices, none of which is preempted by
federal law.
People v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 1:03-CV-1320, at 8 (N.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004),
www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL230044pub/links.shtml (subscription required).
327 One federal judge explained:
In this case. . . ,[a]lthough Ace contends that Goleta is the real maker of the loans at
issue, the state contends just the opposite: that Ace is using Goleta's name as mere
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shall see in the next subsection, this subtle, fact specific, and still-evolving rule
appears to have a significant impact on payday lending to military personnel in
some states.
B. State Law and Empirical Results
In this section, we present our empirical findings regarding geographic
location strategies of payday lenders. However, because our intention is not to
provide mere geographic information, but also to explore the legal implications
of that information, we present our empirical results alongside a description of
the laws controlling payday lending in each state. Thus, for each state, we present
a short summary of state payday lending law, a characterization of the prevalence
and density of payday lending statewide, and brief descriptions of the patterns of
payday lending found at the county and ZIP code resolutions near military
installations. For those particularly significant military installations chosen for in-
depth, street-level analysis, we include a short discussion of those findings where
appropriate. We also provide maps to assist readers in visualizing payday lender
location strategies.328
1. Alabama
Like many states, Alabama has a general usury law, which caps interest rates
at eight percent and is riddled with exceptions for various types of lenders. 329 In
2003, payday lenders successfully lobbied the Alabama legislature to enact the
Deferred Presentment Services Act (DPSA). The statute authorizes the Alabama
Bureau of Loans to grant licenses to payday lenders.330 Licensed payday lenders
are allowed to charge "17.5% of the amount advanced. '' 331 As a result, the Act
subterfuge for its own unlawful lending practices. Thus, a sharp factual issue is
presented as to whether Goleta, a national bank, is the real lender at issue. If Ace is the
de facto lender, then its payday loans may violate the North Carolina Check Casher Act
Goleta Nat'l Bank, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
328 A complete presentation of our results and data is beyond the space limitations of
this Article. However, complete records of our results are on file with the authors. Unless
noted otherwise, all data is drawn from sources as explained in Section II.B, which
describes our methodology. All annual percentage rate calculations were computed using the
National Consumer Law Center's rate calculation software and assume a fourteen-day loan
term. See KATHLEEN E. KEEST ET AL., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL
CHALLENGES (2d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004) (software disk accompanying treatise).
3 2 9 ALA. CODE §§ 8-8-1, 5-18-1 to 5-19-31 (2005); KEEST & RENAULT, supra note 328
at § 2.5.
3 3 0 ALA. CODE § 5-18A-3 (2005).
331 Id. § 5-18A-12(a).
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authorizes an effective APR of around 455%, one of the highest state payday
loan interest rate caps in the country.332 Loans made under the DPSA are limited
to an amount of $500,333 and their duration must be between ten and 31 days,
334
although lenders may renew or extend the loan one time. 3 35 Also, a lender is not
supposed to make a new payday loan to pay off an old loan.336 However, the
provisions discouraging this practice are relatively weak. The statute requires
lenders to use a third-party private sector database to deny payday loan
applications sought by borrowers with outstanding payday loans. 337 However,
lenders must only deny applications from borrowers who have over $500 in
outstanding payday loan debt, 338 and referencing the third-party database is only
required if such a database is "available." 339 Payday loan lenders are also
supposed to display a schedule of all fees, charges, and penalties,340 and disclose
to borrowers the total amounts of all fees and other costs that will or potentially
could be imposed as a result of entering a deferred presentment transaction.
34 1
Under these laws, Alabama has seen an explosion in payday lending,
becoming one of the states most densely populated with payday lenders in the
nation. Today, payday loan companies are now nearly as common in Alabama as
traditional banks. In 2004, Alabama was home to 1077 payday lenders and 1458
banks. 34 2 This is the highest payday lender-to-bank ratio of any state in our
survey. Alabama also has the highest number of payday lenders per person, with
over 24 for every 100,000 residents. To put this rate into some perspective,
332 Assuming a loan term of fourteen days, a 17.5% fee equates to an effective annual
percentage rate of about 455%. Although payday lenders could also operate under the
authority of the Alabama Small Loan Act, Id. §§ 5-18-1 to 5-18-24, including its 36% annual
interest rate, Id. § 5-18-15(a), lenders clearly prefer the generous interest rates authorized by
the DPSA. Lenders also may charge a fee of $30 for any bounced check. Id. §§ 5-18A-12(d),
8-8-15.
333 Id. § 5-18A-12(a).
334 ALA. CODE § 5-18A-13(c) (2005).
335 Id. § 5-18A-12(b).
336Id. § 5-18A-13(n).
337Id. § 5-18A-13(o).
338 Id.
339 I. This provision of the Alabama statute originally required the state to establish a
central database of payday loans, but local consumer advocates argue that a last-minute
change to the provision severely weakened the legislation. ARISE CITIZENS' POLICY PROJECT,
HARD CASH: PREDATORY LENDING IN ALABAMA,
http://www.alarise.org/Predatory/o20lending%20fact%20sheet%2010-04.pdf (last visited
Oct. 17, 2005).
340 ALA. CODE § 5-18A-13(m) (2005).
341 ALA. CODE § 5-18A-13(f) (Supp. 2004).
342 State of Alabama Banking Department, ADPSA License Search,
http://www.bank.state.al.us/ADPSA-licenses.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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consider Colorado, which has about 100,000 fewer people than Alabama, has
711 fewer payday lenders, but only 68 fewer banks.
As extraordinary as the density of payday lenders is in Alabama as a whole,
several military areas nevertheless manage to stand out. Coffee County, which
shares much of its eastern border with the Army's Fort Rucker, has the second
highest density of payday lenders, based on our composite index measurement.
As illustrated in Table 1, the 43,615 people living in Coffee County have only
fourteen banks, but have 20 payday lenders. Even for Alabama, the density of
payday lenders located near Fort Rucker is extremely high. By way of
perspective, Coffee County has two more payday lenders than Ohio's blue-collar
Lorain County, which has a population of 285,000 people, and the 43,615 people
of Coffee County have two times the number of payday lenders as Fairfax
County, Virginia, where almost one million people live. Other Alabama counties
with large military installations, including Houston, Montgomery, Calhoun,
Autauga, and Morgan counties, also show high payday lending location densities.
712 OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 66:653
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PREDATORY LENDING AND THE MILITARY
Zip code regions reveal further evidence of high payday lender density near
military installations. For example, the 9000 soldiers and civilian employees 343 at
the Army's Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville only have to travel a little more than
a mile up General Patton Road before they run into the heaviest concentration of
payday lenders in all of Alabama. Ranking first on our composite statistic is ZIP
code 35816, which contains at least fourteen payday lenders, roughly ten more
than one would expect based on Alabama's already high state average and the
ZIP code's population of about 15,000 people.
Fifth in our payday lender composite density ZIP code ranking is 36201 in
Anniston, home to Anniston Army Depot and Fort McClellan, a recently closed
Army base. About 3500 people still work for the Department of Defense in
Anniston, most of them in civilian capacities. Anniston (36201) has sixteen
payday lenders and only nine banks. This is about eleven more payday lenders
than statistically expected. In a pattern we shall see repeated elsewhere, many
towns that have suffered the loss of a military base within the last fifteen years,
though disposed of the economic benefit of the base, nevertheless retain a high
density of payday lenders.
Enterprise, Alabama ranks ninth in the state on the list of payday lender
density by ZIP codes with eighteen payday lenders for its 31,000 people and
5000 soldiers at nearby Fort Rucker. Daleville, the tiny town at the entrance to
Fort Rucker, has only one payday lender. However, about twelve miles from
Daleville, Dothan (ZIP 36303), where many Fort Rucker soldiers are likely to
shop for goods and services, has 24 payday lenders, thereby giving it the third
highest composite ZIP code density of payday lenders in Alabama.
Other high ranking ZIP codes in Alabama include Montgomery (36109) and
Phenix City (36867). Montgomery, home to Maxwell Air Force Base (Gunter
Annex), is ranked twelfth and is only a few miles from the main base. Phenix
City, located across the river and about ten miles from Fort Benning, Georgia,
ranks twentieth. Its fifteen payday lenders exceed the statistical expectation by
10.56, and many of these lenders are located on the road that leads to Fort
Benning.
343 Statistical Analysis and Information Division, supra note 287.
2005]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNVAL
&O Co
Co -o Co CoC2F
#11
11
Z2 v t2 tE : t:: T
L
F-
I
[Vol. 66:653
- 04 C', ~
~ Co Co Co
~ Co Co Co ~
C) Co Co - Co
~ Co N- 0
c~
Q f --
CD
, v
PREDATORYLENDING AND THE MILITARY
2. Arizona
Arizona's payday lending legislation is similar to Alabama's. Payday lenders
who are licensed with the state may charge a "fee" of 15% of the face amount of
a borrower's check, which is the equivalent of an annual interest rate of about
459%. 344 Licensed payday lenders are permitted to extend a payday loan up to
three times, and the lender may assess a new 15% fee each time.345 The statute
also prohibits borrowers from entering into more than one payday loan
transaction at the same time. However, there is little or no guarantee that payday
lenders will actually comply with these time and volume limits. The statute
merely instructs lenders to "take reasonable measures to ensure that no customer
has more than one deferred presentment loan outstanding at any time with any"
payday loan lender in Arizona. 346 However, all the lender must do to comply
with the rule is ask every borrower whether he or she has loans with other
lenders, and the lender can rely on the borrower's answer in order to satisfy the
statute's requirements. 34 7
Under this law, Arizona has developed approximately 538 payday lenders
and 1056 banks for its 5.1 million people. 34 8 These figures place Arizona toward
the middle of the states in our survey in terms of the density of payday lending
per capita at 10.5 per 100,000. There are four mid-sized military installations in
the state, three of which are air stations. Unlike most states, Arizona is divided
into only fifteen relatively large counties. These large counties make it difficult to
344 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-1260(F) (Supp. 2004). Section 6-1260(H) states that a
payday lender fee is "not interest" for purposes of any other Arizona state law. Id. § 6-
1260(H). This attempt at redefining the concept of interest is at odds with any coherent
notion of commercial reality, as well as with a standard interpretation of the federal Truth in
Lending Act. White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Ky. 1999) (holding
deferred check presentment fees should be "interest" for purposes of state usury law); Smith
v. Cash Store Management, Inc., 195 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying TILA to deferred
presentment check cashing). A fee of 15% of the face amount of the check allows a lender to
charge $17.65 for every $100 loaned (i.e., if a borrower desired to borrow $100, he or she
would need to write a check for $117.65). Assuming a loan duration of fourteen days, a fee
of $17.65 is the equivalent of an APR of 459%.
345 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-1260(I) (Supp. 2004). The lender may also charge a bad
check fee of $25 in addition to any charge assessed by the financial institution that
dishonored the check. Id. §§ 6-1259(B)(10).
3 4 6 Id. § 6-1259(B)(10).
347 Id. § 6-1260(C).
348 For Arizona payday lender data, see OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE ARIZONA STATE
BANKING DEPARTMENT, DEFERRED PRESENTMENT COMPANIES,
http://www.azbanking.com/Lists/DPCList.HTML (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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draw generalizations about payday lender proximity to military bases. 349
Nevertheless, at the ZIP code level, a more workable analysis is possible. As
illustrated in Table 3, two sites of interest are Luke Air Force Base in Phoenix
and the recently closed Williams Air Force Base in Mesa. In the ZIP codes
adjacent to Luke A.F.B., we found only a few banks and zero payday lenders.
Yet, about ten miles from the base is the ZIP code with the worst payday lending
rank in the state. Although the former Williams A.F.B. area exhibits a similar
pattern with very little activity near the base, the second worst ZIP code in the
state is located about ten miles down the freeway.
This same pattern shows up in several Air Force bases in our survey. We
speculate that, due to security concerns and the noise associated with militaryjet
aircraft, the distance between Air Force bases and the surrounding commercial-
retail districts is, on average, a few miles greater than it is at bases affiliated with
other branches of the military. We have also noticed that Air Force personnel
seem to have a more diffused housing pattern than service persons in the other
branches of the Armed Forces and tend to live further from the base.
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson is not as isolated from its local
commercial districts as are the Luke and the former Williams bases. The 6000
airmen and support personnel associated with the base are located next to two
ZIP codes (85713 and 85714) that together have at least eighteen payday lenders
and nine banks. These ZIP codes rank fifth and tenth worst for the greatest
density of payday lenders by ZIP code in Arizona. Based on the combined
population of these ZIP codes, there are twelve more payday lenders than one
would expect based on statewide averages.
The Army's Fort Huachuca (5000 troops) near the Mexican border is
relatively free of payday lending. Yet the neighboring town of Sierra Vista has
eight banks and five payday lenders. Although this is nearly double the number
of payday lenders than one would predict based on the town's population, it
hardly seems impressive considering the densities near other bases.
349 For example, in Maricopa County, the most populous county in the state and home
to Luke Air Force Base, we identified 347 payday lenders and 660 banks. While this is a
large aggregate number, given that there are over three million people in the county, the
number and density of payday lenders is outstanding compared to other large metropolitan
counties. The size of the county does not permit an inference as to whether or not the payday
lenders in the state are targeting military personnel.
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3. California
California's Constitution includes an interest rate cap often percent per year
for money loaned for personal, family, or household purposes. 350 Moreover, the
state's civil and criminal usury laws impose a maximum annual interest rate of
12% for loans of money to be used for other purposes. 35 1 Nevertheless, the
California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law (CDDTL) charges the Department
of Corporations with licensing payday lenders, who then receive safe harbor
exemption from constitutional and statutory usury laws. 352 The CDDTL currently
authorizes payday lenders to charge "15 percent of the face amount of [a] check,"
which equates to an annual percentage rate of about 459%.353 Lenders are not
supposed to allow their borrowers to pay off some or all of a payday loan with
the proceeds of another payday loan, 354 nor may they use the borrower's original
check for a subsequent payday loan. 355 The statute also forbids lenders from
entering into multiple payday loans with the same customer during any one
period of time.3 56 However, the statute provides little guarantee that lenders will
follow these guidelines because there is no procedure or system for verifying
whether a borrower has multiple loans from multiple lenders.
California's leaders have largely stood on the sidelines as the state's payday
lending industry flared in the late 1990s. According to the Associated Press, the
industry did not take root in California until 1997, but thereafter "tripled in size
each year" until 2002. 357 California's regulation has been held hostage while the
legislature has debated and negotiated what to do about the problem for over
three years. 358 Recently the Attorney General's office handed off oversight
responsibilities of payday lenders (but not check cashers) to the Department of
Corporations. 359 This dynamic environment has created uncertainty over the total
350 CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
351 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1916-1, 1916-3 (West 1985).
352 CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 23000-23106 (West Supp. 2005).
353 Id. § 23036(a). Until recently, California law also allowed a ten dollar "set up fee."
Associated Press, Davis Approves Audits, Study of Payday Lending Industry, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRmB., Sept. 22, 2002, at A4. The CDDTL still authorizes a payday lender's returned
check fee of $15. CAL. FN. CODE § 23036(e) (West Supp. 2005).
354 CAL. FIN. CODE § 23037(a) (West Supp. 2005).355 Id.
3 5 6 1d. § 23036(c).
357 Associated Press, supra note 353.
35 8 Jim Evans, California's "Payday" Policing Up in the Air, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb.
6, 2004, at D1, available at 2004 WLNR 12390767.
359 Id.; CAL CIV. CODE § 1789.35(e) (West Supp. 2005) (Attorney General charged with
enforcing check cashing law).
[Vol. 66:653
PREDATORY LENDING AND THE MILITARY
number of payday lenders in the state. For our research, we have relied on data
supplied to us by the state Attorney General's office, which lists a total of 2294
payday lenders in the state. 360 Even assuming the Attorney General's
conservatively small count, this is probably the largest number of payday lenders
in any state. However with a population of about 34 million, this suggests that
there are approximately 6.64 payday lenders per 100,000 people, placing
California toward the very bottom in per capita payday lender density.
Of California's 58 counties, several counties with a significant military
presence or legacy ranked highest in payday lending. San Bernardino and San
Diego counties, perhaps the two counties in the state with the greatest military
presence, both rank among the top five counties in terms of the number and
density of payday lending. San Bernardino County, home to Fort Irwin Army
Training Facility, Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base, the eastern gates of
Edward Air Force Base, China Lake Naval Weapons Facility, and several
recently closed bases, is tied for the county with the highest density of payday
lenders in the state. This county has 161 payday lenders, but only 217 banks,
giving it the highest bank-to-payday lender ratio in the state. San Bernardino
County has nearly 45 more payday lenders than one would expect, given its
countywide population. San Diego County, home to Camp Pendleton and a host
of naval installations, has 238 payday lenders, making it second only to Los
Angeles County and giving it about 50 more than its population would suggest.
Interestingly, Orange County, which neighbors San Diego County and has only a
few thousand more people-but no significant military presence-has 73 fewer
payday lenders. Sacramento County, though presently home to only 2100
military persons, was in recent years home to three military installations
(Sacramento Army Depot and the McClellan and Mather Air Force Bases).
Although the bases are closed today, many of the payday lenders that were
established before the closures are still in business. The economic hardship
wrought by the base closings may be partly responsible for the continued
presence of the payday lenders in the area.
360 CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., CALIFORNIA DEFERRED DEPOSIT
LENDER LIST (2003) (on file with authors) (provided on floppy disk by authors upon request).
There are reports of much larger numbers of payday lenders in California. One Bloomberg
News newspaper article provides an unattributed estimate of over 5600 payday lenders in
California. Robinson, supra note 221. Some of the discrepancy may be due to growth in the
industry or the Bloomberg News figure may include check cashers not specifically licensed
as payday lenders. We also believe California probably has an unusually high number of
unlicensed payday lenders given the recent regulatory handoff from the Attorney General's
office to the Department of Corporations. See Evans, supra note 358. We have cautiously
relied on the Attorney General's figures, which, in the worst case, conservatively undercount
the number of payday lenders near military installations.
20051
720 OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 66:653
o Y,
a
c c C3g
co
"o
2A
15 M
2,
I--
PREDATORY LENDING AND THE MILITARY
Smaller military counties in California also have greater than expected
densities of payday lenders. Yuba County, home to Beale Air Force Base and
with only a little over 60,000 people, has at least five payday lenders-about two
more than one would expect given statewide averages. Five additional payday
lenders are located just across the county line in Yuba City, a town of only about
30,000 people and situated less than ten miles from the somewhat isolated U2
spy plane base. The other counties ranking in the top ten in number and density
of payday lenders include Los Angeles County and several in the impoverished
San Joaquin Valley, where poverty rates are typically over 15%.
Based on statewide averages, we found higher than expected densities of
payday lenders around military bases when mapped at ZIP code level as well.
Fourteen of the top 20 payday lending ZIP codes in California are within five
miles of an active or recently closed military installation. Perhaps the most telling
picture emerged just south of Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base in Oceanside.
The ZIP code at Camp Pendleton's southern gate is a relatively affluent,
beachfront community-hardly the place one would expect a large number of
payday lenders. Yet this ZIP code region (92054) has 22 payday lenders, five
more than any of the other 1661 ZIP code regions in California. Given
Oceanside's population, there should be roughly five payday lenders, but it has
seventeen more than what would be expected. Even if one were to consider the
entire population of 30,000 Marines at Camp Pendleton as part of Oceanside's
demographics, there would still be at least thirteen extra payday lenders, four
more than we found in all of Main County (population 250,000). Oceanside
(92054) has six more payday lenders than banks. For the sake of comparison, the
neighboring ZIP codes in Carlsbad, California (92008 and 92009) have 3000
more people than Oceanside (92054) but only two payday lenders. Admittedly,
Carlsbad is slightly more affluent than Oceanside, but this cannot explain the
stark difference in the number and density of payday lenders in these two
neighboring towns. Clearly, the difference is Oceanside's proximity to the nearly
30,000 Marines stationed at Camp Pendleton.
2005]
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San Diego County was the location chosen in California for a street-level
analysis, which is partially reproduced in Map 1. Since San Diego County is
large and includes multiple military installations, our primary focus was on the
Camp Pendleton region, but other military neighborhoods were also examined
and analyzed. In the three-mile buffer zone around Camp Pendleton (and its
adjacent DOD property, such as the Fallbrook Naval Weapons Annex), we found
24 payday lenders. This is ten percent of all the payday lenders we were able to
map in all of San Diego County. By comparison, there were 25 banks in this
three-mile buffer, representing only 4.65% of the total bank branches mapped in
San Diego County. Approximately 148,859 people live inside this three-mile
buffer zone, accounting for just over five percent of the county's population.
Combined, the buffer zone extending three to nine miles around the base has
only sixteen payday lenders, although there are 204,396 persons living in these
buffer zones.
The rest of San Diego County is speckled with military installations. Rather
than placing buffer zones around individual DOD properties on this map, which
was the practice in other cases, we instead placed buffer zones around census
tracts with high percentages of military persons. This method was employed for
this area because DOD installations are so numerous and so scattered in San
Diego County that the map would have virtually no space not covered by a buffer
zone. Also, many of the service persons and their families do not live on-base, as
was the case with many of the military towns we examined. Instead, we focused
on census tracts with over ten percent of the population aged 18 to 64 actively
serving in the Armed Forces, designating them military census tracts. Buffers
were created around each of these tracts. The primary value of this map is to
show the dispersed nature of the military population in San Diego. The
heightened density of payday lending in these neighborhoods is less suggestive
than it is in Oceanside, but it is visible nevertheless. None of the military
neighborhoods in San Diego are lacking multiple payday lenders, though several
are not well-served by banks. Countywide, more than two-thirds of the payday
lenders are within three miles of a military neighborhood, while less than half of
the banks are within the same three-mile buffer.
2005]
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4. Colorado
Section 5-12-103 of Colorado's state code makes it a felony to lend at
interest rates in excess of 45% percent per annum. 361 Historically, supervised
small loan lenders in Colorado were limited to a 36% interest rate for loans of
less than $1000.362 However, like many other states, payday lenders have
successfully pressured the Colorado legislature into granting them a special
exemption from the criminal usury law.363 The Colorado Deferred Deposit Loan
Act (DDLA) gives licensed payday lenders the right to charge 20% of the first
$300 loaned, plus 7.5% of any amount loaned in excess of $300.364 For a typical
two-week $300 payday loan, this amounts to an annual percentage rate of about
520%. Once the loan is made, Colorado law authorizes accrual of interest for
only the first 40 days after the loan transaction date; even if the lender chooses to
delay completion of the transaction beyond this time, the lender is not supposed
to charge any additional fees. 365 To prevent lenders from indefinitely extending
the 40-day loan period through periodic "renewals," the Colorado legislature has
instructed payday lenders not to renew loans more than once. 366 Still, payday
lenders are free to refinance a payday loan under the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code (UCCC) with a maximum annual interest rate of 36%.367 However,
Colorado has no program to actually guarantee that consumers do not extend
their payday loans indefinitely by switching between different lenders, nor by
extending loans with one lender.
361 COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-12-103 (2004). Section 18-15-104(1) states:
Any person who knowingly charges, takes, or receives any money or other
property as a loan finance charge where the charge exceeds an annual percentage rate of
forty-five percent or the equivalent for a longer or shorter period commits the crime of
criminal usury, which is a class 6 felony.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-104(1) (2004).
362 1d. § 5-2-201.
363 1d. § 18-15-104(4)(a).
364 Id. § 5-3.1-105. A consumer borrowing $100 must write a check for $120 so that the
lender may take its $20 fee from the check. Assuming that the consumer borrows this money
for fourteen days subject to a 20% fee, the effective annual interest rate is 520%.
365 Id. § 5-3.1-103.
366 Id. § 5-3.1-108(1). The DDLA, as introduced by Colorado Senate Bill 00-144, would
have allowed up to three renewals on a single deferred deposit loan, but the Senate Business
Affairs and Labor Committee reduced that number to just one. Letter from Laura E. Udis,
Administrator of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 2 (June 27, 2000),
http://www.ago.state.co.us/UCCC/opinions/deferdeploan062700.pdf.
367 COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(4) (2004); Letter from Laura E. Udis, supra note 366,
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Nevertheless, unlike many states, Colorado officials have made some
significant efforts to enforce the loan duration limitations in their payday lending
statute. For example, in July 2001, Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar filed
a civil lawsuit in state court against ACE Cash Express, Inc., the largest check-
cashing business in the country, 368 for violating the DDLA.369 Salazar accused
ACE of regularly allowing borrowers to renew payday loans far more times than
allowed under the state rollover limit.370 Moreover, ACE had not even bothered
to obtain a license to operate legally under Colorado state law. 371 ACE removed
the case to federal court, claiming that it was an agent of California-based Goleta
National Bank.372 Employing a "charter-renting" argument, ACE argued that the
federal National Bank Act preempted any state law claims arising under the
DDLA.373 The Federal District Court of Colorado disagreed, however, finding
that resolution of Salazar's complaint was not controlled by the National Bank
Act.374 Even though ACE Cash Express may have been an agent of Goleta, the
court distinguished Marquette because ACE was not a subsidiary of Goleta.37
5
The court further stated that ACE and Goleta were "separate entities" and, thus,
ACE could not escape the authority of Colorado state law. 376 After the case was
remanded to state court, ACE settled with the Colorado Attorney General,
agreeing to pay $1.3 million in restitution to Colorado consumers and to comply
with Colorado's payday lending laws in the future.377
In October 2002, Salazar again initiated disciplinary proceedings, this time
against Americash, a Knoxville, Tennessee-based payday lender operating ten
payday loan stores in Denver and Colorado Springs.378 As before, Salazar
at 2. Specifically, a payday lender may charge either (1) 36% interest for the first $1000,
21% interest on any balance in the amount of $1000 to $3000, and 15% interest on any part
of the loan in excess of $3000 or (2) 21% interest on the entire loan. Id. § 5-2-201(2).
368 Press Release, California Reinvestment Comm., Community Groups Warn Goleta
National Bank Shareholders of Dangers of Ace Cash Express Partnership (May 23, 2002),
http://www.calreinvest.org/PRESS/press_52302.html.
369 Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of Colo., ACE Cash Express to Pay $1.3
Million in Restitution to Consumers (May 6, 2002),
http://www.ago.state.co.us/pressdetail.cfm?presslD=37 1.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 People v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1284 (D. Colo. 2002).
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 1285.
377 Office of the Attorney General of Colo., supra note 369.
378 Americash Shut Down, DENV. Bus. J., Nov. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.bizjoumals.com/denver/stories/2003/11/17/dailyl6.html.
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claimed that Americash was operating in violation of Colorado's payday lending
law by renewing loans more than one time and by falsifying its records to make it
appear as if the borrower had paid off the original loan in full before obtaining a
new loan. 379 One year later, Americash settled with the Attorney General,
agreeing not to engage in payday lending in the future in Colorado. It further
consented to surrender its license and pay $18,000 in damages. 380 Colorado
officials said they would use the money in part to reimburse the costs incurred in
prosecuting the case and for consumer education.381
Colorado ranks toward the bottom of our list of states in terms of the number
and the density of payday lending. Colorado has 4.3 million people, 361 payday
lenders, and 1390 banks.382 The relative lack of payday lending statewide may be
partially attributable to the general prosperity and relatively well-funded
educational system in Colorado. Still, where payday lenders are found in high
concentrations, they tend to be near military installations. There are 63 counties
in Colorado and only six of them either house or border a military installation.
These same six counties are the six top counties in the state for payday lending.
The two counties most densely populated with payday lenders in our composite
ranking, Pueblo and El Paso, both share the Army Base at Fort Carson. These
two military counties alone account for 26% of the payday lenders in the entire
state.
379 Id.
380 Id.
3 8 1 Id.
382 Uniform Consumer Credit Code Div., Colo. Depart. of Law, Colo. Deferred Deposit
Lender List, Dec. 2003 (on file with authors) (provided in digital format by authors upon
request).
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PREDATORYLENDING AND THE MILITARY
At the ZIP code level, the military districts in Colorado also stand out in our
ranking of payday lending regions. One of the worst ZIP codes in the state is
80012 in Aurora, Colorado. Situated essentially in the middle of two recently
closed bases (Lowry Air Force Base and Fitzsimons Army Medical Center) and
the still-active Buckley Air Force Base/Air National Guard Base, this ZIP code
has fifteen banks and eleven payday lenders, the third most of any ZIP code in
the state and 7.4 more payday lenders than statistically expected.
A ZIP code analysis clearly demonstrates that the Fort Carson area is the
favorite spot in the state for payday lenders. Bordering Fort Carson on the south
is Pueblo, Colorado. Pueblo has only seven ZIP codes, but still manages to
include the first, sixth, and ninth worst ZIP codes in the state. Pueblo has 36
banks and 28 payday lenders-nearly double our statistical expectations. Eight of
those payday lenders are in Pueblo ZIP code 81008, which directly borders Fort
Carson. Because this ZIP code has less than 7000 people in it, statewide averages
suggest there should not be a single payday lender operating there. Instead, the
ZIP code bordering Fort Carson has the highest density of payday lenders per
capita in the state.
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The northern part of Fort Carson is bordered by Colorado Springs, one of the
United States' best known "military towns," and is therefore an ideal case study
site for additional analysis. Colorado Springs is a fairly large city and has 24 ZIP
codes. Five of them rank among the worst in the state and contain most of the 65
payday lenders citywide. As illustrated in Map 2, almost all of the nearly 27 extra
payday lenders in Colorado Springs are in three ZIP codes located very close to
Fort Carson and Peterson Air Force Base. For example, ZIP code 80909 has
thirteen payday lenders, the most of any ZIP code in the state and almost ten
more than we predicted based on the local population. The second worst ZIP
code in the state (80916) has only two banks but nine payday lenders for its
32,000 people. Most of the payday lenders in this part of town are on Academy
Boulevard. This street, which runs south from the Air Force Academy toward the
other two bases in town has at least nineteen payday lenders, with two more just
off Academy Boulevard. Seventeen of the payday lenders on Academy are along
a roughly five-mile stretch in the neighborhoods closest to Peterson Air Force
Base and Fort Carson. By contrast, only six banks can be found along the same
five-mile stretch of Academy Boulevard. This stretch of highway is very likely
home to one of the heaviest concentrations of payday lenders anywhere in the
country. Thirty-eight of the 63 payday lenders (60.3%) whose addresses could be
matched in El Paso County were within three miles of Peterson Air Force Base or
Fort Carson, which are only a few miles apart. That is more than ten percent of
the total number of payday lenders statewide, serving only three percent of the
state's population, and about 26 more payday lenders than statistically expected
given the number of people inside that perimeter.
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5. Delaware
Delaware has long had a reputation for its laissez faire corporate, tax, and
banking laws. In the wake of the Marquette decision, Delaware actively
encouraged banks to export the state's regulatory environment to states more
focused on consumer protection issues. Today, the state is well-known as the
epicenter of the nation's credit card lending operations. Delaware also imposes
no interest rate cap for payday loans allowing lenders to charge interest "as the
agreement governing the loan provides. '383 Delaware law purports to limit the
duration of payday loans to 60 days and the number of payday loan rollovers to
no more than four times.384 However, the effect of these provisions is ambiguous
in that payday lenders may refinance the entire outstanding and unpaid amount of
a payday loan, and they may even charge a refinancing fee for doing so.385
Lenders operating in states with strict payday lending laws now consistently
seek to partner with Delaware banks in order to export Delaware's deregulated
interest rates to their home states. 386 For example, First Bank of Delaware, which
rents its charter to payday lenders around the country, had $5 million in
outstanding payday loans by the end of 2002, equating to 20% of its total
assets.387 Similarly, the State of New York has accused County Bank of
Rehoboth Beach, a Delaware-chartered state bank, of criminally facilitating
evasion of New York's usury laws. 388 In a different vein, PDL Marketing, LLC
is a Delaware-based company that generates 7000 payday loan applications each
day for payday lenders located throughout the United States.389
For our purposes, Delaware is also of interest because it is home to Dover
Air Force Base, which is the best example of an urban, East Coast base in a small
state. Despite its liberal banking environment, payday lending is no more
common here than it is in some rural southern states. Delaware has 256 banks
383 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2229 (2001).
384 Id. §§ 2227(7), 2235A(a)(1) (Supp. 2004).
385 Id. § 2235A(c).
386 Consumer Federation of America, Consumer and Cmty. Groups Call on Fed.
Reserve Bd. to Halt Rent-A-Bank Payday Lending by Del. Bank (Apr. 15, 2003),
http://www.consumerfed.org/FedLetter.html.
387 Id.
388 People v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, No. 1:03-CV- 1320 (N.D.N.Y. May 25,
2004), www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL230044pub/links.shtml (subscription
required).
389 Press Release, PRWeb, Del. Based PDLMarketing.com Driving Force Behind
America's Newest Bus. Success Stories (Jan. 10, 2005),
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2005/1/prweb 194851 .php.
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and 120 payday lenders390 for its 784,000 people. These numbers rank it in the
upper half in terms of payday lending density among the states we surveyed.
There are only three counties in Delaware, but Kent County, which includes
Dover A.F.B., ranks first in the state in payday lending activity. In Kent County
there are approximately 127,000 people, 32 banks and 30 payday lenders. This is
about ten more payday lenders than predicted for that population according to our
statistics.
390 Del. Office of the State Bank Comm'r, Non-Depository Institutions (Dec. 1,2003),
http://www.state.de.us/bank/information/nondepsearch.shtml (search parameters included
"all licensed lenders").
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Because of Delaware's lack of consumer protection laws, we expected to
find the majority of the high-ranking ZIP codes bordering other nearby states that
would serve borrowers from Maryland and New Jersey. This payday lender
location strategy was evident to some extent. However, as Map 3 illustrates, the
ZIP codes that ranked first and second for payday lending density statewide were
both next to-the Air Force Base in Dover. Dover ZIP 19901 had less than 32,000
people and six banks, but had fifteen payday lenders, which amounts to ten more
than statewide averages would lead us to expect based on this population. Just a
few miles from the base is Milford (ZIP 19963). Though only populated by less
than 15,000 people, Milford has seven banks and eight payday lenders, which is
about six lenders above statistical expectations.
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Dover Air Force Base was selected for additional street-level analysis. In the
first two miles from the base, we could find only one bank, but six payday
lenders. We saw a slight return to normalcy between two and three miles from
the base, as banks outnumbered payday lenders at a ratio of nine banks to five
payday lenders.
PREDA TOR YLENDING AND THE MILITARY
Delaware ZIP Codes Ranked by Payday Lending Activity
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6. Florida
Like other states discussed so far, Florida has legislation specifically
authorizing payday lenders to exceed the state's interest rate cap.391 Under
Florida law, payday lenders may charge ten percent of the loan. Payday lenders
are also authorized to charge the borrower a "verification fee" of no more than
five dollars. 392 Combined, the two charges allow Florida lenders to charge an
effective annual percentage rate of 390%. 393
On the other hand, Florida has been innovative in trying new ways to avoid
the problem of chronic rollovers by borrowers who are unable to repay their
initial payday loans when due. First, the Deferred Presentment Act strictly
prohibits any rollover of a payday loan;394 indeed, a borrower must wait 24 hours
after redeeming or otherwise terminating a payday loan before entering into
another payday loan transaction.395 Second, the Act forbids a lender from
redeeming, extending, or otherwise consolidating a payday loan with the
proceeds of an additional payday loan made by the same or an affiliated
lender.396 Finally, it prohibits a lender from extending a payday loan to any
person who has an outstanding payday loan with that lender or with any other
payday lender.397 To facilitate compliance with these requirements, Florida has
implemented a common database, accessible via the internet, connecting all
deferred presentment providers.398 Lenders must submit the personal information
of any borrower entering into a payday loan into the database, including the
borrower's name, address, social security number, driver's license number,
amount of the transaction, and the dates that the transaction commences and
terminates. 399 Florida has experienced an 82% decrease in multiple outstanding
391 The Deferred Presentment Act effectively exempts payday loans from the state's
normal usury laws capping interest at an annual rate of 18%. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 687.02(1), 687.03(1) (West 2003).
392 Id. § 560.404(6) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
393 For every $100 loaned, a payday lender may charge interest of ten dollars and a
verification fee of five dollars, amounting to a total fee of 15%; assuming an average loan
duration of fourteen days, the annual percentage rate of interest is 390%.
3 9 4 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(18) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
395 Id. § 560.404(19).
396 1d. § 560.404(18).
397 Id. § 560.404(19).
398 d. § 560.404(23).
399 Id. The information entered in to the database is confidential except when payday
lenders need to access it to verify whether a potential borrower has any outstanding (or
recently terminated) deferred presentment transactions. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(23)
(West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
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payday loans since implementing the internet database. 400
Moreover, if a borrower cannot repay a payday loan at the end of the loan's
original term, Florida's Deferred Presentment Act also imposes strict regulations
on both the lender and the borrower. First, the Act prohibits the lender from
depositing the check so long as the borrower informs the lender that the check
will bounce.401 Second, the lender-without any additional charge-must give
the borrower a 60-day grace period to repay the loan.40 2 Finally, the Act requires
that, as a condition of receiving the 60-day penalty-free grace period, the
borrower must enter a consumer credit counseling program with a counseling
agency approved by the State.403
Many payday lenders have actively sought to circumvent or ignore these
rules. For example, state authorities discovered that ACE Cash Express simply
chose to ignore the 390% interest rate cap.4°4 As explained below, our research
also suggests that a significant number of Florida payday lenders may have failed
to obtain licenses to operate payday loan businesses. If some lenders are not
obtaining licenses, one can only speculate to what extent these and other lenders
are registering their loans on the state database, or for that matter, complying
with rollover limitations. Nevertheless, Florida has taken some limited
enforcement measures, such as the settlement imposed on ACE Cash Express. In
exchange for Florida's withdrawing its lawsuit, ACE agreed to comply with the
Deferred Presentment Act in the future and to pay $500,000 in damages:
$250,000 to the state government and $250,000 to the University of Florida law
school.405
In this regulatory environment, Florida has developed a payday lending
industry that is relatively small, given its sizeable population of about sixteen
million people, particularly in comparison to the high payday lender numbers
found other southeastern states. In fact, Florida has about the same number of
payday lenders as Alabama or Missouri, even though it has about ten million
more people than either. Because Florida has a number of very large metropolitan
regions and mostly Air Force bases, we suspected that military towns would not
figure heavily in the pattern of payday lenders statewide. That suspicion is only
partly supported by the data.
400 Don Kennedy, It's Hard to Break Freefrom Payday Lending Trap, FLAGSHiI', June
19, 2003, http://www.flagshipnews.com/archives_2003/un 192003_2.shtml.
401 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(21) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
402 Id. § 560.404(22)(a).
403 Id.
404 Associated Press, Payday Lender Settles Florida Dispute, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Fla.), Jan. 3, 2003,
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/01/03/news_pf/Business/Paydaylender-settles.shtml.
405 Id.
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We conservatively estimate that there are 1071 payday lenders in the state.
This may be an undercount. The Florida Department of Financial Services'
Office of Financial Regulation lists 1040 firms that have submitted notices to
conduct business as a Deferred Presentment Provider.40 6 However, we found an
additional 46 businesses with the word "payday" in their business name who
apparently have not submitted such a notice; nonetheless, we chose to add those
to our list. There were several hundred more businesses with names that
suggested that they too were involved in payday lending, but we chose not to
include them in order to err on the side of caution. A search of the Reference
USA business database produced a list of 1172 businesses in the category of
"check cashing." 407 A quick survey of this list revealed that it includes well over
75% of the same businesses as the list of Deferred Present Providers published
by the State of Florida. Therefore, though we consider the official state list
somewhat short of a full account of payday lending in Florida, we are
nevertheless confident that it represents a highly reliable statistical sample of
payday lending in the state.
Duval County, which includes the city of Jacksonville, two recently closed
facilities at Whitehouse Field and Cecil Field Naval Air Stations, Jacksonville
Naval Air Station, and Mayport Naval Base, ranks first in the state for payday
lending. However, because Duval County is so large, it is difficult to tell at the
county level if the bases are specifically targeted by the payday lending industry.
Hillsborough County is second worst statewide and, like Duval County, has a
military base, MacDill Air Force Base. Yet, because the base is located in a large
city, Tampa, county-level analysis does not penmit a reliable inference as to
whether the payday lending density is caused by the presence of military
personnel. Predictably, heavily populated areas such as Broward (Miami), Polk,
and Orange Counties also rank poorly on our payday lending scale. The
remaining military counties of note are Bay County (ranked eighth of 67), which
contains Tyndall Air Force Base; Escambia County (ranked thirteenth of 67),
home to the Pensacola Naval Air Station; and Okaloosa County (ranked
eighteenth of 67), which is the principal county housing Eglin Air Force Base.
Curiously, the sixth worst county is Hamilton County, which borders Georgia's
Lowndes County, home of Moody Air Force Base.
406 Office of Financial Regulation, Fla. Dept. of Financial Serv., Licensing Data
Download Site, http://www.fldfs.com/OFR/licensing/download.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2005).
4 07 InfoUSA, ReferenceUSA, http://www.ReferenceUSA.com (last visited Oct. 17,
2005). ReferenceUSA is a commercially-prepared internet-based database sold to
corporations and libraries which contains information on U.S. and Canadian businesses,
health care providers, and consumers. See id
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At the ZIP code level, it is easier to discern the location strategy of the
payday lending industry in Florida. One of the ZIP codes adjacent to the Naval
Air Station in Jacksonville (32210) ranks first in the state for total number of
payday lenders (eleven) and ranks fifteenth worst of 916 ZIP codes statewide.
Four and a half miles north of the base, on U.S. Highway 17, is ZIP code 32205.
This ZIP code ranks second worst in the state. Together, these two ZIP codes
have approximately 87,000 people, 24 banks, and 22 payday lenders-15.2
payday lenders above the statistical prediction based on this population. The
intensity of payday lending witnessed around closed military facilities is not as
evident in Jacksonville as we have seen elsewhere, even though the
aforementioned ZIP code 32210 does border the abandoned Cecil Field. Also in
the Jacksonville area is Mayport Naval Station; with its smallish force, the area
has only two payday lenders in its adjacent ZIP codes.
MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa has three payday lenders in the ZIP code
adjacent to it, and although this is one more than our statistical prediction, the
total number is very modest, ranking this ZIP code out of the top 100 statewide.
About five miles up U.S. 92, soldiers can find a group of Tampa ZIP codes
containing over 50 payday lenders-33 more than one would predict given the
population in that part of Tampa. Given its locale, this nearby density may
undermine any greater payday lending density in the ZIP codes immediately
adjacent to MacDill.
Tyndall Air Force Base has two adjacent ZIP codes, 32401 and 32404, that
rank twenty-ninth and thirty-eighth, respectively, among Florida's 917 ZIP code
regions for payday lending. Together they have 59,000 people, sixteen banks and
ten payday lenders, about six payday lenders more than statistically projected for
this population.
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Eglin Air Force Base is massive and covers parts of several counties, but the
ZIP code closest to the main gates at Eglin is Fort Walton Beach (ZIP 32548).
This part of Fort Walton Beach has less than 22,000 people, but eight payday
lenders, which is about seven more than its smallish population would suggest.
These two statistics would likely put Fort Walton Beach in the top five statewide
for payday lending, but like other resort areas, it also has a lot of banks (24) for
its population, which drags the statistical composite ranking downward to forty-
fourth. Mary Esther, a very small ZIP code also adjacent to the beach, is similar
statistically, with only three payday lenders, but still two more than its small
population would suggest.
The biggest military installation in Florida is the Air Station at Pensacola
and, in relative terms, it has very few payday lenders. ZIP code 32507, which
essentially encloses the base, has about 28,700 people, nine banks, and five
payday lenders. This is about three lenders more than we expected given the
population. This same ZIP code, though better off than most military areas, still
ranks thirty-first worst out of 916 ZIP codes statewide and is much more crowded
with payday lenders than the other seven ZIP codes in and around Pensacola.
Pensacola Air Station was chosen for additional street-level analysis because
of its large troop levels and its peculiar infrequency of payday lending at the ZIP
code level. At this resolution, we found that the greatest concentration of payday
lenders in the Pensacola area was in a highway corridor just north of the base.
Within three miles of the base there are at least four payday lenders, but a greater
concentration of payday lending can be found if the buffer is drawn around the
enlisted housing annex at Corry Station. Six payday lenders can be found within
three miles of it, making it easily one of the heaviest concentrations of such
activity in the region.
7. Idaho
Idaho payday loan legislation strongly favors lenders. It does not include any
limitation on interest rates.408 On the contrary, like Arizona, Idaho law
specifically provides that payday loan fees "shall not be deemed interest for any
purpose of law." 409 Idaho allows three rollovers with a new round of fees for
each.410 While lenders are not supposed to issue a payday loan for the purpose of
allowing the borrower to pay off an existing payday loan from the same
lender, 411 the statute does not appear to address paying off one payday lender
with the proceeds of a loan from a different lender.
408 IDAHO CODE § 28-46-412 (2005).
409 Id. § 28-46-412(3). Lenders may further assess a fee of up to $20 for any check that
bounces or is returned for insufficient funds. Id. § 28-46-413(3).
410Id. §§ 28-46-413(6), 28-46-412(5)(b).
4 111d. § 28-46-413(2).
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Idaho, with approximately 1.3 million people, is the least populous state in
the survey, but still has about 160 payday lenders, or roughly 12.4 per 100,000
people.412 Idaho's small population, both statewide and in many of the counties
and ZIP codes, and the relatively small military presence in Idaho make it a
curiosity in terms of our study, but perhaps representative of conditions in a rural,
Mountain West state.
Mountain Home Air Force Base, home to just over 4000 troops, is in Elmore
County. Elmore ranks ninth out of 44 counties in our composite score for payday
lending. Mountain Home, ZIP code 83647, ranks sixth out of 251 ZIP code areas
in the state with a ratio of four payday lenders to every seven banks. Although
four payday lenders may seem insignificant, it is still double what one would
expect in Idaho given the tiny population of Mountain Home (16,600). Two of
the four payday lenders list their address as "Airbase Road," clearly indicating
their target demographic.
412 STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, PAYDAY LENDERS LIST (November 26,
2003), http://finance.state.id.us/industry/icc_lists.asp.
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8. Kentucky
In Kentucky, payday lenders may charge fees equating to an effective annual
interest rate of 459%.413 However, Kentucky law is clear that this charge is a
"service fee," not interest.414 As a result, payday lenders are not subject to the
Commonwealth's interest rate cap of 19%.415 In the event that a borrower's
check bounces, a lender may charge, in addition to its service fee, a returned
check fee in any amount, so long as that amount is disclosed to the borrower in
the original loan documents.416 Once a lender extends a payday loan to a
borrower, the lender may not enter into any further payday loan transactions with
the same borrower until the original loan is terminated. 417 However, a consumer
may enter into a second payday loan transaction at any one time, provided that
the loans are from two different lenders and that the aggregate amount of the
loans does not exceed $500. 4 18 Finally, a lender may not renew, roll over, or
consolidate a payday loan, unless it does so without charging the borrower a
fee. 4 19
413 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(2) (West 2004). Specifically, a payday loan fee may
not exceed 15% of the face amount of the check. Id. For example, for every $100 check
written, the borrower receives $85 while the lender receives $15. As a result, the borrower
actually incurs a charge of 17.65%; assuming an average payday loan duration of fourteen
days, the borrower is charged an effective annual percentage rate of 459%.
414 Id.
415 See id. § 360.010(1).
4 16 Id. § 368.102(3).
4 17 Id. § 368.100(10).
418 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(11) (West 2004).
4 19 Id. § 368.100(15).
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
According to the Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions, the
Commonwealth has 583 payday lenders. 420 At the county level, the state's two
military counties stand out statistically. The worst county in the state for payday
lending is Christian County, where most of the troops at Fort Campbell live. It
has 21 banks and eighteen payday lenders for its roughly 72,000 people. This is
nearly 25 payday lenders per 100,000 and seven more than statistically expected
for the population here, which includes the Kentucky component of the on-base
population. Ranking fifth out of 120 counties in Kentucky is Hardin County,
home to Fort Knox. Ironically, this county has 22 payday lenders to its 38 banks
for its nearly 100,000 people. By comparison, Fayette County, which includes
metropolitan Lexington and 260,000 people, has only four more payday lenders,
but 63 more banks.
4 2 0 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, PAYDAY
LENDER LIST (June 15, 2004) (on file with authors) (provided in digital format by authors'
request).
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The county in Tennessee serving Fort Campbell's soldiers is Montgomery
County. It has 21 payday lenders for its 134,000 residents, including those on-
base. In terms of total number of lenders, it ranks thirteenth among Tennessee's
95 counties, but in terms of per capita density, Montgomery ranks in the middle
percentile.
At the ZIP code level, locations adjacent to military bases appear highly
attractive to payday lenders. The top four ZIP code regions in the state are all
located near the state's only two military bases. Radcliff (ZIP 40160), which lies
adjacent to Fort Knox Army Base, has the greatest composite density of payday
lenders in the state. Though home to only 24,000 people and six banks, it has
managed to attract twelve payday lenders, 8.6 more than statistically predicted.
Radcliff ranks poorly in virtually all of our statistical categories and is the single
most targeted location in the state of Kentucky for payday lending.
Oak Grove, probably the place most soldiers at Fort Campbell would go for a
payday loan, has eight lenders to chose from, but only one bank. With less than
8000 people in Oak Grove, statewide averages predict only one payday lender in
this ZIP code, unless you include the more than 20,000 soldiers stationed at Fort
Campbell. Even when we added those soldiers to Oak Grove's population, there
are still 3.5 payday lenders beyond the expected number. Hopkinsville and
Clarksville, Tennessee, which sandwich Oak Grove on Highway 41, offer
another ten payday lenders for the soldiers at Fort Campbell to choose from. The
density of nearby competition, both in Kentucky and just across the border in
Tennessee, makes the number of payday lenders in Oak Grove even more
statistically dramatic.421
421 For a closely related discussion of payday lending in Tennessee, see infra Section
IV.B.17.
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The Fort Campbell area was also chosen for street-level analysis, and at this
resolution, the pattern is remarkable. As illustrated in Map 4, within three miles
of the main entrance to the base, we located seventeen payday lenders and ten
banks. Outside the three-mile buffer in the surrounding region there are 23
payday lenders and 69 banks. Twenty-four of the 41 total payday lenders in the
region are located on Fort Campbell Boulevard.
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9. Louisiana
Payday lenders in Louisiana operate under the authority of the Deferred
Presentment and Small Loan Act (DPSLA).422 The DPSLA allows lenders to
charge interest rates of as much as 520%,423 well exceeding Louisiana's usury
law prohibiting conventional interest in excess of 12%.424 The Act prohibits
lenders from extending payday loans that exceed a term of 60 days425 or are for
an amount greater than $350.426 If the borrower cannot repay a payday loan on
time, the lender may continue charging interest, but at a reduced rate (36%
annual interest during the first 365 days following the extension, and then 18%
annual interest thereafter). 427 If the borrower's check bounces for any reason
upon the lender's attempted deposit, the lender may recover a returned check
fee.428 The Act's protections for consumers are minimal-lenders may not divide
a payday loan into multiple agreements for the purpose of charging a higher
fee,429 nor may they renew or roll over a payday loan.430 However, a lender may
make a new payday loan to a borrower if the borrower pays off at least 25% of
the original loan. 431
Louisiana has two major military installations: the Army's Fort Polk and
Barksdale Air Force Base. Louisiana also has 685 payday lenders and 1524
banks.432 Because it has about 4.5 million people, it ranks sixth among the 20
states in our survey in terms of the density of payday lending but better than most
of the other southern states in our survey.
4 2 2 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3578.1 to 9:3578.8 (2004).
423 Id. § 9:3578.4.A. Specifically, the Act allows a payday lender to charge a fee of
16.75% "of the face amount of the check issued." Id. Consequently, a consumer borrowing
$100 must write a check for $120, which is the equivalent of 20% interest. Assuming an
average loan duration of fourteen days, Louisiana's DPSLA allows payday lenders to charge
an annual interest rate of 520%.
424 Id. § 9:3500.C.
425 Id. § 9:3578.3(6).
426 ld. § 9:3578.3(2)(c).
427 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3578.4.A (2004).
4281 d. § 9:3578.4.B. The returned check fee must be for the same amount that the
lender's banking institution charged the lender for returning the check. Id However, this
returned check fee may be assessed only one time per check, regardless of the number of
times that the check was returned to the lender by the lender's bank. Id.
429 Id. § 9:3578.6.A(4).
430 Id. § 9:3578.6.A(7).
431 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3578.6.A (2004).
432 STATE OF LOUIsIANA, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INsTrrUTIONs, PAYDAY LENDER
LIST (2001) (on file with authors) (list mailed on authors' request).
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Louisiana has many places where quick loans would seem popular, from the
third-world like poverty of the Delta, to the swamps of the Achafalaya Basin, to
the streets of New Orleans. The swampy St. Martin's Parish has the worst payday
lending numbers in the state at the county level. The second and third worst
parishes are two less likely candidates for payday lending, until you factor in
military demographics. 433 Bossier Parish, home to Barksdale Air Force Base, has
almost 100,000 people, 22 banks, and 24 payday lenders, about eight more than
expected. These statistics rank it second worst among the 64 parishes in
Louisiana. Vernon Parish ranks third worst, and with just over 50,000 people and
fourteen banks, its fourteen payday lenders are well above what one would
expect in rural Louisiana were it not for the presence of Fort Polk in the heart of
Vernon Parish.
433 Parishes are the functional and geographic equivalent of counties in Louisiana.
2005]
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At the ZIP code level, the pattern is similar. Two ZIP codes in Baton Rouge
have the worst ranking for payday lending statewide, but military-adjacent ZIP
codes in Louisiana are not absent from our rankings. ZIP codes 71112 and
71111, which flank Barksdale Air Force Base in Bossier City, rank fifth and
ninth in the state respectively. These two ZIP codes have fifteen banks and 23
payday lenders serving roughly 57,000 people, or fourteen more than statistically
expected given their combined populations. The second highest composite
density ZIP code in the state (71118) is just across the river in Shreveport. Its
fifteen payday lenders are available to service men and women at Barksdale after
only a short and commonly made trip across the Red River into Shreveport.
760 OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 66:653
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The composite score for payday lending is fourth highest in Leesville (ZIP
71446). Leesville has 12 banks and 14 payday lenders for its approximately
24,000 people-10.33 more payday lenders than the population would suggest,
even if the population of soldiers at Fort Polk were included.
Leesville was selected for additional neighborhood analysis, which revealed
that payday lenders were crowded around the main entrance to Fort Polk and less
frequent in Leesville itself, which lies some six miles up Louisiana Highway 171.
We found six payday lenders and one bank located less than a mile from Fort
Polk's border. In the three-mile buffer, we were able to map fourteen payday
lenders and ten banks, but upon closer inspection we found that five of the
payday lenders were crammed along Entrance Road, located within a mile of the
base. Soldiers traveling to Leesville would pass five additional payday lenders in
the next two miles. In Leesville itself, there were only three payday lenders, only
one of which was not on the main route toward the base.
10. Missouri
Missouri's payday lending law is one of the most creditor-friendly in the
nation. The statute actually authorizes lenders to charge fees equating to an
annual interest rate of 1950%. 434 Lenders are also essentially free to turn these
loans into long-term obligations by allowing borrowers to renew six times, so
long as the borrower pays down the loan by at least five percent upon each
renewal.435 Lenders may not accept repayment out of the proceeds of another
payday loan made by the same or an affiliated lender.436 However, lenders are
not required to use a unified system to track whether consumers have more than
one loan outstanding with other non-affiliated lenders.
Missouri is another state with a large number and high density of payday
lenders. There are roughly 5.6 million people in Missouri, and they have some
2193 banks and 1138 payday lenders from which to choose.437 There are more
than 20 payday lenders per 100,000 people in the state, ranking it fifth worst
among the 20 states in our survey. Fort Leonard Wood and Whiteman Air Force
Base are the only significant military installations in the state. Because Fort
Leonard Wood has many missions and functions partly as a training facility,
434 A lender in Missouri may charge 75% interest on any payday loan. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 408.505(3) (2005). Assuming an average loan duration of fourteen days, this equates to an
eye-popping annual rate of 1950%. It should be noted, however, that the 75% in interest
authorized by Missouri law applies to the total of the initial loan and up to six renewals. Id.
§§ 408.505(3), 408.500(6).
4 3 5 Id. § 408.500(6).
436 Id. § 408.505(5).
437 STATE OF MissouRI, DIVISION OF FINANCE, SECTION 408.500, SMALL, SMALL LOAN
COMPANIES (Dec. 16, 2004), http://www.missouri-finance.org/pdfs/smallsmallloans.pdf.
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estimates of its population vary from just over 10,000 to more than 20,000
personnel, many of whom are from branches other than the Army. 438 Whiteman
Air Force Base houses approximately 4000 service persons.
With sixteen payday lenders and just over 41,000 people, Pulaski County,
home to Fort Leonard Wood; ranks eleventh of 115 counties in terms of the
number and density of payday lending. Neighboring Laclede County ranks tenth
in the state, despite its isolation in south-central Missouri.
438 Two sources from the DOD provide divergent estimates of troop levels at Fort
Leonard Wood. The DOD's Base Structure Report estimates roughly 20,000 troops and the
DOD's Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports estimates troops to be around
10,000. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 284; DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION
OPERATIONS AND REPORTS, STATISTICAL INFORMATION ANALYSIS DIVISION WORK FORCE
PUBLICATIONS (Fiscal Year 2004),
http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/L03/fy04/ATLAS_2004.pdf.
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At the ZIP code level, the effect of the base on Fort Leonard Wood's tiny
gateway town is evident. Although St. Robert has only 5200 people, apparently
enough to support only two banks, eight payday lenders have decided it is a good
location-seven more than necessary according to statistical predictions. Given
the number and density of payday lending for this population, St. Robert is the
second worst place in the state for this activity. While Whiteman Air Force Base
has been somewhat spared of payday lenders, the tiny town of Windsor, less than
five miles from the base on Route 23, has attracted as many payday lenders (four)
as banks, thereby earning the town a ranking in the top 30 statewide for payday
lending.
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11. New York
Proponents of the payday lending industry have thus far failed to sway the
New York state legislature to their cause. Unlike most states with a significant
military presence, New York has steadfastly stood by its criminal and civil
interest rate caps. Except where authorized, New York's civil usury law imposes
a maximum interest rate of 16% per year.439 And New York also has a criminal
usury law which makes lending at interest rates over 25% per annum a class E
felony for first offenses, and a class C felony for subsequent offenses.440 To
further reinforce the state's prohibition against payday lending, New York
expressly bars check cashers from advancing money on postdated checks and
requires them to deposit any checks cashed within one business day.441
Regulatory authorities have also aggressively pursued payday lenders. The state
banking department superintendent has unequivocally expressed disdain for
banks that rent their charters, accusing them of abusing the public trust.
442
Similarly, the New York Attorney General has accused a Delaware-chartered
state bank of criminally facilitating evasion of New York's usury laws.44 3
Nevertheless, the interaction between New York usury law and federal law
preempting interest rate caps for banks presents an interesting legal puzzle. If
payday lenders are correct in their argument that federal law legalizes "charter-
renting," then the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, under this theory,
would make payday lending as legal in New York as in other states.
We included New York in our sample both because it is home to Fort Drum,
a relatively significant Army post located near the "military town" of Watertown,
New York, and because of the state's legal and financial importance. However,
the regulatory climate in New York creates a challenging data collection
problem. State authorities actively attempt to sue or prosecute businesses found
to be engaged in payday lending, so authorities do not maintain a list of payday
lenders. Similarly, payday lenders may not list their addresses or phone numbers
439 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-a (McKinney 2004); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501.
(McKinney 2004).
440 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 190.40, 190.42 (McKinney 2004).
441 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 373 (McKinney 2004).
442 Elizabeth McCaul, Superintendent of Banks, Industry Letter on Payday Loans (June
13, 2000), http://www.banking.state.ny.us/t000613.htm ("[B]anks that choose to offer this
type of loan product at exorbitant interest rates are blatantly abusing [federal] authority.
These types of actions, when judged in the court of public opinion, can lead to a groundswell
of outrage resulting in reputational harm and safety and soundness problems.").
443 People v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, No. 1:03-CV- 1320 (N.D.N.Y. May 25,
2004), www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL230044pub/links.shtml (subscription
required).
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in commonly available telephone directories or in any other business address
database. A survey of directories in the Watertown, New York area near Fort
Drum produced no listings for "Check and Cash Advances," "Check Cashers," or
any other similar categories. In an effort to ensure that our data was as accurate
and reliable as possible, we chose to conduct in-person field work at Fort Drum
to verify the presence or absence of payday lending and/or businesses offering
equivalent services. Our field work methodology was essentially a standard
"windshield survey," which involved driving the streets and highways of our
target area, making note of and paying visits to establishments we suspect are
making payday loans, and collecting address data and other useful information.
In conducting our field work, we drove through all commercially-zoned areas
within a five-mile radius of Fort Drum's main gate and through every
commercial district of nearby Watertown. Our search focused not only on lenders
openly offering payday loans, but also businesses offering payday loans disguised
as other transactions.
Our field work revealed two outlets in the Fort Drum region offering the
functional equivalent of payday loans under the common fagade of "catalog
sales." 444 As discussed in Section II, catalog sales are a thin disguise aimed at
illegally lending in excess of state usury laws. Subsequent to conducting our field
work, the New York Attorney General's office obtained a permanent injunction
shutting down both of these lending operations, holding their owner personally
liable for restitution. 445 The Attorney General's office has subsequently
confirmed that these two payday lending locations near Fort Drum have now
ceased operations.446 Combined with our field work, this verifies that unlike
every other significant military installation in all 20 states we studied, there are
essentially no payday lenders targeting military personnel in the Fort Drum
area.447 The FDIC lists fifteen banks in Jefferson County, New York, the main
home to Fort Drum. Based upon that statistic, this county ranks perhaps best of
all the military counties in all 20 states included in our survey on all three counts:
total number of payday lenders, per capita density, and ratio to banks.
444 See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
445 See People v. JAG NY, 794 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2005).
446 Telephone Interview with Mark D. Fleischer, Assistant N.Y. Att'y Gen. (Mar. 2,
2005).
447 Nevertheless, our field work did identify numerous other potential credit sources
including traditional banks, credit unions, finance companies, rent-to-own furnishing stores,
and pawn shops.
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12. North Carolina
North Carolina provides an interesting contrast to New York. In 1997, North
Carolina enacted legislation authorizing payday lending. This statute was
comparable to those in many states included in our study in that it created a
statutory mechanism allowing payday lenders to obtain licenses authorizing them
to charge fees of 15% of the face amount of a borrower's check (an annual
interest rate cap of 459%). 448 However, the North Carolina legislature also
included a four-year "sunset provision" on the special usury law. In August 2001,
the legislature allowed the four-year experimental law to expire, despite
venomous opposition by payday lenders. 44 9 As a result, North Carolina law
reverted to its traditional small loan law which caps the annual interest rate for
small consumer loans at 36%.450 After 2001, payday lending became as illegal in
North Carolina as it is in New York.
Nevertheless, nearly four years later, North Carolina has not been able to
successfully stop payday lending in the state. Shortly after the payday lending
law expired, state authorities began to order businesses to stop making payday
448 The 1997 law authorized payday loans that did not exceed a duration of 31 days or an
amount of $300. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-281 (a), (b) (1997) (repealed 2001). It allowed lenders
to charge interest of 15% of the amount of the face amount of the check the borrower used to
borrow the money, or $17.65 for every $100 check. N.C. GEN STAT. § 53-281(d)(1997)
(repealed 2001). Assuming an average loan duration of fourteen days, payday lenders used to
be able to charge an effective annual interest rate of 459%.
449 See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, N.C. PAYDAY LENDING: HISTORY OF
PAYDAY LENDING IN N.C., http://www.responsiblelending.org/predlend nc/payday.cfin (last
visited Oct. 17, 2005). The legislature allowed the law to sunset because it was concerned
with the consumer protection issues arising from it. From 1999 to 2000, for example, the
number of payday lending companies increased by 16%, with revenues rising by 28% to
more than $123 million. See Rick Rothacker, Researchers Call For Payday Lending
Reforms, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 17, 2003, at 7D,
http://www.charlotte.com/mld/observer/5198784.htm? I c. A study conducted by the North
Carolina Banking Commissioner showed that 87% of North Carolina consumers rolled-over
their loans at least one time with any given lender. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BANKS,
REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON PAYDAY LENDING 6 (Feb. 22, 2001). Not counting
debtors who borrowed from multiple locations, 38.3% of borrowers renewed their payday
loan more than ten times. Id. About 14% of borrowers renewed their loans more than
nineteen times a year with each lender. Id.
450 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-173(a) (2004) (imposing an interest rate cap of 36% for loans
under $600, and a cap of 15% on any amount loaned from $600 to $3000). This interest rate
cap is a component of the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act (NCCFA). Id. §§ 53-164 to
53-191. Small loans under the NCCFA are generally limited to a duration of about two to
four years, but lenders may refinance loans if necessary. Id. §§ 53-181(a)(9), 53-180(a)
(2004). Lenders can also charge a five percent fee no more than twice a year. Id. § 53-
173(a)(1) (2004).
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loans. 451 A consumer advocacy organization reported that after the payday loan
law sunset, some smaller payday lending companies sold out to larger chains
while others reverted to their original check cashing business.452 Many lenders
simply continued to offer payday loans without licenses through catalog sales,
sale-leaseback transactions, and other disguises.453 Other payday lenders turned
to out-of-state banks and began payday lending under a charter-renting theory.
454
State leaders and consumer protection attorneys have waged a continuing
legal and political battle over the future of payday lending in the state. In 2002,
for example, North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper filed suit against
ACE Cash Express for offering payday loans in violation of the state's payday
lending laws.455 Only a few months later, ACE agreed to stop its payday lending
activities for one year and to pay civil penalties of $325,000.456 In February
2003, North Carolina's Office of the Comptroller of the Currency filed suit
against Advance America, Cash Advance Centers Inc., and Peoples National
Bank for engaging in illegal payday lending transactions in the state. The parties
eventually reached a settlement agreement, agreeing to end their payday lending
arrangement in North Carolina; in addition, Peoples National Bank agreed to pay
$175,000 in civil penalties. 457 Finally, in July 2004, consumers filed a series of
lawsuits against Advance America, Check into Cash, and Check 'N Go, alleging
that the lenders were exploiting poor people by luring them into quick loans that
carry exorbitantly high interest rates.458
This regulatory uncertainty created data collection challenges in studying
payday lender locations around North Carolina's important and large military
installations. Because the state Commissioner of Banks has taken the position
that payday lending is illegal in the state, it does not publish a list of payday
lenders. However, it does maintain a list of companies licensed as check
451 Richard Wagner, Court Shuts Down Payday Lender, CAROLINA J., Dec. 15, 2003,
http://www.carolinajournal.com/articles/displaystory.html?id = 1241.
452 CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 449.
453 Id.
454 Id. Using a charter-renting arrangement, as of mid-2004, Advance America was
operating 114 stores in North Carolina, generating revenues of more than $30 million per
year, and two other payday lending outlets, Check 'N Go and Check Into Cash, together had
one hundred stores in the state, bringing in combined revenues of $28 million every year. See
TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, CONSUMERS FILE CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AGAINST
THREE OF NORTH CAROLINA's LARGEST PAYDAY LENDERS, July 28, 2004,
http://www.tlpj .org/pr/ncpayday_072804.htm.
455 CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 449.
456 Id.
457 ILd.
458 TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, supra note 454.
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cashers. 459 Many of the check cashers on this list are the very companies that are
using charter-renting relationships with state banks to evade North Carolina's
interest rate cap. However, other payday lenders that do not engage in simple
check cashing are not included on this list, making it unsuitable for our purposes.
Instead we painstakingly culled payday lender addresses statewide from current
classified business and telephone directory listings.460 While significantly more
time-consuming than state regulatory databases, use of classified business and
telephone directories is widely accepted by social scientists conducting studies
similar to ours.461
Based on our analysis of classified directories, we estimate that 612 payday
lenders currently serve North Carolina's eight million-plus people. When
compared to the 2478 banks in the state, North Carolina ranks tenth of 20 states
in our survey in the total number of payday lenders, and sixteenth in per capita
459 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BANKS, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, NORTH
CAROLINA LICENSED CHECK CASHERS,
https://www.nccob.org/Online/CCS/CompanyListing.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
460 After searching dozens of business directories and telephone directories, we found
that the most reliable and extensive directory of payday lenders was to be found in several
on-line directories. We would have preferred to use the BellSouth Yellow Pages, available
on-line through Yahoo.com, because this directory allowed us to look up businesses under
the heading "Check and Cash Advances." Unfortunately, this database did not allow us to
compile a comprehensive list of payday lenders for the entire state. After some searching, we
found the business database Reference USA that offered statewide listings, but unfortunately
did not list the same businesses as "Check and Cash Advances," rather listing them as
"Check Cashing Services." After numerous trials in which we compared the directory listings
provided by both services, we became confident that the Reference USA and the BellSouth
Yellow Pages listings, though categorized under different headings, were essentially the
same list. We concede that some businesses in both databases may offer only check-cashing
services and not loans, but clearly the vast majority of those listed in the Reference USA
database are offering loans and thus we chose to use the addresses in this database as a proxy
for payday lenders. We would also like to note that the use of proxy variables is a common
and accepted practice among social scientists and researchers who conduct studies similar to
ours. From the Reference USA database, we compiled a list of 612 businesses that we will
call payday lenders. Reference USA, Category Heading: Check Cashing Services,
http://www.referenceusa.com (last viewed Oct. 17, 2005). Over half of the list is comprised
of national payday lenders such as Advance America and Check N' Go. One hundred
additional businesses on this list have words such as "loan," "advance," "payday," or "pawn"
in their names, indicating that they too are offering loans.
461 For example, John Caskey has used a similar technique to measure growth and
distribution of check cashers and pawnshops. See JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING:
CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 46 n.6 (1994) ("A comparison of the
number of pawnshop outlets listed in the classified pages of telephone books with the
number reported by state regulators shows a generally close correspondence."). Because
most lenders are anxious to advertise their services, telephone directories tend to provide
business lists as accurate or more so than comparable government databases.
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density of payday lenders at 7.60 per 100,000. This rate is much lower than its
neighbors Tennessee and South Carolina, but still above the 6.64 per 100,000
density found in Virginia, despite the fact that under state law payday lending is
legal in Virginia and illegal in North Carolina. There are six military bases in
North Carolina with over 4000 troops, but the Marine Corps' Camp LeJeune
(30,000) and the Army's Fort Bragg (40,000) are the largest. All told there are
well over 100,000 active military personnel stationed in North Carolina.
The counties with the greatest number and density of payday lenders tend to
be those with significant military activity. The county with the greatest composite
ranking in the state is Wayne County, home of Seymour Johnson Air Force Base.
Wayne County has 113,400 persons, 30 banks, and seventeen payday lenders,
which is about 8.5 more than our statistical prediction.
Craven County, where the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point is
housed, ranks fourth worst in the state. Cumberland County, which shares Fort
Bragg and encloses Pope Air Force Base, has an estimated 32 payday lenders,
ranking it third in the state for sheer volume and sixth worst out of 101 counties
on our composite payday lending score. Not far behind is Onslow County, where
Camp LeJeune is sited. Onslow County has 25 banks and fourteen payday
lenders, which gives it a ranking of eight out of 101.
20051
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PREDATORYLENDING AND THE MILITARY
The story was much the same once we examined the numbers at the ZIP code
level. It was clear that within the military counties overcrowded with payday
lenders, the ZIP codes adjacent to bases were the hottest spots for payday
lending. For example, Goldsboro, home to about 65,000 civilians and 4500
service persons at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, has nineteen banks and
seventeen payday lenders citywide, but the ratio is most uneven on the side of
town where the main base gates are located (ZIP 27534). Here, the ratio climbs to
eleven payday lenders to only four banks, and with less than 30,000 people, it is
the most thickly concentrated ZIP code in the state for payday lending.
Ranking fourth highest out of 735 possible ZIP codes in North Carolina is
Jacksonville (28546). This ZIP code, adjacent to Camp LeJeune, has almost
33,000 people, eight banks, and ten payday lenders-7.5 more than the
population would predict based on state averages. The Marine Corps Air Base at
Cherry Point is situated just up the road in Havelock. The ZIP code here (28532)
ranks tenth in the state, with its three banks and six payday lenders.
Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base share the same general space on the
west side of Fayetteville. These bases have a number of local ZIP codes with
unusually high numbers and densities of payday lenders. Fayetteville's 28303
ZIP code ranks highest among the local ZIP codes, (eight of 735) with seventeen
banks and twelve payday lenders for roughly 32,000 people. The other nearby
ZIP code of note is 28301, which has an additional nine payday lenders, helping
to make it the fourteenth worst ZIP in the state for payday lending. Another ZIP
(28311) bordering the base also has more payday lenders than one would expect
and together the three Fayetteville ZIP codes near the bases have 26 payday
lenders, 18.3 more than the population in those ZIP codes statistically warrants.
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PREDATORYLENDING AND THE MILITARY
Because Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base together constitute one of the
largest installations in the country, Fayetteville has become one of the nation's
best known "military towns" and serves as an excellent site for additional
analysis at the street level. When we mapped payday lenders in the region, we
found roughly 36 total in Cumberland County, plus two others in a neighboring
ZIP code in Harrett County, just to the north of Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force
Base.462 We were able to map the location of each payday lender, plus all 68
banks in this same region. After placing a series of one-mile buffers around the
three ZIP codes that largely constitute the two bases, we counted the banks,
payday lenders, and people living within each buffer zone.
As shown in Map 5, seven out of 36 payday lenders or about 20% of the
payday lenders in the region were within one mile of the bases, while only five of
the 68 banks (7.35%) were in that same one-mile buffer zone around the bases.
Our mapping software counted eight banks either on-base or on the bases'
immediate perimeter. There are no payday lenders on-base. Six additional payday
lenders were between one and two miles from the bases, while only one bank was
found in that zone. From two to three miles from the bases, the ratio of payday
lenders to banks begins to edge back toward statewide averages with three
payday lenders and six banks. Statewide there are roughly four banks to each
payday lender, but in the three miles adjacent to Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force
Base, the ratio is four banks to every five payday lenders.
Overall, about half of the payday lenders in the Fort Bragg region are within
three miles of the base, while only about 17.5% of the banks are in that same
three-mile zone. Even if we add in the on-base banks, only about 30% of the
banks in the region are close to the Bragg/Pope area. There are about 90,000
people living within three miles of a base and, on average, 16% of this
population is military. If this area conformed to state-wide averages, there should
be less than seven payday lenders for this population, nine fewer than what we
found in this three-mile zone around the Base. According to our statistical
measures, those nine extra payday lenders next to the bases are enough to serve
120,000 additional North Carolinians. Outside the three mile buffer, there
remains additional payday lending capacity, with at least six of the 21 remaining
area payday lenders just beyond the three mile circumferential border used in our
study.
462 A listing of addresses for the Fayetteville region listed under "Check and Cash
Advance" was downloaded from Yellow Pages and cross-checked against the database of
check cashers. We found all but two of the entries matched, boosting our confidence in the
accuracy of our proxy variable.
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PREDATORYLENDING AND THE MILITARY
13. Ohio
In Ohio, unless otherwise authorized by law, charging interest in excess of
25% per annum is criminal usury, which is a fourth degree felony.4 63 However,
the Ohio legislature has passed legislation protecting licensed payday lenders
from the criminal law statute.464 Licensed Ohio payday lenders are authorized to
charge interest of five percent per month465 in addition to an "origination fee" of
ten percent,466 which is the effective equivalent of an annual rate of interest of
390%.467 Further, payday lenders may also charge defaulting borrowers returned
check fees468 and check collection fees.469 The statute forbids allowing payday
loans to extend beyond a term of six months, the longest duration of any state
included in our survey.470 The statute also includes a prohibition of entering into
a payday loan transaction for the purpose of "retiring" an existing loan, but only
as between the original two parties.
While Ohio's large population and relatively lax payday lending regulation is
reflected by the large number of payday lenders (1042),471 the state does not have
a great density of payday lenders (9.18 per 100,000 residents), nor does it have a
sizeable number of military facilities. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near
Dayton, Ohio is the only significant active military installation in the state. This
base is large and touches at least three other counties. The off-base population is
widely scattered throughout the four-county region. Among those counties
bordering Wright-Patterson, only Greene County ranks in the top ten in payday
lending. Only Montgomery County ranks high in any of the statistical categories
we examined, and only in terms of the total number of payday lenders (165), but
given its population of over a half million people, this number is about what we
expected statistically.
463 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2905.21(H), 2905.22 (West 2004).
464Id. §§ 1315.36-1315.38.
465 Id. § 1315.39(B). Specifically, the lender may charge five percent interest "per
month or fraction of a month on the unpaid principal." Id. § 1315.39(B) (emphasis added).
4 6 6 Id. § 1315.40(A). The ten percent rate is allowed for loans under $500; if a loan
exceeds $500, the interest rate is capped at 7.5 percent.
467 Assuming an average loan duration of fourteen days, a 15% fee (including the
interest and the origination fee) equates to an annual interest rate of 390%.
468 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.40(B) (West 2004). Returned check fees are the
actual fees charged by the lender's bank for a returned check. Id.
469 Id. § 1315.40(B). Check collection fees are additional fees, not to exceed $20, that a
lender may charge a borrower for the inconvenience of depositing a worthless check. Id.
4 7 0 1d. § 1315.39(A)(2).
471 OHIO DIVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs, OHIO CHECK LENDERS (Dec. 12, 2003)
(on file with author) (provided by mail on authors' request).
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At the ZIP code level, the picture remains cloudy. For example, Fairborn
(ZIP 45324), which is Wright-Patterson's "gateway town," ranks fifty-third
among Ohio's 1016 ZIP codes because it has ten banks and seven payday lenders
for its nearly 40,000 people including those on-base. Just across U.S. 35 lies
Dayton's 45420 ZIP code. It ranks twenty-third in the state with seven banks and
six lenders for its 25,000 people. Otherwise, the ZIP codes surrounding Wright-
Patterson are statistically unremarkable.
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PREDATORY LENDING AND THE MILITARY
The street-level analysis done for Wright-Patterson did, however, show some
greater clustering around the base that the other resolutions did not. In the three-
mile buffer zone around the base, we found 21 of the 75 payday lenders in the
tri-county region. This is 28% of the region's payday lenders, but only ten
percent (25 of 242) of the region's banks are found in the same three-mile buffer
zone. In the first two miles from base, the ratio of payday lenders to banks is
twelve to eight. We have documented similarly uneven ratios in other states, but
in Ohio such an imbalance is actually quite rare. Of the 1016 ZIP code regions in
Ohio, only 38 have more payday lenders than banks, and of those, only one in
Akron has a greater imbalance between payday lending and banks than the two-
mile radius around Wright-Patterson. By taking the number of people in the
three-mile buffer, plus those living on-base, we can estimate that there should be
about 14.5 payday lenders there, which is roughly seven fewer than what we
actually found in the three miles surrounding Wright-Patterson. Because the
banks, payday lenders, and population are split into numerous ZIP codes, the
pattern we normally see at the ZIP code level is diluted. If, however, the near-
base neighborhoods were collapsed into a single ZIP code, surely it would be one
of the worst in Ohio.
14. Oklahoma
In Oklahoma, payday lenders are licensed and regulated under the state's
Deferred Deposit Loan Act (DDLA).472 The Oklahoma DDLA authorizes
payday lenders to charge a fee of $15 for every $100 loaned up to the first
$300.4 73 Assuming a fourteen-day loan of an amount within this range, the
statute allows an effective annual interest rate of 390%. The DDLA further
allows lenders to charge an additional returned check fee of $25.474 Initial loan
terms are limited to between twelve and 45 days.475 The DDLA prohibits any
renewal or rollover of a payday loan. 476 But, the Act also allows lenders to make
two payday loans to a given borrower at one time, suggesting that the prohibition
472 OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 3101-19 (Supp. 2005).
4 7 3 Id. § 3108. For payday loans of more than $300, the lender can charge an additional
$10 for every $100 advance in excess of $300. Id.
4 74 Id. § 3108(B).
475 Id. § 3106(8). However, a loan term may exceed 45 days if the debtor has entered
into an installment payment plan.
4 76 1d. § 3109(A). A renewal is defined as a transaction in which the borrower
refinances all or part of the unpaid balance of a payday loan with the proceeds of a new
payday loan, regardless of whether the new payday loan is extended by the same or a
different lender. Id. § 3102(16). A renewal is further defined as a payday loan made within
thirteen days after a previous payday loan has been entered into.between the lender and the
borrower. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 3109(C).
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on rollovers may be unenforceable. 477 To verify that a borrower has no more than
two outstanding loans, every payday lender must require the borrower to sign an
affidavit, and then the lender must "verify the accuracy of the affidavit" by
searching through the lender's own records and by searching through an on-line
database managed by a government contractor.478 The DDLA also regulates
"consecutive" payday loans, which are defined as loans extended to a borrower
no later than seven days after the date on which a previous loan was fully paid off
by that borrower.479 The Act allows a borrower to pay the fourth loan in a series
of consecutive payday loans through means of an installment payment plan for
which the lender can charge no more than $15.480 If a borrower has entered into
five consecutive payday loans, the DDLA mandates that the borrower wait until
at least 8:00 a.m. on the second business day after the fifth loan has been fully
repaid before entering into his or her next payday loan transaction.481 Finally, the
Act also establishes the regulatory revolving fund, which is intended to be used
to pay claims filed by aggrieved Oklahoma consumers. 482
Under this regulation, Oklahoma has developed about 407 payday lenders483
and about 1241 banks. This is about 11.8 payday lenders per 100,000 people,
which is somewhere in the middle of the survey. The pattern of payday lending
statewide is disproportionately focused in the state's two metropolitan counties.
Together, Tulsa County and Oklahoma County have about one-third of the
population but about one-half of the payday lenders. Oklahoma County is home
477 Oklahoma consumer advocates complain that Oklahoma's DDLA has not prevented
chronic borrowing:
Since the Oklahoma Deferred Deposit Lending Act became effective September 1,
2003, the average Oklahoma payday loan customer is borrowing at a pace of a little
over one payday loan per month, which equals 13 loans a year. During the four month
period August-November, 2004, most payday borrowers (77%) had taken out
consecutive loans, and 36.4% had taken out 3 or more consecutive loans.
COMMUNITY ACTION PROJECT, PAYDAY LENDING: SB 892 WILL HELP PROTECT CONSUMERS,
http://www.captc.org/pubpol/PaydayLending/SB892_IssueBrief.pdf (last visited Oct. 17,
2005).
478 OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 3109(B)(2) (Supp. 2005); Steve Kanigher, Florida, Oklahoma
Databases Reduce Loans Per Customer, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 6,2005, at D4. The database
is funded by a $0.46 assessment charged to lenders for every payday loan transaction. Id.
4 79 OKLA. STAT. TIT. 59, § 3102(4) (Supp. 2005).
4 80 Id. §§ 3104(E), 3109(D).
4 81 1d. § 3110.
4 82 Id. § § 3118-19. The fund is funded by payday lender license fees, examination fees,
and application fees, as well as a $0.05 charge assessed to payday lenders for every loan
transaction entered into. Id. §§ 3118-19 (Supp. 2005).
483 STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER CREDIT, DEFERRED DEPOSIT
LENDER ROSTER, http://www.okdocc.state.ok.us/ROSTERS/rosterDDL.pdf(last visited Oct.
17, 2005).
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to Tinker Air Force Base. Garfield County, home of Vance Air Force Base, ranks
tenth in the state on our composite scale, and Comanche County, where Fort Sill
is located, ranks twenty-third of 77 counties. Muskogee County, which does not
have a military base, ranks first in our composite scale, and no obvious causal
variables can be found for this anomalous statistical condition.
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Examining the data at the ZIP code level produces a clearer picture of the
pattern of payday lending around military bases. The ZIP code next to Tinker Air
Force Base (73110) has nine payday lenders, which ties it for third most in the
state and gives it almost five more payday lenders than one could expect given
the local population. Overall, ZIP code 73110 ranks ninth worst out of 591.
Ranking tenth worst on our composite ranking is another ZIP code near Tinker
Air Force Base (73115), which has six additional payday lenders. The other
military installations in Oklahoma have lower numbers and densities of payday
lenders than we have documented elsewhere. Fort Sill's adjacent ZIP code has
seven payday lenders, which is two more than one would expect given the
population, but if one were to include the numbers from Fort Sill proper, the
combined number would be about on target. Phone interviews conducted with
financial advisors at Fort Sill suggested very strongly that the state of
Oklahoma's registry of payday lenders is incomplete and that many of the nearby
payday lenders are operating without licenses. A survey of the phone book
listings in Fort Sill's gateway town of Lawton revealed fourteen payday lenders,
of which only five were on the state's list of licensees for Lawton. Moreover, five
payday lenders that were on the state's list of payday lenders could not be found
in the phone book. By combining the lists and taking care not to double count
those on both lists, the total number of payday lenders in Lawton stands at
nineteen. A representative with the Consumer Credit Counseling Service in
Oklahoma estimated that 20 or more payday lenders operated in Lawton as of
January 2005.484
484 Telephone Interview with Jennifer Delacamp, Lawton Area Supervisor, Consumer
Credit Counseling of Oklahoma, in Oklahoma City, Okla. (Jan. 19, 2005).
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURAAL [Vol. 66:653
.1V:; Co TS -I- 00 d0C'! )"'C*'"A !Dr
(N Co Co Co! cD og~Co
co CD COU) N
-1cmi o2 - CooD)N O( .cO
Co Co N- Co N- Co -,Ig
(N4 (N ' N Co Co Co
0o mo -- Co co 1:rm o m o o o
co co U-) N c4 CMo o o
CN o N- (N mo) ~ ) o DN o0C
CD ~ C) ~ (N C) N- Co Co
~ Co (N Co Co CD CO
Co CO ~ C) CD CO CD Co -
(N(N(NCo,-,,-(N
< <C
OF-000F-c-
U) 0 M CoCo > < CoE
N-~ ~ ~ ~ C N-U)- -  N -
(Nco a'
'N "C'
' co C,
(N co
CD CD c
m)0m CC
O m- cc
0 N-
< C) C'
C-)
a
C N
m-C oC
"4 .,I -0 C-4
") Col C) CC2 CJ mN - Co
N-q V
NCM 0N 1
- Co (N- a
I-
)) 0)
-i-i 0
C) C)
- F- 0
t) CD -
- C) C)
N-
CC
N- N-
(NN -cc
- N DCDC
(N(N(N (
U-
< 5 >- of
CD Co 0- CC
N- t CO O
C)> Co 't Com
- N- N- N- N
- - j I ? co ?
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15. South Carolina
Payday lenders in South Carolina operate under the authority of the South
Carolina Deferred Presentment Services Act (SCDPSA).485 Under the Act,
licensed payday lenders may assess a maximum fee of 15% of the face amount of
the check,486 which equates to an annual percentage interest rate of 459%.487
Lenders may issue a loan with a maximum duration of 31 days.488 The loan may
not be issued for the purpose of paying off another payday loan from the same
lender,489 nor may a lender renew a payday loan. 490
With over 900 payday lenders491 but just over four million people, South
Carolina has one of the heaviest densities of payday lenders in the country at over
22 per 100,000 people. South Carolina is home to Advance America Cash
Advance Centers, Inc., one of the largest payday lenders in the country.492
Advance America operates nearly 2300 storefronts in 34 states and makes more
than 1.5 million loans per year.493 In December of 2004, the company raised
$322.5 million in an initial public offering on the New York Stock Exchange.494
South Carolina is also home to three significant military bases: the Fort Jackson
Army Base, Shaw Air Force Base, and the Beaufort/Parris Island Marine Corps
complex.
Our data, mapped at the county level, revealed that counties with a
significant military presence had comparatively high numbers and densities of
payday lenders. Richland County, home to the Army's Fort Jackson had the most
payday lenders among all counties statewide. Third on this list was Charleston
County, where Charleston Air Force Base is located.
Though not high on the list of total payday lenders, Sumter County, home to
Shaw Air Force Base, still had 13.5 more payday lenders than its population
485 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-39-110 to 34-39-260 (Supp. 2004).
4 8 6 1d. § 34-39-180(E).
487 The SCDPSA allows a fee of 15%, which equates to a fee of$17.65 for every $100
loaned. Assuming an average loan duration of fourteen days, the Act authorizes an effective
APR of 459%.
488 S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-39-180(A) (Supp. 2004).
4 8 9 1d. § 34-39-180(F).
490 Id.
491 STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, STATE BOARD OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, DEFERRED
PRESENTMENT SERVICES LICENSEES (Dec. 12, 2003) (on file with authors) (mailed to authors
by request).
492 Ieva M. Augstums, Dallas-Area Companies Expand as Payday Lending Goes
Mainstream, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 4. 2005.
493 Id.
494 Id.
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would suggest, making it the third worst on a per capita basis. Sumter also ranks
first in the ratio of payday lenders to banks in the state (37 to 15), giving it the
worst overall ranking in the state for payday lending. Although Aiken County
does not contain a military base, it had seven payday lenders beyond what one
would expect, enough to serve an additional 31,000 plus people. It also has five
more payday lenders than banks in the county, giving it overall the third worst
record in the state. After zooming out from the map, a strong rationale for the
odd number of payday lenders in Aiken County becomes evident: it is just a few
miles away from the 10,000 troops stationed across the Georgia border at the Fort
Gordon Army Base.
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The analysis of payday lending at the ZIP code level produced a pattern
mimicking what we found at the county level. The ZIP code ranked first in the
state for payday lending is Sumter (29150), which has 30 payday lenders and
sixteen banks for just over 38,000 people. Statistically, one would expect to find
about ten payday lenders in a ZIP code this size, even including the 5000 plus
Air Force personnel stationed at Shaw Air Force base in the adjacent ZIP code.
ZIP codes within five miles of Fort Jackson's borders also stand out. West
Columbia (29169) ranks third worst in the state, Columbia (29210) ranks sixth
and Columbia (29223) also scores poorly with excess capacity. Together these
three ZIP codes have 48 payday lenders and only 28 banks. Adjacent to
Charleston Air Force Base is North Charleston (21624), which has fifteen payday
lenders, and only seven banks. This is 10.14 payday lenders above the number
expected and makes this ZIP code the fifth worst in the state. The second worst
ZIP code in South Carolina is North Augusta (29841), the ZIP code closest to
Fort Gordon in Augusta, Georgia. Home to less than 30,000 people, North
Augusta has eighteen payday lenders, more than eleven beyond statistical
expectations for the population.
The Beaufort/Parrs Island area deserves some notice as well. Beaufort ZIP
code 29906, with four payday lenders and no banks, ranks highest in the state in
terms of payday lenders per bank, and seven of the eight payday lenders in the
county are within three miles of the Marine Corps Air Station. Still, our statistical
analysis does not reveal the concentration of payday lending found near Marine
bases elsewhere in our study. The local context provides some additional
explanation that bears mentioning. Beaufort County has an unusually large
number of banking facilities, more than double what is statistically expected for
the population there. Much of that is due to the large excess of banks in the
luxury resort town of Hilton Head. The density of banking reduces the overall
ranking calculated for Beaufort County. The other likely factor in the moderate
number of payday lenders in the area is the complete absence of this activity near
the Marine Corps' training facility at Parris Island. This is surely due to the
Marines' exceptional restrictions upon their boot-camp trainees, including a
prohibition against having private automobiles while at Paris Island.
[Vol. 66:653
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16. South Dakota
South Dakota law imposes few restrictions on payday lenders operating
within its borders. Lenders must be licensed with the state495 and they may not
enter into payday loan transactions with borrowers who already have an
outstanding payday loan. 496 Further, a payday loan may not be renewed more
than four times.497 However, beyond these minimal requirements, South Dakota
imposes no limits on the duration of payday loans498 and no maximum interest
rate so long as the parties establish the interest rate in a written agreement.499
Similar in many respects to Delaware, South Dakota is a state with a small
population (755,000), a single Air Force base (Ellsworth), and a laissez faire
lending and taxation tradition. Despite its sparse population, South Dakota has
448 banks and 175 payday lenders.500 South Dakota has the highest number of
banks per capita in the survey and the second highest density of payday lenders
per capita (23.18 per 100,000) among the states in our survey. It is possible that
the banking density can be seen partly as a manifestation of the number of banks
that operate in South Dakota for taxation purposes only. It is also partly a result
of so many very small communities with multiple, very small banking operations.
The density of payday lending statewide may also be partly a result of these
conditions. At least seven South Dakota banks are currently renting their charters
to lenders in states with more restrictive payday lending laws. 501
495 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-4-40 (Supp. 2003).
496 1d. § 54-4-65.
497 Id.
498 Payday loans are referred to as "small, short-maturity loan[s] on the security of a
check." Id. § 54-4-36(12).
499 1d. § 54-3-1.1.
500 STATE OF SouTH DAKOTA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND REGULATION, DIVISION OF
BANKING, LIST OF LICENSEES, http://www.state.sd.us/drr2/reg/bank/licensee.htm (last visited
Oct. 17, 2005).
501 Joe Mahon, Banking on the Fringe: Payday and Title Loans Continue to be
Popular, and States Continue to Seek Tougher Regulation for an Industry Adept at Finding
Ways to Grow, FEDGAZETrE, July 2004, http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/04-
07/banking.cfn. Some state officials around the country are challenging South Dakota-based
lenders for violating their own state usury laws. For example, Arkansas Attorney General
Mike Beebe is investigating two lenders based in South Dakota, Mount Rushmore Loan Co.
and Dakota Loan Co., for entering into payday loan transactions carrying interest rates far in
excess of the Arkansas constitutional usury limit. Arkansas AG Investigating Payday
Lenders, Including 2 From S.D., PRESS & DAKOTAN (Yankton, S.D.), Jan. 21, 2005.
Similarly, the Georgia Attorney General's office is pursuing legal action against South
Dakota-based Bank West for violations of Georgia's payday lending law. Mahon, supra note
501.
[Vol. 66:653
2005] PREDATORYLENDING AND THE MILITAR Y 793
Pennington County, which contains the majority of Ellsworth Air Force
Base, ranks first in the state for payday lending. It has almost 90,000 residents,
28 banks, and 40 payday lenders. This is about 21 more payday lenders than the
population of 90,000 people would suggest, even in South Dakota where
densities are high. Pennington County, with 12% of the population, has 23% of
the state's payday lenders. It may be tempting to speculate that Pennington
County's American Indian population is another possible causal variable;
however, because this county is only about seven percent Native American, one
of the lower rates in South Dakota, such speculation proves unfounded.
794 OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 66:653
.0 LY
r-- ~ ~ ~ C 'a-U)L w rr CD Cr '
NU i( c=!C) C) mD (U) U) r-' CD, -Cq
x0
wu a.
o
TA---------------t --------------- 1"
-W wCD m ,C L oC c -D
CD0
Co0
a) CDCD- -a) ) (0 U7~ ~
Lo~-UC C M <D co
-oo
-D U, w t I. -
0U
C C>MC
(0C' CD LfNU)c N ) UI) mt r U_ C ) -_c
C: (Ni C"~(U CD C D 00 - C N U) cn C) Cco U)LO 00 L I)C -.-- C' LOU 0 L" PD(i-U m-Ocm
COL C)C C..-~ N-
0c -
Co
0 0 ID 0) 0 )
C,, C
cc CDCL
cu o4 c c a=-
C)E auiL : -M -( )-
C-c
2005] PREDA TORY LENDING AND THE MILITARY 795
At the ZIP code level, Rapid City ZIP code 57701, which borders Ellsworth
Air Force Base on the west, ranks first in the state for payday lending. This ZIP
code, with roughly 40,000 people and nineteen banks, has 28 payday lenders-
nineteen more than its population would suggest based on statewide averages.
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17. Tennessee
Payday lenders in Tennessee operate under the authority of the Deferred
Presentment Services Act (DPSA).502 For each payday loan issued, the DPSA
authorizes lenders to charge a fee equating to an annual rate of interest of
459%.503 However, the Act is clear that the fee is not to be deemed "interest for
any purpose of law;" instead, the "fee" is considered compensation to cover a
lender's operating costs. 5°4 As a result, the "fees" associated with payday loans
under the DPSA avoid the state constitution's usury provision prohibiting interest
in excess of ten percent per year.505 In fact, the Act reinforces this notion by
specifically exempting the fees charged for payday loans from control by "any
other statute governing the imposition of interest, fees or loan charges," 50 6
including the State's statutory limit often percent annual interest for loans of less
than $1000.507 Loans may not exceed a duration of 31 days. 508 After a payday
loan is made, the lender may not renew or consolidate the loan with the proceeds
of another payday loan made by the same lender. 50 9
Tennessee has 1201 payday lenders which translates into 21.05 per 100,000
people. 510 This gives Tennessee one of the highest rates of payday lending in the
country, with several counties and ZIP codes ranking among the most densely
populated with payday lenders in the country. Military installations in Tennesee
include the Naval Support Facility in Millington and a small arsenal in Milan. Of
much greater importance is Montgomery County and the town of Clarksville, just
across the border from the Army's Fort Campbell in Kentucky. Montgomery
County has 21 payday lenders for its 134,000 residents, including those on the
base. In terms of total number of lenders, it ranks thirteenth among Tennessee's
502 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-17-101 to 45-17-119 (2000).
503 Id. § 45-17-112(b)(1)-(2) (2000). Specifically, the DPSA authorizes lenders to
charge a fee not exceeding the greater of 15% of the face amount of the check or $30. Id.
This means that a borrower who writes a check for $100 actually receives only $85, with the
rema*ining $15 going to the lender as its fee; the borrower actually incurs a charge of 17.65%.
Consequently, assuming an average payday loan duration of fourteen days, this equates to an
annual percentage rate of 459%.
504 Id. § 45-17-112(b)(2).
505 See TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
506 TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-118 (2000).
507 Id. § 47-14-104(a).
508 Id. § 45-17-112(d) (2000).
509 Id. § 45-17-112(q).
5 10 STATE OF TENNESSEE, DEPARTMENT OF FINANcIAL, INSTITUTIONS, LICENSED
DEFERRED PRESENTMENT LIST, http://www.tennessee.gov/tdfi/LicDP.html (last visited Oct.
17, 2005).
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95 counties, but in terms of per capita density, Montgomery ranks near the 50th
percentile.
Because the most significant military population affecting payday lender
location strategies is stationed over the border, the ZIP code level of analysis is
most helpful. In Clarksville (ZIP 37042), near Ft. Campbell, there are ten payday
lenders and nine banks. However, if one were to drive away from Fort Campbell
into other parts of Clarksville, the ratio begins turning toward average. We found
that in Clarksville's other two ZIP codes there are eleven payday lenders and 34
banks. 511 With at least 2000 military personnel, the Naval support facility near
Millington is relatively large, but at only five percent of the population, the
military does not attract a large number of payday lenders. Millington itself has
seven banks and six payday lenders, a ratio that would be alarming in other
states, but in Tennessee, where payday lending is rampant, this ratio is not
unusual and is about what one would expect on a per capita basis. Immediately to
the south are two ZIP codes (38127 and 38128), which together host 25 payday
lenders close to the service members stationed at Millington. ZIP code 38122,
which is less than six miles from Millington, ranks second worst in our
composite ranking of Tennessee.
511 For a street-level analysis of Fort Campbell, see Part IV.B.8 supra.
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The other high-ranking ZIP codes in Tennessee include a few county seats in
Eastern Tennessee. Interestingly, the number one ZIP code in Tennessee is
Chattanooga (ZIP 37412) which borders Georgia along Interstate 75, reminiscent
of the Georgia border-town phenomena we observed in Alabama, South
Carolina, and Florida.
18. Texas
The Texas Legislature has not adopted a statute that regulates payday lenders
separately from other small consumer lenders in the state. This means that
lenders licensed under Texas's small loan law who wish to offer payday loans
must comply with the state's traditional small loan interest rate cap of 48% per
annum.512 However, Texas law also allows licensed lenders to charge an
additional "acquisition" fee of up to ten dollars per loan. 513 When combined, the
interest and acquisition fee amount to an effective annual percentage rate of
about 3 09%, assuming a $100 loan with an initial term of fourteen days. 514 At
the end of the loan period, the lender may either renew the loan continuously or
convert the loan from a single payment balloon loan to a declining balance
installment note.515 Because Texas's price limits are lower than many states, a
significant percentage of payday lenders in Texas have turned to charter-renting
relationships with out-of-state banks. Consumer advocates have reported that
over one thousand payday outlets in the state are circumventing the 48% interest
plus ten dollar fee price limitation. 516 In 2002, for example, Check 'N Go alone
512 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 1.605(c) (2005); TEx. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.252(3)(B)
(Vernon Supp. 2004).
513 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 1.605(c) (2005); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.252(3)(A)
(Vernon Supp. 2004).
514 For example, a consumer borrowing $100 would need to pay a ten dollar acquisition
charge in addition to interest, which, at an annual rate of 48%, would be $1.87 if the
borrower planned to repay the loan after fourteen days. Consequently, the total fees of
$11.87 represent 11.87% interest over the two-week period, which is the equivalent of an
annual rate of interest of 309.47%. Loans with larger principles will have smaller annual
percentage rates because lenders cannot proportionally increase the ten dollar acquisition
charge. Thus, a fourteen-day loan of $300 would have a maximum finance charge of$15.60
and an annual percentage rate of 135.57%. See 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 1.605(c) Exhibit 1
(2005). This creates an incentive to induce borrowers to make multiple loans in smaller
increments. Thus, Texas regulators, consumer attorneys, and courts should carefully give
careful scrutiny to payday lending arrangements where multiple loans are taken from the
same lender.
5 15 /d. § 1.605(0(1).
5 16 CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, PAYDAY LENDERS USE FDIC BANKS AND
SHAM REBATES TO PEDDLE ExoRBrrANTLY PRICED SMALL LOANS (Mar. 31, 2004),
http://www.consumerfed.org/033104_2004payday.html.
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extended more than $1 million in payday loans to Texas consumers by renting a
charter from Ohio-based First Place Bank. 517
Texas is an expansive state, with a very large and very diverse population,
including pockets of extreme poverty, numerous large metropolitan areas, and a
long border with Mexico. This variety creates several variables that would
presumably draw payday lenders away from military bases, leading one not to
expect the same high concentrations of payday lending around military bases in
the Lone Star State. Nevertheless, payday lenders have many bases to target in
Texas, including seven large installations and dozens of smaller facilities
scattered around the state. Because the bases are located in a variety of
geographic and demographic settings, Texas is an ideal location for close
inspection.
However, because Texas has the same licensing rules for payday lenders as it
does for other consumer lenders, the state's Consumer Credit Commissioner does
not maintain a separate database of lenders offering payday loans. Rather their
registry of consumer lenders includes not only payday lenders, but also pawn
shops, tax preparation offices, signature loan companies, and others. The
Consumer Credit Commission lists 3239 licensed consumer lenders, all of whom
have the legal authority to make payday loans.518 Nevertheless, many of these
lenders have different business models and do not engage in payday lending. In
an attempt to get a more accurate count of payday lenders in Texas, we again
turned to the Reference USA business database, which lists 1664 payday lenders,
or about eight payday lenders per 100,000 people, ranking Texas fifteenth of our
20 states surveyed.519
In spite of our initial hypothesis to the contrary, many of the counties with
excess payday lenders are those with a military base. The worst county in the
state is Wichita County, home to Sheppard Air Force Base and its nearly 10,000
personnel. With 132,000 people, 35 banks, and 22 payday lenders, Wichita
county ranks high in all three categories of measurement and has about twelve
more payday lenders than statistically expected. Ranking second is Nueces
County, home to Corpus Christi and its Naval Air Station. There are over
517 See Letter to James E. Gilleran, Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (Jan. 3,
2003), http://www.naca.net/OTSletter.doc.
5 18 STATE OF TEXAS, OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMMISSIONER, LICENSED LENDER
LIST (Dec. 2003) (on file with authors).
519 Reference USA, Category Heading: Check Cashing Services, available at
http://www.referenceusa.com/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). See infra note 407, and
accompanying text (discussing statistical reliability of Reference USA database). In cross-
checking the Reference USA figure, we found 1,570 businesses statewide with the terms
such as "Advance," "Payday," "Cash," and "EZ" in the business name in the state's list of
small loan companies. STATE OF TEXAS, OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMMISSIONER,
LICENSED LENDER LIST (Dec. 2003) (on file with authors).
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300,000 people and 77 banks in this county, but it has 45 payday lenders-20
more than our predictions based on population. El Paso County, home to Fort
Bliss, ranks ninth worst in the state with 70 banks and 61 payday lenders for
approximately 680,000 residents. Goodfellow Air Force Base is in Tom Green
County; this county ranks tenth worst statewide with 104,000 people, 29 banks,
and fourteen payday lenders. In fact, of the ten largest military bases in Texas,
only Laughlin and Dyess Air Force Bases are not in or bordering one of the worst
sixteen counties in Texas for payday lending. Because there are 245 counties in
the state, this is a highly suggestive statistic.
There are 1745 ZIP codes in Texas and dozens of military installations.
Therefore, we must limit our discussion to the largest handful of installations in
the state. Almost every base in the state has a ZIP code adjacent to it that has
payday lenders in excess of statewide averages. Several of the bases that have
closed within the last ten years, such as Carswell Air Force Base, Reese Air
Force Base, Bergstrom Air Force Base, and Chase Naval Air Station also have
adjacent ZIP codes with large numbers or high densities of payday lenders.
Though Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene and Laughlin Air Force Base in Del
Rio do have more payday lenders nearby than we predicted based on local
populations, they are the only two bases out of nearly a dozen we examined that
do not have unusually large numbers of payday lenders in the neighboring ZIP
codes.
Sheppard Air Force Base, perhaps the second largest Air Force Base in the
country, has within three miles of its gates two ZIP codes (76301 and 76306) that
rank in the top 25 statewide and a third ZIP code (76308) 4.5 miles away that
ranks fifty-second out of 1745 ZIP codes. In the two closest ZIP codes, there are
only four banks but twelve payday lenders. That is 9.25 payday lenders above
statistical expectations for the populations in those ZIP codes.
San Angelo ZIP code 76903 ranks forty-seventh in the state, easily among
the worst five percent statewide. This ZIP code borders Goodfellow Air Force
Base and has a population of about 32,000. We counted eleven banks in this ZIP
code and eight payday lenders, which is 5.5 more payday lenders than expected
based on statewide averages.
Corpus Christi has multiple bases and excess payday lending capacity.
Although the Naval Air Station is somewhat separated from the rest of Corpus
Christi, it is just over three miles to a business district (ZIP code 78411) that
ranks eleventh worst in Texas. It has twelve banks and twelve payday lenders, ten
over statistical expectations. Adjacent to ZIP 78411 are several other ZIP codes
badly overrepresented by the payday lending industry, including 78415, due
south of base, which has at least eight payday lenders and only one bank for
almost 40,000 people. Interestingly, there are 26 establishments with a license to
make short-term loans here according to State of Texas. If they were all making
payday loans, this would be one the heaviest concentrations of payday lenders in
the country. Using our conservative estimate, there are at least five more payday
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lenders than one would expect for the local population, and about 20 extra
payday lenders if we were to define them as the State of Texas does.
There are six military bases in and around San Antonio, two of which are
partially closed. Still, with over 30,000 active duty troops in Bexar County,
greater San Antonio remains one of the great military towns in the country. It
also ranks among the great payday lending cities in the nation. Among the six
bases, all but the mostly closed Camp Bullis have an adjacent ZIP code with an
unexpectedly high number of payday lenders.
The third worst ZIP code in Texas is ZIP code 78218. Here, on the northeast
side of the Army's Fort Sam Houston, there are only three banks, but eleven
payday lenders. For the 30,000 people who live there, that is 8.56 more payday
lenders than statistically expected. Three other nearby ZIP codes (78202, 78203
and 78220) together contain another six payday lenders and three banks, raising
the total number of excess payday lenders in the area by another 3.25.
There are twelve ZIP codes adjacent to or within a few miles of Lackland
and Kelly Air Force Bases, which are essentially adjoined and function together.
Three of these ZIP codes rank among the worst 30 ZIP codes statewide, and ZIP
code 78238 is twelfth worst. Several of the remaining twelve nearby ZIP codes
also have unexpectedly high concentrations of payday lenders. Combined, these
twelve ZIP codes contain 321,000 people and 25 banks, but 40 payday lenders,
which is fourteen more than the population warrants. Two ZIP codes (78227 and
78238) contain most of this excess capacity. It is very likely that these
neighborhoods are where most of the personnel from Lackland and Kelly do their
shopping because these ZIP codes are both within three miles of the base and
straddle the Interstate 410 beltway. These two ZIP codes combined should have
less than five payday lenders based on their combined population, but seventeen
have set up shop here close to the service persons at Lackland-Kelly Air Force
Base.
It is about seven miles between the eastern gates of Kelly Air Force Base and
the western edge of Brooks Air Force Base. Lying halfway between the two and
within three miles of each on Texas Loop Road 13 is ZIP code 78221. This ZIP
code has five banks and eight payday lenders, almost five more than it should
have given its population. Even Randolph Air Force Base in the northeastern
suburbs of San Antonio has a payday lending surplus. Although fewer than
15,000 people live there and there are only five banks, four payday lenders have
set up shop, which is about three too many for that population.
Soldiers stationed at Fort Bliss in El Paso may have the greatest number and
variety of short-term loan options of any persons in the military. There are 182
licenses issued for El Paso County and we estimate that at least 61 of those
licensees are actually making payday loans. Unlike many of the other
communities we have examined, we cannot be as certain that the military is the
sole focus of the payday lending industry here. Because El Paso is a border town,
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we believe that many of the payday lenders here are at least as involved in check
cashing and currency exchanging as they are in lending. Nevertheless, this fact
does not reduce the availability of high-interest, short-term loans to soldiers at
Fort Bliss, and may only serve to intensify the competition and marketing
activities of payday lenders in the region.
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There are four ZIP codes in El Paso that rank in the top 100 statewide, but
only one of them, 79901, which ranks thirtieth, actually borders Mexico. This
suggests that the military is at least as attractive to check casher-payday lenders
as cross-border transient workers are. The more intensive payday lending activity
appears to be closer to Fort Bliss. ZIP code 79925, which is partly surrounded by
Fort Bliss, is the fourteenth worst in the state for payday lending. There are about
41,000 people here and seven banks, but ten payday lenders, seven above
statistical expectations. The adjacent ZIP code 79903, which also borders Ft.
Bliss has three banks and three payday lenders, however, 20 companies have a
license to make payday loans here, making it potentially one of the most densely
crowded ZIP codes in the country for short-term loans. The ZIP code bordering
the southwestern section of Fort Bliss (79904) also seems heavy on payday
lenders with four, even though it has no banks, making it one of top three ZIP
codes statewide in terms of the ratio of payday lenders to banks.
Fort Hood, which is one of the largest military bases in the United States, has
more than its share of payday lenders lined up at its many gates, but the Killeen
area is a little less saturated with payday lending than some of the other military
towns in Texas. Because Fort Hood is so massive, its off-base commercial
districts are a bit more scattered than those around many other bases. The main
commercial district just outside Fort Hood is Killeen's 76541 ZIP code. Here, we
found eleven banks and nine payday lenders, which is about 7.3 more payday
lenders than would be expected for the population in that ZIP code. Even if we
added 43,000 soldiers from Fort Hood to that ZIP code's population, we would
still only expect there to be five payday lenders, four less than there are. This ZIP
code ranks twenty-seventh worst statewide on our composite index but has the
ninth most lenders of ZIP codes statewide. Using the State of Texas list, this ZIP
code has the fourth most small-loan licenses in the state with eleven. Clearly,
there are many businesses offering loans next to Fort Hood. There are other
nearby ZIP codes that add to the availability of quick, high-interest loans for
soldiers. Copperas Cove, other parts of Killeen, and nearby Temple, Texas all
have excess payday lending capacity.
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Because Fort Hood is so large and houses so many soldiers, we chose to
analyze payday lending activity in the neighborhoods surrounding it. Within
three miles of Fort Hood's perimeter, there are at least eighteen payday lenders,
and thirteen of those are within one mile of base. For soldiers and their families
driving east off-base using the Tank Destroyer Boulevard exit, they would leave
base onto Rancier Boulevard. Before they had traveled 1000 yards past the
security gates, they would pass no fewer than seven payday lenders. After that
initial tangle of payday lenders, they could drive to the nearby town of Belton
and only pass one more payday loan shop. If the family turned right off Tank
Destroyer and went south on Fort Hood Street (Highway 195), they would pass at
least three additional payday lenders before they made it to U.S. Highway 190, a
mile and a half from the gates. Once they were at that intersection, within two
miles in any direction they could find six additional payday lenders. If the family
were to leave Fort Hood at the Clear Creek exit and drive west to the next exit
off-base, they would come to Copperas Cove. Just a few feet into Copperas
Cove, they would pass their first payday lender; two more are within the first
mile and two additional ones are in the second mile.
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19. Virginia
Payday lenders in Virginia operate under the authority of the
Commonwealth's Payday Loan Act (PLA). 520 The lender may charge a fee no
greater than fifteen percent of the amount of the loan proceeds, 521 which is
equivalent to an annual percentage rate of interest of 390%.522 At the end of the
original loan period, a lender may not refinance, renew, or extend any loan. 523
Furthermore, a lender may not extend a payday loan to the borrower to pay off a
previous loan from the same lender.524
Virginia is another state with vast numbers of military personnel, rivaling
California for supremacy as the leading military state. Most of Virginia's military
population is in two areas: near Washington D.C., where there are more
command and intelligence personnel, and the Newport-Portsmouth region where
there are many thousands of enlisted troops. Virginia ranks at the bottom of the
states in terms of numbers and densities of payday lenders. Although the
population numbers over seven million and there are 2434 banks, there were only
about 460 payday lenders registered with state authorities in 2004.525 Statewide,
there are on average 6.50 payday lenders per 100,000 people, the lowest rate of
any state other than New York. This is presumably a by-product of the short
history of payday lending in Virginia, where the activity was made legal on July
1, 2002. Though legal only a few years in Virginia, the densities of payday
lenders around military bases differs little from what we observed in other parts
of the country where it has been legal for many years.
52 0 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-444 to 471 (Supp. 2004). The state legislature enacted the
PLA in 2002, since which time five hundred payday lending outlets have sprung up around
the Commonwealth. See Bill Sizemore, State Lawmakers Want to Regulate Payday Loans,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 22, 2005,
http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfin?story=80962&ran=l 35970.
521 VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-460 (Supp. 2004).
522 A consumer borrowing $100 must write a check for $115 to cover the interest
charged by the lender. Assuming an average payday loan duration of fourteen days, this 15%
rate of interest equals an annual rate of interest of 390%.
Although Virginia's usury law invalidates contracts "made for the payment of interest
on a loan greater than twelve percent per year," the law specifically exempts payday loans
from its control. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.55 (Supp. 2004).
523 Id. § 6.1-459(6).
524 Id. § 6.1-459(11). Of course this provision does not prevent a lender from extending
a payday loan to a borrower in order to pay off a payday loan obtained from another lender.
5 2 5 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION, BUREAU OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, PAYDAY LENDERS LICENSED IN VIRGINIA,
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/division/banking/paydaylend.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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At the county level,526 the pattern of payday lending is evidently focused on
military bases. The number one county for payday lending in Virginia is Prince
George County, home of the Army's Fort Lee and Logistics Center. The
population ofjust over 33,000 people in Prince George County is served by five
banks; however, fourteen payday lenders have moved in. Prince George ranks
first of 135 counties in terms of density per capita, first in density per bank, and
its fourteen payday lenders are about twelve more than statistically expected for
this county. Henrico County, which is about 6.5 miles north of the base on
Interstate 295, ranks tenth worst in the state and offers 30 additional payday
lenders.
Perhaps the most militarized region in the United States is the Norfolk-
Portsmouth-Newport News region. The four counties that house most of the
military population in the area (Newport News, Hampton, Norfolk and
Portsmouth) have a combined population of over 661,000, 63 banks, and a
whopping 101 payday lenders. This stands in stark contrast to the statewide ratio
of one payday lender to every five banks. Given the population in these counties,
this is 56 payday lenders above what statewide averages would predict. Each of
the four counties in the region ranks among the ten worst in Virginia.
526 Virginia has both counties in the classic sense and a number of municipal districts
that are classified as counties by the government and are used as such in our analysis.
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Our analysis of payday lending using ZIP code data revealed a strong bias
toward military areas as well. Newport News (ZIP 23605) ranked worst in the
state on our composite index for payday lending. Only a few miles in any
direction to a number of military bases and home to a significant off-base
population, this ZIP code has ten payday lenders but only one bank for its almost
15,000 people, of whom about one-fourth are military personnel. This per capita
density is roughly ten times the statewide density for payday lending and its
payday lender-to-bank ratio ranks third worst in the state.
Making these statistical anomalies more remarkable is the fact that Newport
News is bordered by other ZIP codes with similar densities of payday lenders.
Though this ZIP code is the worst, it is closely followed by a dozen or so
neighbors in the statewide rankings. In this very small four-county area, five of
the top ten and ten of the top 20 ZIP codes for payday lending are located. These
ten ZIP codes contain 63 banks and 74 payday lenders-54 more payday lenders
than statistically expected based on the population.
Looking outside the Newport-Norfolk region, other military bases also rank
high in payday lender density. The second highest composite ranking ZIP code
among the 847 ZIP Code regions in Virginia was adjacent to Fort Lee.
Petersburg (ZIP 23805) has five banks and nine payday lenders. Only one payday
lender would be predicted based on the small population here and statewide
averages. On the other side of Fort Lee, Colonial Heights (ranked thirteenth), and
Hopewell (ranked thirty-fifth) combine to provide an additional eleven payday
lenders, almost eight more than their combined populations would predict. The
other top ranking ZIP codes were all border towns with regional service functions
in western Virginia.
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The four-county Chesapeake Bay region was chosen for street-level analysis.
Our analysis at this resolution reconfirmed our findings using ZIP code and
county data. High concentrations of payday lenders are visible near the gates of
nearly every installation in the Chesapeake Bay area, but the pattern is not as
distinct as it at appears elsewhere. The relatively greater dispersion of payday
lenders in this region is probably due to the sheer number of installations and the
ubiquity of military personnel in all parts of these four counties.
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprising given the location and role of the
installations at Quantico Marine Corps Base and Fort Belvoir near Washington
D.C., neither base is significantly affected by payday lending. The counties and
ZIP codes near these installations each rank near the median among their
counterparts in Virginia.
20. Washington
In Washington, a payday lender must be a licensed "check casher"5 27 with a
small loan endorsement. 528 Although Washington's usury laws generally prohibit
parties from contracting for a rate of interest in excess of 12% per year,529 the
State authorizes payday lenders to charge a rate of interest as high as 390%.530 In
addition to the interest, a lender may charge a one-time returned check fee in an
amount determined by Washington's Director of Financial Institutions. 531 If a
borrower realizes that payment of the loan on the date originally specified will
not be possible, he or she may convert the loan to a payment plan, which
generally must have a duration of 60 days. 532 The lender may charge the
borrower a one-time conversion fee often to fifteen percent, but it cannot assess
any other fee or charge as a result of converting a payday loan into a payment
plan.533 Regulators have found some of the largest lenders in the state regularly
ignoring price limitations and engaging in illegal collection behavior.
534
527 WASH. REv. CODE § 31.45.010(5) (2005).
528 Id. §§ 31.45.030, 31.45.073(1).
529 1d. § 19.52.020(1).
530 Specifically, a payday lender may charge interest of 15% on the first $500 loaned,
and ten percent on any amount loaned from $500 to $700. Id. § 31.45.073(3). Assuming an
average payday loan of$ 100 for fourteen days, the effective annual rate of interest would be
390%.
531 Id. § 31.45.082.
532 Id. § 31.45.084(1).
533 WASH. REv. CODE §§ 31.45.084(1), 31.45.073(3) (2005). The lender may charge a
set-up fee of 15% for any principal amount of $500 or less and ten percent for any principal
amount greater than $500. Id. § 31.45.073(3).
534 ConsumerAffairs.com, Fast Cash Loans Faces Charges, Sept. 29, 2004,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/fastcash.html.
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Washington is another state with several large military installations. Like the
others included in our study, payday lending activity appears to be most intense
in those locations where the military presence is significant. Washington has
approximately 480 payday lenders535 and 1830 banks. That means that there are
approximately 8.15 payday lenders per 100,000 persons, a rate that places
Washington fourteenth among the 20 states we studied.
At the county level, the number and density of payday lending is most
pronounced in those counties with a significant military presence. The county
with the highest composite score for payday lending was Spokane County, home
to Fairchild Air Force Base. With roughly 55 payday lenders, it has about 20
more than expected based on its population. Ranking second and third worst in
the state were Thurston and Pierce Counties respectively. Pierce County is home
to McChord Air Force Base and the Army Base at Fort Lewis, which spills over
into Thurston County. The two bases together have over 27,000 military
personnel, making this area one of the most visible military regions in the
country. Together, these two counties have about 94 payday lenders, nearly 20
more than the population would suggest. The other two counties with significant
Navy populations, Kitsap and Whidbey Island also rank among the 20 worst
counties for payday lending.
535 STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, DIVISION OF
CONSUMER SERVICES, LICENSEE LIST, http://www.dfi.wa.gov/cs/list.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2005).
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At the ZIP code level, a more telling picture emerges in Washington,
especially when we examined the ZIP codes closest to Fort Lewis and McChord
Air Force Base. Lakewood (ZIP code 98499), lying adjacent to McChord A.F.B.
and just over a mile from Fort Lewis, has the highest composite score in the state.
It has more payday lenders (sixteen) than any other ZIP code in the state, as well
as the greatest excess number of payday lenders based on population (fourteen),
and it is twelfth worst in the state in terms of its payday lender-to-bank ratio. This
density of payday lending is all the more impressive considering that six ZIP
codes bordering Lakewood combined have an additional 22 payday lenders,
twelve more than predicted in those ZIP codes for their combined population.
ZIP codes in which payday lenders exceed the expected number can be
found in close proximity to all of the major bases in Washington, but none of the
densities appears as extreme as the density near Fort Lewis. The Bremerton area,
with its many scattered facilities has about fourteen payday lenders, which is
about six more than our statistical expectation. Even isolated Oak Harbor, with
its Air Station at Whidbey Island has five payday lenders, double the amount
suggested by its population. The Naval Station at Everett has nearly identical
numbers. Service persons at Fairchild Air Force Base have to drive about ten
miles to get to the business areas of Spokane, where there are 29 payday lenders
and 49 banks in the six ZIP codes along the highway leading to the heart of
Spokane. This is about eighteen more payday lenders than we predicted based on
the population of those ZIP codes. Spokane includes the second and sixth worst
payday lending ZIP codes in the state, and both of these neighborhoods are surely
widely visited by the Air Force families in the area, many of whom live off-base
in Spokane. It should be noted that Spokane does serve as the regional service
hub, and therefore should have some additional commercial activity, but Spokane
is easily the most overrun of the many service hubs in Washington in terms of
payday lending.
[Vol. 66:653
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For the street-level analysis, Thurston and Pierce Counties were chosen as
the case study in Washington. Using the thre- mile buffer around the ZIP codes at
Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base, we found 36 payday lenders and 37
banks. Statewide, there are more than four banks for each payday lender. The
216,738 people living within three miles of these bases have more than eighteen
payday lenders beyond what is statistically expected for this region. By statewide
standards, this is enough payday lenders to serve an additional 441,000 residents.
The great majority of these payday lenders are found in two locations. The first is
along or near Bridgeport Way, a road that leads north from McChord Air Force
Base, and the other is Union Avenue, a road that runs along part of the northern
border of Fort Lewis. Densities of payday lenders are very high in these two
locations. In one two-mile stretch along Bridgeport Way, there are thirteen
payday lending operations, including many of the industry leaders such as Check
into Cash, Advance America, Advance Til Payday, etc. Five additional payday
lenders are only a couple of miles down the road and again include widely
recognized names in the business.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Empirical Discussion
Nearly every statistical measure we used at every spatial scale points to the
same conclusion: the payday loan industry targets military personnel. The
evidence is overwhelming and incontrovertible. Our overall analysis included 20
states; 1516 counties; 13,253 ZIP codes; and nearly 15,000 payday lenders.
Situated among those many counties and ZIP codes were 109 military bases and
several dozen recently closed bases. 536 Within three miles of open bases were
150 counties and 813 ZIP codes. Payday lenders were in these military-adjacent
counties and ZIP codes at greater numbers and in greater densities in almost
every state we examined. These counties and ZIP codes represent a wide range of
ethnic, income, and population characteristics and none of these variables
account for the clarity of pattern that we have witnessed. With striking regularity,
the counties and ZIP codes most overrepresented by payday lenders had one
thing in common: large military populations.
The consistency with which we found payday lenders overrepresented in
military regions was remarkable. In twelve of the nineteen states where county-
level data was available, the worst county in the state was a military county. In
Florida, Washington, California, and Colorado the top three, four, five, and six
counties respectively all had a military legacy. The only states in which a military
county did not have the highest composite density of payday lenders were (1)
Alabama, where the second and third worst counties were military counties; (2)
Idaho, which has only one small Air Force base; (3) Louisiana, where the second
and third worst counties house military bases; (4) Missouri, where there is only
one large base, which is adjacent to the second worst ZIP code statewide; (5)
Ohio, with only one base in a top-ten county; (6) Oklahoma, where again the
second worst county is a military county; and (7) Tennessee, which has no large
base of its own, but shares Fort Campbell with Kentucky. The 150 counties
housing or bordering a military base account for roughly one-tenth of all the
counties in our survey and they account for a quarter of the total number of
banks. Yet those same counties contain one-third of the payday lenders.
Often the most populous counties in our survey had the most payday lenders
statewide, but in terms of per capita density, the worst counties tended to be
military counties. Among the military counties we surveyed, we found 4765
536 This number of bases includes only bases with over 550 on-base personnel,
including civilians, according to the DOD's Directorate of Information Operations and
Reports, Statistical Analysis and Information Division. See Department of Defense, supra
note 287. Georgia's Fort Benning, which lies close to the Alabama border, and a few others,
were also included in our study, but not counted among the 109 bases mentioned above.
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payday lenders, which was 386 more than we predicted based on the population
in these same counties. Seventeen of the 93 counties that had the highest per
capita density of payday lending were military counties. Some of these counties,
such as El Paso County, Texas, had huge populations while some, such as Mason
County, Washington, had few people. However, both had military bases.
Moreover, we found the same pattern when we zoomed into the ZIP code
level, often in even sharper focus. About sixteen million people live in a ZIP
code near one of the bases in the nineteen states where ZIP code data was
available, and well over a half-million of those people are currently serving in the
Armed Forces. Including their families, this number probably reaches over one
million. In these ZIP codes, we found about 1854 payday lenders and 3852
banks. This equaled 12.5% of the total number of payday lenders in our survey
but only 8.5% of the banks in our survey. Given the population in these ZIP
codes, this is about 370 payday lenders over the number we predicted based on
the population in these ZIP codes. While 370 extra payday lenders may not seem
an extraordinary excess, it is greater than the number of payday lenders in the
entire state of Colorado, and if they were all in California it would be enough to
service 5.6 million citizens.
In seven out of nineteen states, the single worst ZIP code in the state was
adjacent to a military base. This is a momentous statistic given that many states
have over a thousand ZIP codes statewide. Some of these worst-ranking ZIP
codes would have been very difficult for us to predict before we began this study.
Who among the casual observers of this industry would have guessed small
towns like Lakewood, Washington; Radcliff, Kentucky; or Sumter, South
Carolina would have the greatest combination of payday lending frequency and
payday lending density in their states?
In five additional states, the worst payday lending ZIP code was either
adjacent to a closed military base (California) orjust beyond the three-mile range
we set as our parameter for inclusion as an "adjacent" ZIP code. The statistical
picture would have been even more compelling had we gone with a more liberal
definition of geographic proximity. Many Air Force bases, such as Luke or
Fairchild are isolated from the nearest commercial-retail district. This strategy
removed several ZIP codes from our list, though they are by default the place
where soldiers, sailors, and other service personnel and their families would take
out a payday loan. Other ZIP codes were also left off our list because we used the
primary on-base ZIP code to define the perimeter of what we consider the base,
even though including off-base housing annexes and facilities would have
included many more offending ZIP codes.
In several states, including Virginia, Washington, Colorado, and Texas,
where multiple bases were found, more than half of the worst ZIP codes were
within a few miles of a base. Only Ohio, Tennessee, and Florida were without a
military-adjacent ZIP code among the ten worst in their respective states, and
2005]
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these anomalies are easily explained. Ohio, for example, has only one base and
the payday lenders and service families surrounding Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base are divided among a dozen different nearby ZIP codes, of which three
manage to rank among the worst 30 in the state. Tennessee only has the small
Navy Support Facility and part of Fort Campbell, so there are few military targets
for payday lenders in the Volunteer State. Still, the second worst ZIP code in
Tennessee is just over five miles from Millington, where the Navy Support
Facility is located and the second worst ZIP code in Kentucky serves Fort
Campbell just over the Tennessee border. In Florida, the caveat we offer is that
the second, third, and fourth worst ZIP codes in the state lie just outside our
three-mile buffer but still within very easy commuting distances from the bases
they serve.
The pattern of payday lender targeting becomes even more troubling when
compared to bank location strategies. Banks did not follow the same location
patterns as payday lenders, suggesting that neither local zoning ordinances nor
ordinary business development patterns forced payday lenders into military
counties, ZIP codes, and neighborhoods. Our study found that the ratio of payday
lenders to banks was most lopsided in counties and ZIP codes with a military
base. Twenty-seven of the worst 100 counties in our survey on our Location
Quotient score were military counties, almost three times the number we
expected to see.
Concentrations of competitive businesses are common in certain industries,
and there are a variety of good reasons why such clustering happens. For
example, some businesses benefit from cooperative agglomeration, as is the case
with car dealerships, appliance stores, furniture stores and other retailers of
expensive durable goods which find clustering together helps consumers
comparison shop. Fast food franchises also agglomerate along certain high traffic
corridors, but generally these are carefully calculated site location decisions that
keep them, as a group, from exceeding the population threshold necessary for
survival. In the case of payday lenders, we find the agglomeration pattern
difficult to explain utilizing any of the standard rationales for such patterns.
There are businesses that agglomerate in certain spaces of a city because they
are making a conscious effort to be close to their target demographic. We have no
doubt that the military is a target demographic for the payday lending industry.
Around each of the bases we analyzed, the greatest concentration of payday
lenders anywhere in the county was within a few miles of the military base.
Payday lenders crowd around the gates of military bases like bears on a trout
stream. Around most of the major military installations we have mapped, we
have found at least 20 and sometimes as many as 40 payday lenders within just a
few miles of the base gates. The only logical reason that we can fathom as to why
ten to 20 businesses competing against one another for customers would locate
within a few miles of each other, while simultaneously forsaking less crowded
locations elsewhere in the community, is that there is something peculiarly
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profitable about the site of agglomeration.
Some would argue that the neighborhoods we have examined near bases
suffer from poverty, have large minority populations, or high population
densities, but this is not the case. We have found most military neighborhoods to
be relatively prosperous, not particularly crowded, and generally unremarkable
from a demographic standpoint. Indeed, in several instances, such as Oceanside,
California, the neighborhood adjacent to the military base is affluent and without
a large minority population. We have little doubt that the payday lending industry
targets poor, minority, and crowded areas, but we can confidently assert that
distance to military bases is the variable that best predicts a large number of
payday lenders. When considered in light of the ancient history of predatory
lenders targeting military personnel and the compelling body of social scientific
literature suggesting financial vulnerability of service members, our findings
should stand as conclusive proof that the payday lending industry targets
members of the armed forces and their families.
B. Legal and Public Policy Considerations
1. Voluntary Compliance and Industry Best Practices
The public policy response of choice for the payday lending industry has
been voluntary "best practices" lists written and sponsored by industry trade
associations. Currently, two trade associations represent the interests of the
payday lending industry: the Financial Services Center of the America (FiSCA)
and the Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA). FiSCA
has a voluntary "code of conduct" which trade association members aspire to
comply with.537 FiSCA's code calls on trade association members to maintain
"integrity" in eleven different business activities such as collection practices,
invoking criminal process, consumer education, pricing and consumer charges,
and extensions. 538 For example, the code states:
Integrity in Invoking the Criminal Process. FiSca members will never
threaten to file criminal charges against a customer merely for defaulting on a
debt. Criminal charges can be appropriate where a customer seeks to defraud a
FiSCA Member, such as by closing their checking account or passing a false
537 Financial Services Center of America, Code of Conduct (Feb. 7, 2001),
www.fisca.org/FiSCACodeCcc.pdf [hereinafter FiSCA Code of Conduct].
538 Id. Other activities for which the code suggests acting with integrity include:
marketing and advertising, operations, documentation, consumer's right to rescind, in the
industry, and as a money service business. Id.
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instrument.539
Similarly, the CFSA best practices list encourages members of that
organization to give full disclosure, truthfully advertise, encourage consumer
responsibility, limit rollovers'to four or the state limit, whichever is less, and
comply with "applicable" laws. 540 Recently, CFSA has also adopted a separate
"military best practices" list. This list requires members not to garnish military
wages, temporarily defer collection activity against a military customer deployed
in combat, refrain from contacting commanding officers in an effort to collect a
loan, honor the terms of any agreement, educate military customers, develop a
brochure and a hotline, and develop and maintain a military best practices web
site.541
Neither trade association's voluntary guidelines includes any form of price
limitation, leaving members free to charge unlimited interest rates. Neither trade
association has committed to refrain from refinancing one payday loan with
another payday loan. With carefully qualified language, both policies appear to
leave open the possibility of threatening borrowers with criminal prosecution.
542
Neither policy commits to comply with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
543
Neither trade association imposes any penalty or sanction on members who do
not comply with their best practices. Also, payday lenders who do not pay dues to
join either trade association do not make even a nominal commitment to comply
with the policies. CFSA's military best practices say nothing about obtaining
judgments and then seizing automobiles or other property of service members,
garnishing from bank accounts where wages are deposited, or garnishing the
wages of service members' spouses.
But perhaps more fundamentally, our empirical findings raise significant red
flags about whether the payday lending industry will comply with voluntary
standards. While collecting our data, in state after state we found significant
numbers of payday lenders openly doing business who are not registered to make
539 Id.
54 0 Community Financial Services Association of America, Best Practices for Industry
(Feb. 15, 2005), www.cfsa.net/genfo/egeninf.html [hereinafter CFSA Best Practices].
541 Community Financial Services Association of America, Military Best Practices
(2004), http://www.cfsa.net/genfo/MilBestPractie.html [sic].
542 For example, FiSCA's Code somewhat ambiguously authorizes members to threaten
borrowers with criminal prosecution for "passing a false instrument." FiSCA Code of
Conduct, supra note 537. CFSA's prohibition of criminal threats is similarly ambiguous.
CFSA Best Practices, supra note 540.
543 By its own terms, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is not applicable to at least
some payday lenders because it governs only professional third-party debt collection
agencies, rather than originating lenders. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(4), (6); 1692d (2004) (unlike
"debt collectors," "creditors" are not barred from harassment or abuse under the federal
statute).
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payday loans as required by state law. 544 Moreover, dozens of lawsuits and
enforcement proceedings are regularly brought by state attorneys general,
financial institution regulators, and private consumer attorneys. 545 Literally
thousands of payday lenders around the country openly and systematically ignore
state consumer protection laws. 546 Despite trade association aspirational goals, no
industry with which we are familiar, with the possible exception of the illegal
narcotics business, so openly ignores the law. We do not see how reasonable
observers of the payday lending industry can have faith in voluntary compliance
standards. Either industry best practices will remain so substantively weak as to
be irrelevant, or a large portion of lenders will not voluntarily comply. The
financial incentives in lending at high rates to distressed and often uneducated
borrowers appear to be too great to facilitate responsible lending in the absence
of strict oversight. Finally, trade association voluntary guidelines will never
recognize the possibility that communities in general, and military communities
in particular, may simply be better off without easy access to triple-digit interest
rate loans.
2. State Law
Payday lending law in the 20 states we studied can be divided into roughly
six categories. The first and largest group includes thirteen states: Alabama,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. These states have all
clung to only a pretense of price control by adopting fee limitations equivalent to
between 390% and 1950% per annum. Many of these states have ancillary rules,
such as dollar amount limitations, roll-over limitations, and disclosure rules.
Most of these provisions are either redundant with federal law, meaningless, or
largely unenforceable. More likely than not, these ancillary provisions were mere
bargaining chips used by payday lending industry lobbyists to create an illusion
of consumer protection where there is little or none. Certainly there are laws
among these states, Missouri's legislation for example, which stand out as less
consumer-and service member-friendly than others. And, there are some
states, such as Colorado, that have put more administrative backbone into
enforcing their laws. Yet, none of the consumer protection statutes in these states
have led to any identifiable reduction in the numbers of lenders clamoring to
leech the income of military personnel.
Second, Florida and Oklahoma probably deserve separate mention from the
first group of states if only because they have adopted laws requiring lenders to
544 See infra notes 360, 406, and 453 and accompanying text.
545 See infra notes 369, 443, and 534 and accompanying text.
546 See infra notes 50, 59, and 516 and accompanying text.
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use statewide internet-based databases to verify that borrowers do not have
outstanding payday loans to other companies. Still, it is far from clear whether
payday lenders will actually comply with the database requirements. For
example, our data collection efforts suggest that many payday lenders in both
states have not bothered to obtain state payday lending licenses.547 Certainly
these lenders cannot be trusted to list each individual loan on the state's database
system. Accordingly, the effectiveness of these database systems remains, at least
to some degree, an open question.
The third group of states includes Delaware and South Dakota, which have
abandoned consumer protections in order to attract financial service industry jobs
to their small, primarily rural states. Similar to the first and second group of
states, Delaware and South Dakota have no laws which might exert a restraining
force on payday lenders seeking to target military personnel. And what may be
more significant, with no price controls whatsoever, these two states have
become the home of choice for banks that assist payday loan companies in
circumventing consumer protection laws in other states. Delaware and South
Dakota have legally specialized in undermining the consumer and service
member protection efforts of their neighbors.
Texas, North Carolina, and New York all have unique regulatory
environments which are materially different from every other state we studied.
While Texas has not adopted legislation specifically addressing payday lending,
its price controls are loose enough that payday lenders can still do business
within the bounds of Texas law by lending at rates in the neighborhood of 309%
per annum. Instead, soldiers in Texas, perhaps more than any other state, have
suffered at the hands of the "charter-renting" legal strategy. With the cooperation
of banks in Delaware, South Dakota, and other more loosely regulated states,
thousands of payday lenders in Texas simply ignore the will and commands of
the Texas legislature.
From 1997 to 2001, North Carolina was firmly within our first classification
of states. But when the legislature allowed its payday loan licensing law to
expire, the state became one of only two states we studied which retained the
traditional small loan laws prevalent in the United States for most of the
twentieth century. Our empirical results in North Carolina show how difficult it
can be for legislatures and regulators who wish to turn back the clock. Once a
payday lending industry is established, it is difficult to control. Payday lending in
North Carolina continues today under a variety of questionable guises. There, the
legislature made a deliberate choice to protect soldiers at Fort Brag, Marines at
Camp LeJeune, and others. It remains to be seen if the courts, regulators, and
future legislators will have the will power to stand by their decision.
In the empirical analysis, the State of New York stands alone. Of every major
54 7 See infra notes 289, 406, and 484 and accompanying text.
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military base we studied, Fort Drum in upstate New York is the one location
where service members and their families are not targeted for triple-digit interest
rate loans. Ironically, the law in New York is not materially different from the
law in North Carolina. Herein lies the most important legal insight of our study:
state governments retain the power to prevent payday lending within their
borders, both to military service members and to all consumers. In state after
state, legislators have been sold on the notion that regulating payday lenders with
a licensing statute is better than traditional interest rate caps since federal banking
regulation makes payday lending inevitable anyway. 548 When out-of-state banks
have rented their charters to payday loan companies hoping to cash in on the
large and potentially lucrative New York market, the state has successfully sued
the banks accusing them of criminally facilitating violation of the state criminal
usury law. 549 Similarly, when payday lenders have tried to disguise their loans in
thin veneers such as "catalog sales," the state has aggressively pursued
management of these companies obtaining judgments that hold owners
personally liable. 550 New York's stubborn enforcement of its 25% criminal usury
cap has acted as a serious deterrent to banks and payday loan companies who
consider flouting the will of the New York legislature. This is not to say the Ft.
Drum area is free from other potential financial hazards. Credit card lenders,
finance companies, car dealerships, rent-to-own furnishers, and pawnshops-as
well as banks, thrifts, credit unions-all profitably provide copious amounts of
credit to soldiers near Ft. Drum. Yet all of these businesses profit with less
brazen rates and collection practices than payday lenders. Accordingly, the New
York approach should serve as a model for North Carolina, Texas, and any other
state wishing to more carefully protect the welfare of its soldiers and citizens than
does Delaware or South Dakota.
3. Federal Law
It is a bizarre twist of fate that gave an agency with the primary mission of
protecting banks the primary responsibility for protecting consumers from over-
reaching banks. Payday loans are a highly controversial financial product with
terms nearly indistinguishable from those offered by our nation's first loan
sharks, the nineteenth century salary lenders. Average payday loans carry interest
548 See, e.g., Shean, supra note 14 ("Del. Harvey B. Morgan, patron of the bill said he
and several other House members were uncomfortable with payday-loan practices. However,
they decided that 'payday lending is here' and that some form of state regulation was
needed .... ).
549 People v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 1:03-CV-1320 (N.D.N.Y. May 25,
2004), www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL230044pub/links.shtml (subscription
required).
550 People v. JAG NY, 794 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 5, 2005).
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rates nearly twice as high as average rates of extortionate New York mafia
syndicates. 551 Appreciating the profound reputational risk associated with this
type of loan, the OCC has concluded that payday lending partnerships
unacceptably endanger the safety and soundness of national banks. Unlike the
OCC, the FDIC has taken a narrow view of safety and soundness. Our empirical
results should serve as a wake-up call to the FDIC as to how serious a
reputational threat payday loans are for state banks. For over a thousand years,
citizens have surprised lenders and governments with fury over loans to soldiers
at loan shark prices. Not only the FDIC, but the vast majority of more responsible
banks who eschew payday lending should carefully consider whether the public
will find an abuse of trust in triple-digit interest rate loans to eighteen-year-old
soldiers and their families.
Independent of safety and soundness concerns, the FDIC's actions have also
hobbled state consumer and service member protection law across the country-
all for the benefit of twelve small banks. By creating a plausible veneer of
legality on bank-payday company relationships, the FDIC has confused and
frustrated enforcement of state regulations. But perhaps even more importantly,
the FDIC's indifferent response to charter-renting places state legislators who
wish to protect soldiers from predatory payday lenders in an untenable position.
State legislators have been led to believe that payday lending is inevitable
because the FDIC tolerates charter-renting by out of state banks. Many state
legislators believe they can only protect consumers from in-state lenders because
out-of-state lenders are beyond their reach. While New York's experience shows
that this is not necessarily true, there should be no doubt that many state
legislators around the country would prefer double-digit interest rate caps if they
applied to all businesses equally. However, these state legislators cannot risk
being accused of "discriminating" against local businesses in favor of large out-
of-state interests. It is one thing for the FDIC to be ambivalent about protecting
consumers, but it is something entirely different for the FDIC to force that
ambivalence on other institutions whose mission is protecting their local
constituents' well-being. Indeed, a significant amount of the impoverishment
suffered by our nation's soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen at the hands of
payday lenders is rightfully laid on the doorstep of the FDIC.
4. Military Leadership on Payday Lending
Just as military leaders must care for the physical and mental health of their
people, so too must they take responsibility for service members' financial
551 Compare Fox AND MIERZWINSKI, supra note 29 (national study showing average
payday lender interest rates of 474% per annum) with Comment, Syndicate Loan-Shark
Activities and New York's Usury Statute, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 167, 167 (1966) (reporting
extortionate mafia loanshark interest rates averaging 250% per annum).
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health. For too long, civilian government has stood by while a parade of cheats
and charlatans have preyed on young service members and their families. With
the increasing strain on military resources due to overseas engagements, the
military should not expect to use its own funds to bail out enlisted personnel
from financial traps, nor can the military expect that financial education and
counseling will solve their problems. The expense of designing programs that
will make a significant dent in current payday lending trends will be far beyond
military capabilities. The Armed Forces cannot take the place of the nation's
public school system. Commanding officer "off limits" orders are also unlikely to
be a viable long term solution. These orders are difficult to enforce and monitor:
payday lenders will in most cases be free to ignore them, and the orders only last
as long as a given commanding officer remains stationed at any one location.
Moreover, these orders have a side effect of increasing blame and pressure on
those service members who disobey them when seeking quick solutions to their
financial problems. These orders also do not bind military spouses, making them
a partial solution at best.
Instead, military leaders should actively engage state and federal regulators,
state legislatures, and Congress to lobby for better consumer protection laws. In
particular, our data suggest that the Pentagon should advocate for a no-exception,
criminal usury law with robust government enforcement and private litigation
rights at both the federal and state level. The United States rose to power during
the twentieth century with criminal usury laws limiting interest rates to a
moderate range of around 18 to 42%. It was not until we abandoned these laws
that payday lenders came to cluster around military bases in the current numbers
and with such onerous contractual terms. Moreover, just such a law, as currently
found in New York, has been the only legal strategy in the 20 states we surveyed
which successfully protected service members from triple-digit interest rate
loans. In furthering this goal, the Pentagon should designate an office with
responsibility for tracking state and federal predatory lending legislation,
assisting consumer advocacy organizations, and coordinating with state and
federal consumer protection agencies. Above all, individual military leaders
should not underestimate their influence and political capabilities. Military
leaders possess a unique and persuasive voice in advocating for consumer
protection of their enlisted personnel. Indeed, the military may be the one
institution with the esteem and independence capable of trumping the millions of
dollars predatory lenders will readily spend influencing legislative and public
opinion with respect to their products. 552
552 It is worth noting that current U.S. House of Representatives Majority Leader Tom
DeLay gave a keynote address and attended a closed-door fundraiser at this year's annual
payday lender trade association convention in Hollywood, Florida. CFSA Convention
Schedule, CHEKLIST, Program Guide to the 2005 CFSA Annual Meeting in Hollywood, FL
(Mar. 2005).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has conclusively demonstrated that payday lenders target
military personnel. By surveying 20 states, 1516 counties, 13,253 ZIP codes,
nearly 15,000 payday lenders, and 109 military bases, this research systematically
tracked the location patterns of payday lenders in a preponderance of the military
communities in the United States. Even when accounting for commercial
development patterns and zoning ordinances with bank locations, payday lender
location patterns unambiguously show greater concentrations per capita near
military populations. Moreover, of the 20 state legal environments studied, only
one was home to a prominent military base where troops were not targeted for
payday loans: Fort Drum in upstate New York.
For all those who genuinely care for the welfare of American soldiers,
sailors, Marines, and airmen, these empirical results should be profoundly
troubling. Supporting the troops should not be merely an empty slogan.
Ironically, many of those who claim most vocally to support the troops are the
same individuals who adopt laws allowing predatory lenders to target those
troops. What use is a Congress that eats "freedom fries" in the Capitol cafeterias
but ties the hands of state regulators who hope to protect soldiers from predatory
lending? 553 For the great majority of the past century, the American government
protected service members from high-cost predatory loans with usury laws
limiting interest rates to between 18% and 42% per annum. Through federal
preemption and state legislative change, these laws have given way to an
environment in which service members are literally surrounded by lenders
clamoring to charge annual rates averaging around 450%. Military personnel
both in ancient history and contemporary America have chronic financial
vulnerabilities owing to their demanding and semi-nomadic lifestyles. Inevitably,
many struggling military personnel and their families find the temptation of short
term financial quick fixes advertised as "easy, .... no hassles," "no credit check,"
or "quick cash" too difficult to pass up. For the reasonable and caring, supporting
the troops should include an emphatic return to the traditional usury laws insisted
upon by previous American generations.
553 In March of 2003, with tensions rising over French opposition to American foreign
policy, the U.S. House of Representatives changed menus in the House cafeteria to serve
"freedom fries" instead of french fries. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, An Order of Fries, Please, But
Do Hold the French, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2003, at A5.
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